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Denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository in Minder

CVSS 3.1 5.7 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.7 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/stacklok/minder 0.0.52osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/stacklok/minder 0.0.52KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-37904

Published

Minder is an open source Software Supply Chain Security Platform. Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on lines `L55-L89`. The Git provider does the following on the lines `L56-L62`. First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc. It then validates the options. It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones and Finally, it clones the repository. The `(g *Git) Clone()` method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions: 1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones, 2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository, 3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory. This issue has been addressed in commit `7979b43` which has been included in release version v0.0.52. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-2072

Published

Minder is an open source Software Supply Chain Security Platform. Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on lines `L55-L89`. The Git provider does the following on the lines `L56-L62`. First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc. It then validates the options. It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones and Finally, it clones the repository. The `(g *Git) Clone()` method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions: 1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones, 2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository, 3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory. This issue has been addressed in commit `7979b43` which has been included in release version v0.0.52. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-37904

Published

Minder is an open source Software Supply Chain Security Platform. Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on lines `L55-L89`. The Git provider does the following on the lines `L56-L62`. First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc. It then validates the options. It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones and Finally, it clones the repository. The `(g *Git) Clone()` method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions: 1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones, 2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository, 3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory. This issue has been addressed in commit `7979b43` which has been included in release version v0.0.52. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-hpcg-xjq5-g666

Published

Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on these lines: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L55-L89 The Git provider does the following on these lines: First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L56-L62 It then validates the options: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L66-L68 It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L70-L71 Finally, it clones the repository: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L77 This `(g *Git) Clone()` method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions: 1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones. 2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository. 3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory. ## PoC Here, we share a PoC of how the logic of `(g *Git) Clone()` behaves isolated from Minder. To get a true assessment of whether this is 100% identical to its behavior in the context of Minder instead of an isolated PoC, this should be tested out by creating a large repository and instructing Minder to clone it. However, even in that case, it might not be possible to deterministically trigger a DoS because of noise from network calls. We believe the below PoC is a correct representation because: 1. We have replicated the important and impactful parts of `(g *Git) Clone()` 2. We run this in multiple goroutines which Minder does here: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/3afa50ef2e06269ed619d390d266cf1988c2068b/internal/engine/executor.go#L128 3. Minders timeout is set to 5 minutes: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/3afa50ef2e06269ed619d390d266cf1988c2068b/internal/engine/executor.go#L114. With a reasonable connection, Minder can download many GBs in that period. In our PoC, we demonstrate that under these two conditions, a large repository can perform a SigKill of the Go process which in Minders case is the Minder server. First, create a local Git repository: ``` cd /tmp mkdir upstream-repo cd upstream-repo git init --bare cd /tmp git clone /tmp/upstream-repo ./upstream-repo-clone cd ./upstream-repo-clone # Add large file: fallocate -l 8G large-file git add . git commit -m "add large file" git push cd /tmp ``` Create and run the following script in `/tmp/dos-poc/main.go`: ```go package main import ( "context" "fmt" "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/memfs" "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5" "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/storage/memory" "runtime" "sync" ) func main() { var ( wg sync.WaitGroup ) for i := 0; i < 2; i++ { fmt.Println("Starting one...") wg.Add(1) go func() { defer wg.Done() opts := &git.CloneOptions{ URL: "/tmp/upstream-repo", SingleBranch: true, Depth: 1, Tags: git.NoTags, } storer := memory.NewStorage() fs := memfs.New() git.CloneContext(context.Background(), storer, fs, opts) }() } fmt.Println("Finished") PrintMemUsage() wg.Wait() } func PrintMemUsage() { var m runtime.MemStats runtime.ReadMemStats(&m) // For info on each, see: https://golang.org/pkg/runtime/#MemStats fmt.Printf("Alloc = %v MiB", bToMb(m.Alloc)) fmt.Printf("\tTotalAlloc = %v MiB", bToMb(m.TotalAlloc)) fmt.Printf("\tSys = %v MiB", bToMb(m.Sys)) fmt.Printf("\tNumGC = %v\n", m.NumGC) } func bToMb(b uint64) uint64 { return b / 1024 / 1024 } ``` On my local machine, this Go program is killed before it prints "Finished" in the terminal. Observing the memory by way of `top`, we can see that the memory climbs steadily until the program crashes around 93% memory consumption.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-2934

Published

Minder affected by denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository in github.com/stacklok/minder

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2024-37904

Published

Denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository in Minder

Minder is an open source Software Supply Chain Security Platform. Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on lines `L55-L89`. The Git provider does the following on the lines `L56-L62`. First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc. It then validates the options. It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones and Finally, it clones the repository. The `(g *Git) Clone()` method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions: 1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones, 2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository, 3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory. This issue has been addressed in commit `7979b43` which has been included in release version v0.0.52. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Source published
18 Jun 2024 17:07:02 UTC
Source modified
2 Aug 2024 04:04:23 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2024-2072

Published

Minder is an open source Software Supply Chain Security Platform. Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/g…

