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gix traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

CVSS 3.1 8.8 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 8.8 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.8 HIGHCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by gix-worktree-state 0.11.0Fixed by gitoxide 0.36.0Fixed by gix-fs 0.11.0Fixed by gix-worktree 0.34.0CVSS_V3 Fixed by gix-index 0.33.0CVSS_V3 Fixed by gix-worktree 0.34.0CVSS_V3 Fixed by gix-fs 0.11.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-35186

Published

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. This vulnerability leads to a major loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. This vulnerability has been patched in version(s) 0.36.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506

Published

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. This vulnerability leads to a major loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. This vulnerability has been patched in version(s) 0.36.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-35186

Published

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. This vulnerability leads to a major loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. This vulnerability has been patched in version(s) 0.36.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c

Published

### Summary During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. ### Details Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's `.git` directory. The simplest cases are: - A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed. A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past: - A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or blob whose name contains one or more `\`, to traverse upward or downward. (Unlike `/`, these are valid on other systems.) See [GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq). - On a case-insensitive filesystem (such as NTFS, APFS, or HFS+), a tree named as a case variant of `.git`. - On HFS+, a tree named like `.git` or a case variant, with characters added that HFS+ ignores [in collation](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn/tn1150.html#StringComparisonAlgorithm). See https://github.com/git/git/commit/6162a1d323d24fd8cbbb1a6145a91fb849b2568f. - On NTFS, a tree equivalent to `.git` (or a case variant) by the use of [NTFS stream](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3) notation, such as `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. See [GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj). - On an NTFS volume with [8.3 aliasing](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#short-vs-long-names) enabled, a tree named as `git~1` (or a case variant). See [GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v). When a checkout creates some files outside the repository directory but fails to complete, the repository directory is usually removed, but the outside files remain. ### PoC For simplicity, these examples stage a stand-in file with a valid name, modify the index, and commit. The instructions assume `sed` supports `-i`, which is the case on most systems. If using Windows, a Git Bash shell should be used. #### Example: Downward traversal to install hooks 1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-installs-hook` and `cd` into the directory. 2. Create the stand-in called `.git@hooks@pre-commit`, with the *contents*: ```sh #!/bin/sh printf 'Vulnerable!\n' date >vulnerable ``` 3. Stage the stand-in: `git add --chmod=+x .git@hooks@pre-commit` 4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.git@hooks@pre-commit|.git/hooks/pre-commit|' .git/index` 5. Commit: `git commit -m 'Initial commit'` 6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote. Then, on another or the same machine: 1. Clone the repository with a `gix clone …` command. 2. Enter the newly created directory. 3. *Optionally* run `ls -l .git/hooks` to observe that the `pre-commit` hook is already present. 4. Make a new file and commit it with `git`. This causes the payload surreptitiously installed as a `pre-commit` hook to run, printing the message `Vulnerable!` and creating a file in the current directory containing the current date and time. Note that the effect is not limited to modifying the current directory. The payload could be written to perform any action that the user who runs `git commit` is capable of. #### Example: Upward traversal to create a file above the working tree 1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-reaches-up`, and `cd` into the directory. 2. Create the stand-in: `echo 'A file outside the working tree, somehow.' >..@outside` 3. Stage the stand-in: `git add ..@outside` 4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.\.@outside|../outside|' .git/index` 5. Commit: `git commit -m 'Initial commit'` 6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote. Then, as above, on the same or another machine, clone the repository with a `gix clone …` command. Observe that a file named `outside` is present alongside (not inside) the cloned directory. ### Impact Any use of `gix` or another application that makes use of `gix-worktree-state`, or otherwise relies on `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` for validation, is affected, if used to clone untrusted repositories. The above description focuses on code execution, as that leads to a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. In use cases where no untrusted repository is ever cloned, this vulnerability has no impact. Furthermore, the impact of this vulnerability *may* be lower when `gix` is used to clone a repository for CI/CD purposes, even if untrusted, since in such uses the environment is usually isolated and arbitrary code is usually run deliberately from the repository with necessary safeguards in place.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0348

