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Code Signing Bypass on Windows in electron-updater < 6.3.0-alpha.6

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by electron-updater 6.3.0-alpha.6KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-39698

Published

electron-updater allows for automatic updates for Electron apps. The file `packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts` implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by `cmd.exe` expands any environment variable found in command-line above. This creates a situation where `verifySignature()` can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid. This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.). The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-2310

Published

electron-updater allows for automatic updates for Electron apps. The file `packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts` implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by `cmd.exe` expands any environment variable found in command-line above. This creates a situation where `verifySignature()` can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid. This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.). The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-39698

Published

electron-updater allows for automatic updates for Electron apps. The file `packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts` implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by `cmd.exe` expands any environment variable found in command-line above. This creates a situation where `verifySignature()` can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid. This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.). The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-9jxc-qjr9-vjxq

Published

### Observations The file `packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts` implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. It executes the following command in a new shell (`process.env.ComSpec` on Windows, usually `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe`): https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/140e2f0eb0df79c2a46e35024e96d0563355fc89/packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts#L35-L41 Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by `cmd.exe` expands any environment variable found in command-line above. ### Exploitation This creates a situation where `verifySignature()` can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid. ### Impact This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.). ### Patch This vulnerability was patched in #8295, by comparing the path in the output of `Get-AuthenticodeSignature` with the intended one. The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2024-39698

Published

electron-builder

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "electron-userland",
                    "product": "electron-builder",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 6.3.0-alpha.6",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2024-2310

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 9, 2024, 5:50:28 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 4:26:15 AM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2024-39698

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-154 · CWE-295

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-07-09T18:15:10.863

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:42:29.710

7 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:electron:electron-builder:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:electron:electron-builder:6.3.0:alpha0:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:electron:electron-builder:6.3.0:alpha1:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:electron:electron-builder:6.3.0:alpha2:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:electron:electron-builder:6.3.0:alpha3:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:electron:electron-builder:6.3.0:alpha4:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:electron:electron-builder:6.3.0:alpha5:*:*:*:node.js:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-9jxc-qjr9-vjxq

Published

electron-updater

npm

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 6.3.0-alpha.6

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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