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Evmos's contract balance not updating correctly after interchain transaction

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 18.1.0Fixed by github.com/evmos/evmos/v17 18.1.0Fixed by github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 18.1.0Fixed by github.com/evmos/evmos/v15 18.1.0osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 18.1.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-37153

Published

Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. There is an issue with how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile. This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-2214

Published

Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. There is an issue with how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile. This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-37153

Published

Evmos is the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) Hub on the Cosmos Network. There is an issue with how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the sender parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile. This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction.The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc

Published

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ ### Details We discovered a bug walking through how to liquid stake using Safe which itself is a contract. The bug only appears when there is a local state change together with an ICS20 transfer in the same function and uses the contract's balance, that is using the contract address as the `sender` parameter in an ICS20 transfer using the ICS20 precompile ### Proof of Concept ```solidity // This function does not reduce the contract balance correctly but liquid stakes correctly function transfer( string memory sourcePort, string memory sourceChannel, string memory denom, uint256 amount, string memory receiver, string memory evmosReceiver ) external returns (uint64 nextSequence) { counter += 1; # Only happens when there is a local state update together with an ICS20 Transfer Height memory timeoutHeight = Height(100, 100); string memory memo = buildLiquidStakeMemo(receiver, evmosReceiver); return ICS20_CONTRACT.transfer( sourcePort, sourceChannel, denom, amount, address(this), # this is the sender address which is the contract receiver, timeoutHeight, 0, memo ); } ``` ### Impact This is in essence the "infinite money glitch" allowing contracts to double the supply of Evmos after each transaction. ### Severity Based on [ImmuneFi Severity Classification System](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/13332717597585-Severity-Classification-System) the severity was evaluated to `Critical` since the attack could have lead to create new supply of EVMOS and therefore lead to Direct loss of funds's value. ### Patches The issue has been patched in versions >=V18.1.0. ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Reach out to the Core Team in [Discord](https://discord.gg/evmos) Open a discussion in [evmos/evmos](https://github.com/evmos/evmos/discussions) Email us at [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) for security questions

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-2903

Published

Contract balance not updating correctly after interchain transaction in github.com/evmos/evmos

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2024-37153

Published

evmos

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "evmos",
                    "product": "evmos",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "<= 18.0.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2024-2214

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jun 6, 2024, 6:51:30 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 3:50:54 AM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2024-37153

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-670

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-06-06T19:15:58.403

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:37:51.240

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:evmos:evmos:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-xgr7-jgq3-mhmc

Published

github.com/evmos/evmos/v18

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v17

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v16

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v15

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v14

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v13

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v12

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v11

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v10

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v9

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v8

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v7

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v6

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2024-2903

Published

github.com/evmos/evmos

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v2

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v3

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v4

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v5

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v6

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v7

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v8

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v9

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v10

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v11

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v12

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v13

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v14

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v15

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v16

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v17

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

github.com/evmos/evmos/v18

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 18.1.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 14:56 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current