Published

### Summary During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. ### Details Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's `.git` directory. The simplest cases are: - A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed. A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past: - A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or blob whose name contains one or more `\`, to traverse upward or downward. (Unlike `/`, these are valid on other systems.) See [GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq). - On a case-insensitive filesystem (such as NTFS, APFS, or HFS+), a tree named as a case variant of `.git`. - On HFS+, a tree named like `.git` or a case variant, with characters added that HFS+ ignores [in collation](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn/tn1150.html#StringComparisonAlgorithm). See https://github.com/git/git/commit/6162a1d323d24fd8cbbb1a6145a91fb849b2568f. - On NTFS, a tree equivalent to `.git` (or a case variant) by the use of [NTFS stream](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3) notation, such as `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. See [GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj). - On an NTFS volume with [8.3 aliasing](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#short-vs-long-names) enabled, a tree named as `git~1` (or a case variant). See [GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v). When a checkout creates some files outside the repository directory but fails to complete, the repository directory is usually removed, but the outside files remain. ### PoC For simplicity, these examples stage a stand-in file with a valid name, modify the index, and commit. The instructions assume `sed` supports `-i`, which is the case on most systems. If using Windows, a Git Bash shell should be used. #### Example: Downward traversal to install hooks 1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-installs-hook` and `cd` into the directory. 2. Create the stand-in called `.git@hooks@pre-commit`, with the *contents*: ```sh #!/bin/sh printf 'Vulnerable!\n' date >vulnerable ``` 3. Stage the stand-in: `git add --chmod=+x .git@hooks@pre-commit` 4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.git@hooks@pre-commit|.git/hooks/pre-commit|' .git/index` 5. Commit: `git commit -m 'Initial commit'` 6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote. Then, on another or the same machine: 1. Clone the repository with a `gix clone …` command. 2. Enter the newly created directory. 3. *Optionally* run `ls -l .git/hooks` to observe that the `pre-commit` hook is already present. 4. Make a new file and commit it with `git`. This causes the payload surreptitiously installed as a `pre-commit` hook to run, printing the message `Vulnerable!` and creating a file in the current directory containing the current date and time. Note that the effect is not limited to modifying the current directory. The payload could be written to perform any action that the user who runs `git commit` is capable of. #### Example: Upward traversal to create a file above the working tree 1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-reaches-up`, and `cd` into the directory. 2. Create the stand-in: `echo 'A file outside the working tree, somehow.' >..@outside` 3. Stage the stand-in: `git add ..@outside` 4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.\.@outside|../outside|' .git/index` 5. Commit: `git commit -m 'Initial commit'` 6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote. Then, as above, on the same or another machine, clone the repository with a `gix clone …` command. Observe that a file named `outside` is present alongside (not inside) the cloned directory. ### Impact Any use of `gix` or another application that makes use of `gix-worktree-state`, or otherwise relies on `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` for validation, is affected, if used to clone untrusted repositories. The above description focuses on code execution, as that leads to a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. In use cases where no untrusted repository is ever cloned, this vulnerability has no impact. Furthermore, the impact of this vulnerability *may* be lower when `gix` is used to clone a repository for CI/CD purposes, even if untrusted, since in such uses the environment is usually isolated and arbitrary code is usually run deliberately from the repository with necessary safeguards in place.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0349

Published

### Summary During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. ### Details Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's `.git` directory. The simplest cases are: - A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed. A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past: - A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or blob whose name contains one or more `\`, to traverse upward or downward. (Unlike `/`, these are valid on other systems.) See [GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq). - On a case-insensitive filesystem (such as NTFS, APFS, or HFS+), a tree named as a case variant of `.git`. - On HFS+, a tree named like `.git` or a case variant, with characters added that HFS+ ignores [in collation](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn/tn1150.html#StringComparisonAlgorithm). See https://github.com/git/git/commit/6162a1d323d24fd8cbbb1a6145a91fb849b2568f. - On NTFS, a tree equivalent to `.git` (or a case variant) by the use of [NTFS stream](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3) notation, such as `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. See [GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj). - On an NTFS volume with [8.3 aliasing](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#short-vs-long-names) enabled, a tree named as `git~1` (or a case variant). See [GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v). When a checkout creates some files outside the repository directory but fails to complete, the repository directory is usually removed, but the outside files remain. ### PoC For simplicity, these examples stage a stand-in file with a valid name, modify the index, and commit. The instructions assume `sed` supports `-i`, which is the case on most systems. If using Windows, a Git Bash shell should be used. #### Example: Downward traversal to install hooks 1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-installs-hook` and `cd` into the directory. 2. Create the stand-in called `.git@hooks@pre-commit`, with the *contents*: ```sh #!/bin/sh printf 'Vulnerable!\n' date >vulnerable ``` 3. Stage the stand-in: `git add --chmod=+x .git@hooks@pre-commit` 4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.git@hooks@pre-commit|.git/hooks/pre-commit|' .git/index` 5. Commit: `git commit -m 'Initial commit'` 6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote. Then, on another or the same machine: 1. Clone the repository with a `gix clone …` command. 2. Enter the newly created directory. 3. *Optionally* run `ls -l .git/hooks` to observe that the `pre-commit` hook is already present. 4. Make a new file and commit it with `git`. This causes the payload surreptitiously installed as a `pre-commit` hook to run, printing the message `Vulnerable!` and creating a file in the current directory containing the current date and time. Note that the effect is not limited to modifying the current directory. The payload could be written to perform any action that the user who runs `git commit` is capable of. #### Example: Upward traversal to create a file above the working tree 1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-reaches-up`, and `cd` into the directory. 2. Create the stand-in: `echo 'A file outside the working tree, somehow.' >..@outside` 3. Stage the stand-in: `git add ..@outside` 4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.\.@outside|../outside|' .git/index` 5. Commit: `git commit -m 'Initial commit'` 6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote. Then, as above, on the same or another machine, clone the repository with a `gix clone …` command. Observe that a file named `outside` is present alongside (not inside) the cloned directory. ### Impact Any use of `gix` or another application that makes use of `gix-worktree-state`, or otherwise relies on `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` for validation, is affected, if used to clone untrusted repositories. The above description focuses on code execution, as that leads to a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. In use cases where no untrusted repository is ever cloned, this vulnerability has no impact. Furthermore, the impact of this vulnerability *may* be lower when `gix` is used to clone a repository for CI/CD purposes, even if untrusted, since in such uses the environment is usually isolated and arbitrary code is usually run deliberately from the repository with necessary safeguards in place.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0350

