bpf: Explicitly check accesses to bpf_sock_addr

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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Explicitly check accesses to bpf_sock_addr Syzkaller found a kernel warning on the following sock_addr program: 0: r0 = 0 1: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +60) 2: exit which triggers: verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion (0) This is happening because offset 60 in bpf_sock_addr corresponds to an implicit padding of 4 bytes, right after msg_src_ip4. Access to this padding isn't rejected in sock_addr_is_valid_access and it thus later fails to convert the access. This patch fixes it by explicitly checking the various fields of bpf_sock_addr in sock_addr_is_valid_access. I checked the other ctx structures and is_valid_access functions and didn't find any other similar cases. Other cases of (properly handled) padding are covered in new tests in a subsequent patch.

Source published

28 Oct 2025 11:48:43 UTC

Source modified

15 Oct 2026 01:08:54 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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