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Unbounded loop over untrusted input can lead to endless data attack

CVSS 3.1 3.1 LOWEUVD CVSS 3.1 3.1 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 3.1 LOWCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating LOWFixed by github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go 0.6.1osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go 0.6.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-45395

Published

sigstore-go, a Go library for Sigstore signing and verification, is susceptible to a denial of service attack in versions prior to 0.6.1 when a verifier is provided a maliciously crafted Sigstore Bundle containing large amounts of verifiable data, in the form of signed transparency log entries, RFC 3161 timestamps, and attestation subjects. The verification of these data structures is computationally expensive. This can be used to consume excessive CPU resources, leading to a denial of service attack. TUF's security model labels this type of vulnerability an "Endless data attack," and can lead to verification failing to complete and disrupting services that rely on sigstore-go for verification. This vulnerability is addressed with sigstore-go 0.6.1, which adds hard limits to the number of verifiable data structures that can be processed in a bundle. Verification will fail if a bundle has data that exceeds these limits. The limits are 32 signed transparency log entries, 32 RFC 3161 timestamps, 1024 attestation subjects, and 32 digests per attestation subject. These limits are intended to be high enough to accommodate the vast majority of use cases, while preventing the verification of maliciously crafted bundles that contain large amounts of verifiable data. Users who are vulnerable but unable to quickly upgrade may consider adding manual bundle validation to enforce limits similar to those in the referenced patch prior to calling sigstore-go's verification functions.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-2773

Published

sigstore-go, a Go library for Sigstore signing and verification, is susceptible to a denial of service attack in versions prior to 0.6.1 when a verifier is provided a maliciously crafted Sigstore Bundle containing large amounts of verifiable data, in the form of signed transparency log entries, RFC 3161 timestamps, and attestation subjects. The verification of these data structures is computationally expensive. This can be used to consume excessive CPU resources, leading to a denial of service attack. TUF's security model labels this type of vulnerability an "Endless data attack," and can lead to verification failing to complete and disrupting services that rely on sigstore-go for verification. This vulnerability is addressed with sigstore-go 0.6.1, which adds hard limits to the number of verifiable data structures that can be processed in a bundle. Verification will fail if a bundle has data that exceeds these limits. The limits are 32 signed transparency log entries, 32 RFC 3161 timestamps, 1024 attestation subjects, and 32 digests per attestation subject. These limits are intended to be high enough to accommodate the vast majority of use cases, while preventing the verification of maliciously crafted bundles that contain large amounts of verifiable data. Users who are vulnerable but unable to quickly upgrade may consider adding manual bundle validation to enforce limits similar to those in the referenced patch prior to calling sigstore-go's verification functions.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-45395

Published

sigstore-go, a Go library for Sigstore signing and verification, is susceptible to a denial of service attack in versions prior to 0.6.1 when a verifier is provided a maliciously crafted Sigstore Bundle containing large amounts of verifiable data, in the form of signed transparency log entries, RFC 3161 timestamps, and attestation subjects. The verification of these data structures is computationally expensive. This can be used to consume excessive CPU resources, leading to a denial of service attack. TUF's security model labels this type of vulnerability an "Endless data attack," and can lead to verification failing to complete and disrupting services that rely on sigstore-go for verification. This vulnerability is addressed with sigstore-go 0.6.1, which adds hard limits to the number of verifiable data structures that can be processed in a bundle. Verification will fail if a bundle has data that exceeds these limits. The limits are 32 signed transparency log entries, 32 RFC 3161 timestamps, 1024 attestation subjects, and 32 digests per attestation subject. These limits are intended to be high enough to accommodate the vast majority of use cases, while preventing the verification of maliciously crafted bundles that contain large amounts of verifiable data. Users who are vulnerable but unable to quickly upgrade may consider adding manual bundle validation to enforce limits similar to those in the referenced patch prior to calling sigstore-go's verification functions.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-cq38-jh5f-37mq

Published

### Impact sigstore-go is susceptible to a denial of service attack when a verifier is provided a maliciously crafted Sigstore Bundle containing large amounts of verifiable data, in the form of signed transparency log entries, RFC 3161 timestamps, and attestation subjects. The verification of these data structures is computationally expensive. This can be used to consume excessive CPU resources, leading to a denial of service attack. TUF's security model labels this type of vulnerability an "Endless data attack," and can lead to verification failing to complete and disrupting services that rely on sigstore-go for verification. The vulnerable loops are in the verification functions in the package `github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/pkg/verify`. The first is the DSSE envelope verification loop in `verifyEnvelopeWithArtifact`, which decodes all the digests in an attestation can be found here: https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/blob/725e508ed4933e6f5b5206e32af4bbe76f587b54/pkg/verify/signature.go#L183-L193 The next loop is in the `VerifyArtifactTransparencyLog` function, which verifies all the signed entries in a bundle: https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/blob/725e508ed4933e6f5b5206e32af4bbe76f587b54/pkg/verify/tlog.go#L74-L178 The next loop is the `VerifyTimestampAuthority` function, which verifies all the RFC 3161 timestamps in a bundle: https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/blob/725e508ed4933e6f5b5206e32af4bbe76f587b54/pkg/verify/tsa.go#L59-L68 ### Patches This vulnerability is addressed with sigstore-go 0.6.1, which adds hard limits to the number of verifiable data structures that can be processed in a bundle. Verification will fail if a bundle has data that exceeds these limits. The limits are: - 32 signed transparency log entries - 32 RFC 3161 timestamps - 1024 attestation subjects - 32 digests per attestation subject These limits are intended to be high enough to accommodate the vast majority of use cases, while preventing the verification of maliciously crafted bundles that contain large amounts of verifiable data. ### Workarounds The best way to mitigate the risk is to upgrade to sigstore-go 0.6.1 or later. Users who are vulnerable but unable to quickly upgrade may consider adding manual bundle validation to enforce limits similar to those in the referenced patch prior to calling sigstore-go's verification functions.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2024-3116

Published

sigstore-go has an unbounded loop over untrusted input can lead to endless data attack in github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2024-45395

Published

sigstore-go

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "sigstore",
                    "product": "sigstore-go",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 0.6.1",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2024-2773

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 4, 2024, 8:15:08 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 5, 2024, 2:25:27 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2024-45395

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-835

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-09-04T21:15:14.237

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:54:07.890

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:sigstore:sigstore-go:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-cq38-jh5f-37mq

Published

github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.6.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2024-3116

Published

github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.6.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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