Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto…
Historical advisory recorded 25 Oct 2026 00:17:28 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
nvd · CVE-2024-45311
PublishedQuinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
nvd · CVE-2024-45311
PublishedQuinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…
Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-670
Original publisher date fields
published: 2024-09-02T18:15:37.373
lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:54:00.150
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:quinn_project:quinn:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 2 Sep 2024 18:15:37 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 07:54:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 00:17:28 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H