Minder is an open source Software Supply Chain Security Platform. Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on lines `L55-L89`. The Git provider does the following on the lines `L56-L62`. First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc. It then validates the options. It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones and Finally, it clones the repository. The `(g *Git) Clone()` method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions: 1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones, 2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository, 3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory. This issue has been addressed in commit `7979b43` which has been included in release version v0.0.52. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jun 18, 2024, 5:07:02 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 4:04:23 AM

Source published
Jun 18, 2024, 5:07:02 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 2, 2024, 4:04:23 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 01:55:37 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd · CVE-2024-37904

Published

Minder is an open source Software Supply Chain Security Platform. Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/g…

Minder is an open source Software Supply Chain Security Platform. Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on lines `L55-L89`. The Git provider does the following on the lines `L56-L62`. First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc. It then validates the options. It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones and Finally, it clones the repository. The `(g *Git) Clone()` method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions: 1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones, 2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository, 3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory. This issue has been addressed in commit `7979b43` which has been included in release version v0.0.52. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-400

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-06-18T17:15:52.337

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:39:01.357

Source published
18 Jun 2024 17:15:52 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 07:39:01 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 00:17:15 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv · GHSA-hpcg-xjq5-g666

Published

Minder affected by denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository

Minder's Git provider is vulnerable to a denial of service from a maliciously configured GitHub repository. The Git provider clones users repositories using the `github.com/go-git/go-git/v5` library on these lines: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L55-L89 The Git provider does the following on these lines: First, it sets the `CloneOptions`, specifying the url, the depth etc: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L56-L62 It then validates the options: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L66-L68 It then sets up an in-memory filesystem, to which it clones: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L70-L71 Finally, it clones the repository: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/85985445c8ac3e51f03372e99c7b2f08a6d274aa/internal/providers/git/git.go#L77 This `(g *Git) Clone()` method is vulnerable to a DoS attack: A Minder user can instruct Minder to clone a large repository which will exhaust memory and crash the Minder server. The root cause of this vulnerability is a combination of the following conditions: 1. Users can control the Git URL which Minder clones. 2. Minder does not enforce a size limit to the repository. 3. Minder clones the entire repository into memory. ## PoC Here, we share a PoC of how the logic of `(g *Git) Clone()` behaves isolated from Minder. To get a true assessment of whether this is 100% identical to its behavior in the context of Minder instead of an isolated PoC, this should be tested out by creating a large repository and instructing Minder to clone it. However, even in that case, it might not be possible to deterministically trigger a DoS because of noise from network calls. We believe the below PoC is a correct representation because: 1. We have replicated the important and impactful parts of `(g *Git) Clone()` 2. We run this in multiple goroutines which Minder does here: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/3afa50ef2e06269ed619d390d266cf1988c2068b/internal/engine/executor.go#L128 3. Minders timeout is set to 5 minutes: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/3afa50ef2e06269ed619d390d266cf1988c2068b/internal/engine/executor.go#L114. With a reasonable connection, Minder can download many GBs in that period. In our PoC, we demonstrate that under these two conditions, a large repository can perform a SigKill of the Go process which in Minders case is the Minder server. First, create a local Git repository: ``` cd /tmp mkdir upstream-repo cd upstream-repo git init --bare cd /tmp git clone /tmp/upstream-repo ./upstream-repo-clone cd ./upstream-repo-clone # Add large file: fallocate -l 8G large-file git add . git commit -m "add large file" git push cd /tmp ``` Create and run the following script in `/tmp/dos-poc/main.go`: ```go package main import ( "context" "fmt" "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5/memfs" "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5" "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5/storage/memory" "runtime" "sync" ) func main() { var ( wg sync.WaitGroup ) for i := 0; i < 2; i++ { fmt.Println("Starting one...") wg.Add(1) go func() { defer wg.Done() opts := &git.CloneOptions{ URL: "/tmp/upstream-repo", SingleBranch: true, Depth: 1, Tags: git.NoTags, } storer := memory.NewStorage() fs := memfs.New() git.CloneContext(context.Background(), storer, fs, opts) }() } fmt.Println("Finished") PrintMemUsage() wg.Wait() } func PrintMemUsage() { var m runtime.MemStats runtime.ReadMemStats(&m) // For info on each, see: https://golang.org/pkg/runtime/#MemStats fmt.Printf("Alloc = %v MiB", bToMb(m.Alloc)) fmt.Printf("\tTotalAlloc = %v MiB", bToMb(m.TotalAlloc)) fmt.Printf("\tSys = %v MiB", bToMb(m.Sys)) fmt.Printf("\tNumGC = %v\n", m.NumGC) } func bToMb(b uint64) uint64 { return b / 1024 / 1024 } ``` On my local machine, this Go program is killed before it prints "Finished" in the terminal. Observing the memory by way of `top`, we can see that the memory climbs steadily until the program crashes around 93% memory consumption.

Source published
18 Jun 2024 16:34:24 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:15 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2024-2934

Published

Minder affected by denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository in github.com/stacklok/minder

Minder affected by denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository in github.com/stacklok/minder

Source published
28 Jun 2024 15:28:30 UTC
Source modified
3 Mar 2026 04:55:30 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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