Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. There is an issue with how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile. This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.
Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. There is an issue with how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile. This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.
Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. There is an issue with how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile. This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.
### Summary
_Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._
### Details
We discovered a bug walking through how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the `sender` parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile
### Proof of Concept
```solidity
// This function does not reduce the contract balance correctly but liquid stakes correctly
function transfer(
string memory sourcePort,
string memory sourceChannel,
string memory denom,
uint256 amount,
string memory receiver,
string memory evmosReceiver
) external returns (uint64 nextSequence) {
counter += 1; # Only happens when there is a local state update together with an ICS20 Transfer
Height memory timeoutHeight = Height(100, 100);
string memory memo = buildLiquidStakeMemo(receiver, evmosReceiver);
return ICS20_CONTRACT.transfer(
sourcePort,
sourceChannel,
denom,
amount,
address(this), # this is the sender address which is the contract
receiver,
timeoutHeight,
0,
memo
);
}
```
### Impact
This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.
### Severity
Based on [ImmuneFi Severity Classification System](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/13332717597585-Severity-Classification-System) the severity was evaluated to `Critical` since the attack could have lead to create new supply of EVMOS and therefore lead to Direct loss of funds's value.
### Patches
The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.
## For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Reach out to the Core Team in [Discord](https://discord.gg/evmos)
Open a discussion in [evmos/evmos](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/discussions)
Email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) for security questions
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 6, 2024, 6:51:30 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 3:50:54 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Modified
Weakness classifications: CWE-670
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-06-06T19:15:58.403
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:37:51.240
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:evmos:evmos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.