Published

### Summary During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application. ### Details Although `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's `.git` directory. The simplest cases are: - A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed. A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past: - A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or blob whose name contains one or more `\`, to traverse upward or downward. (Unlike `/`, these are valid on other systems.) See [GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq). - On a case-insensitive filesystem (such as NTFS, APFS, or HFS+), a tree named as a case variant of `.git`. - On HFS+, a tree named like `.git` or a case variant, with characters added that HFS+ ignores [in collation](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn/tn1150.html#StringComparisonAlgorithm). See https://github.com/git/git/commit/6162a1d323d24fd8cbbb1a6145a91fb849b2568f. - On NTFS, a tree equivalent to `.git` (or a case variant) by the use of [NTFS stream](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3) notation, such as `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. See [GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj). - On an NTFS volume with [8.3 aliasing](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#short-vs-long-names) enabled, a tree named as `git~1` (or a case variant). See [GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v). When a checkout creates some files outside the repository directory but fails to complete, the repository directory is usually removed, but the outside files remain. ### PoC For simplicity, these examples stage a stand-in file with a valid name, modify the index, and commit. The instructions assume `sed` supports `-i`, which is the case on most systems. If using Windows, a Git Bash shell should be used. #### Example: Downward traversal to install hooks 1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-installs-hook` and `cd` into the directory. 2. Create the stand-in called `.git@hooks@pre-commit`, with the *contents*: ```sh #!/bin/sh printf 'Vulnerable!\n' date >vulnerable ``` 3. Stage the stand-in: `git add --chmod=+x .git@hooks@pre-commit` 4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.git@hooks@pre-commit|.git/hooks/pre-commit|' .git/index` 5. Commit: `git commit -m 'Initial commit'` 6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote. Then, on another or the same machine: 1. Clone the repository with a `gix clone …` command. 2. Enter the newly created directory. 3. *Optionally* run `ls -l .git/hooks` to observe that the `pre-commit` hook is already present. 4. Make a new file and commit it with `git`. This causes the payload surreptitiously installed as a `pre-commit` hook to run, printing the message `Vulnerable!` and creating a file in the current directory containing the current date and time. Note that the effect is not limited to modifying the current directory. The payload could be written to perform any action that the user who runs `git commit` is capable of. #### Example: Upward traversal to create a file above the working tree 1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-reaches-up`, and `cd` into the directory. 2. Create the stand-in: `echo 'A file outside the working tree, somehow.' >..@outside` 3. Stage the stand-in: `git add ..@outside` 4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.\.@outside|../outside|' .git/index` 5. Commit: `git commit -m 'Initial commit'` 6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote. Then, as above, on the same or another machine, clone the repository with a `gix clone …` command. Observe that a file named `outside` is present alongside (not inside) the cloned directory. ### Impact Any use of `gix` or another application that makes use of `gix-worktree-state`, or otherwise relies on `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` for validation, is affected, if used to clone untrusted repositories. The above description focuses on code execution, as that leads to a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well. In use cases where no untrusted repository is ever cloned, this vulnerability has no impact. Furthermore, the impact of this vulnerability *may* be lower when `gix` is used to clone a repository for CI/CD purposes, even if untrusted, since in such uses the environment is usually isolated and arbitrary code is usually run deliberately from the repository with necessary safeguards in place.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

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Risk history

Compare earlier KEV listings and EPSS scores. Advisory wording and affected versions have a separate history.

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Advisory history

19 saved versions

See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.

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15 Nov 2026 08:27:30 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

13 Nov 2026 07:12:23 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

11 Nov 2026 00:40:57 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

9 Nov 2026 12:02:17 UTC

Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0348 · Published

9 Nov 2026 12:02:17 UTC

Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0349 · Published

9 Nov 2026 12:02:17 UTC

Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0350 · Published

9 Nov 2026 00:11:11 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

6 Nov 2026 23:14:19 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

4 Nov 2026 23:01:27 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

2 Nov 2026 22:06:16 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

31 Oct 2026 21:12:41 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

29 Oct 2026 20:23:47 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

27 Oct 2026 19:56:03 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

euvd · EUVD-2024-1506 · Published

25 Oct 2026 00:17:10 UTC

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. During checkout, `gix-worktree-state` does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by th…

nvd · CVE-2024-35186 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

gix traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

osv · GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0348 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0349 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0350 · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

gix traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution

cve-program · CVE-2024-35186 · Published

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 00:16 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 251 fully read · 18 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current