tgstation-server is a production scale tool for BYOND server management. Prior to 6.8.0, low permission users using the "Set .dme Path" privilege could potentially set malicious .dme files existing on the host machine to be compiled and executed. These .dme files could be uploaded via tgstation-server (requiring a separate, isolated privilege) or some other means. A server configured to execute in BYOND's trusted security level (requiring a third separate, isolated privilege OR being set by another user) could lead to this escalating into remote code execution via BYOND's shell() proc. The ability to execute this kind of attack is a known side effect of having privileged TGS users, but normally requires multiple privileges with known weaknesses. This vector is not intentional as it does not require control over the where deployment code is sourced from and _may_ not require remote write access to an instance's `Configuration` directory. This problem is fixed in versions 6.8.0 and above.
tgstation-server is a production scale tool for BYOND server management. Prior to 6.8.0, low permission users using the "Set .dme Path" privilege could potentially set malicious .dme files existing on the host machine to be compiled and executed. These .dme files could be uploaded via tgstation-server (requiring a separate, isolated privilege) or some other means. A server configured to execute in BYOND's trusted security level (requiring a third separate, isolated privilege OR being set by another user) could lead to this escalating into remote code execution via BYOND's shell() proc. The ability to execute this kind of attack is a known side effect of having privileged TGS users, but normally requires multiple privileges with known weaknesses. This vector is not intentional as it does not require control over the where deployment code is sourced from and _may_ not require remote write access to an instance's `Configuration` directory. This problem is fixed in versions 6.8.0 and above.
tgstation-server is a production scale tool for BYOND server management. Prior to 6.8.0, low permission users using the "Set .dme Path" privilege could potentially set malicious .dme files existing on the host machine to be compiled and executed. These .dme files could be uploaded via tgstation-server (requiring a separate, isolated privilege) or some other means. A server configured to execute in BYOND's trusted security level (requiring a third separate, isolated privilege OR being set by another user) could lead to this escalating into remote code execution via BYOND's shell() proc. The ability to execute this kind of attack is a known side effect of having privileged TGS users, but normally requires multiple privileges with known weaknesses. This vector is not intentional as it does not require control over the where deployment code is sourced from and _may_ not require remote write access to an instance's `Configuration` directory. This problem is fixed in versions 6.8.0 and above.
### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
Low permission users using the "Set .dme Path" privilege could potentially set malicious .dme files existing on the host machine to be compiled and executed.
These .dme files could be uploaded via tgstation-server (requiring a separate, isolated privilege) or some other means.
A server configured to execute in BYOND's trusted security level (requiring a third separate, isolated privilege OR being set by another user) could lead to this escalating into remote code execution via BYOND's shell() proc.
The ability to execute this kind of attack is a known side effect of having privileged TGS users, but normally requires multiple privileges with known weaknesses. This vector is not intentional as it does not require control over the where deployment code is sourced from and _may_ not require remote write access to an instance's `Configuration` directory.
### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_
This problem is patched by pull request #1835 and fixed in versions 6.8.0 and above.
### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_
Do not give un-trusted users the Deployment permission to set a .dme path on instances.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 29, 2024, 3:00:23 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 4:46:52 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.