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runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and…

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 3.6 LOWCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 3.6 LOWCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 25 Oct 2026 00:17:28 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

nvd · CVE-2024-45310

Published

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

nvd · CVE-2024-45310

Published

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host…

runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. runc 1.1.13 and earlier, as well as 1.2.0-rc2 and earlier, can be tricked into creating empty files or directories in arbitrary locations in the host filesystem by sharing a volume between two containers and exploiting a race with `os.MkdirAll`. While this could be used to create empty files, existing files would not be truncated. An attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom volume configuration. Containers using user namespaces are still affected, but the scope of places an attacker can create inodes can be significantly reduced. Sufficiently strict LSM policies (SELinux/Apparmor) can also in principle block this attack -- we suspect the industry standard SELinux policy may restrict this attack's scope but the exact scope of protection hasn't been analysed. This is exploitable using runc directly as well as through Docker and Kubernetes. The issue is fixed in runc v1.1.14 and v1.2.0-rc3. Some workarounds are available. Using user namespaces restricts this attack fairly significantly such that the attacker can only create inodes in directories that the remapped root user/group has write access to. Unless the root user is remapped to an actual user on the host (such as with rootless containers that don't use `/etc/sub[ug]id`), this in practice means that an attacker would only be able to create inodes in world-writable directories. A strict enough SELinux or AppArmor policy could in principle also restrict the scope if a specific label is applied to the runc runtime, though neither the extent to which the standard existing policies block this attack nor what exact policies are needed to sufficiently restrict this attack have been thoroughly tested.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-61 · CWE-363

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-09-03T19:15:15.243

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:54:00.017

3 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.2.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.2.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
3 Sep 2024 19:15:15 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 07:54:00 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 00:17:28 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 3.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 3.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

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