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OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego

cve-program · CVE-2025-46569

Published

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Prior to version 1.4.0, when run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document reference is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation. A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. A workaround involves having network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs being limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks, unless necessary for production reasons.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2025-12838

Published

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Prior to version 1.4.0, when run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document reference is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation. A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. A workaround involves having network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs being limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks, unless necessary for production reasons.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2025-46569

Published

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Prior to version 1.4.0, when run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document reference is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation. A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. A workaround involves having network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs being limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks, unless necessary for production reasons.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-6m8w-jc87-6cr7

Published

### Impact When run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP[ Data API](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/rest-api/#data-api) for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document [reference](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/policy-language/#references) is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation. A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack. **Users are only impacted if all of the following apply:** * OPA is deployed as a standalone server (rather than being used as a Go library) * The OPA server is exposed outside of the local host in an untrusted environment. * The configured [authorization policy](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) does not do exact matching of the `input.path` attribute when deciding if the request should be allowed. **or, if all of the following apply:** * OPA is deployed as a standalone server. * The service connecting to OPA allows 3rd parties to insert unsanitised text into the path of the HTTP request to OPA’s Data API. **Note:** With **no** Authorization Policy configured for restricting API access (the default configuration), the RESTful Data API provides access for managing Rego policies; and the RESTful Query API facilitates advanced queries. Full access to these APIs provides both simpler, and broader access than what the security issue describes here can facilitate. As such, OPA servers exposed to a network are **not** considered affected by the attack described here if they are knowingly not restricting access through an Authorization Policy. ### Patches Fixed in OPA v1.4.0. ### Workarounds #### Don’t publicly expose OPA’s RESTful APIs #### Unless necessary for production reasons, network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs should be limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks. Since OPA v1.0, unless otherwise configured, the server listener defaults to `localhost`. #### Enable Authentication to Only Allow Access to Trusted Clients #### A configured [authentication](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) scheme is a requirement when OPA is exposed in an untrusted environment. While requiring authentication alone doesn’t mitigate this attack, it effectively reduces the scope from untrusted clients to trusted clients. #### Perform Path Validation Using OPA’s Authorization Policy Functionality #### OPA can be configured to use an [Authorization Policy](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) to validate all incoming requests. By authoring the Authorization Policy to only accept paths corresponding to expected Rego package references, this attack can be fully mitigated. The HTTP path in a Data API request is of the format `/v1/data/{path:.+}` (`/v0/data/{path:.+}`, for the v0 Data API), where `data/{path:.+}` directly corresponds to a reference to a virtual document, and a prefix of `{path:.+}` corresponds to a Rego `package` declaration. E.g. the HTTP path `v1/data/do/re/mi` corresponds to the data reference `data.do.re.mi`, where `do.re` is the package and `mi` is the rule in the following Rego module: ```rego package do.re mi if { ... } ``` Unless otherwise [configured](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/configuration/#miscellaneous), OPA will use the rule at `data.system.authz.allow` as Authorization Policy. Authorization is enabled by starting OPA with the `--authorization=basic` flag, and the Authorization policy must be made available to the OPA runtime either through a bundle (via the `--bundle` flag or through [discovery](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/management-discovery/)) or as an individual module via the command-line. A trivial Authorization Policy example: ```rego package system.authz allowed_paths := [ ["v1", "data", "policy1", "allow"], ["v1", "data", "policy2", "allow"], ... ] allow if { input.path in allowed_paths } ``` **Note:** configuring an Authorization Policy in OPA isn't the only way to protect against malicious request paths. Path validation and sanitisation can also be performed by connecting clients and 3rd party intermediaries, such as API gateways, reverse proxies, etc.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2025-3660

Published

OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego in github.com/open-policy-agent/opa

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2025-46569

Published

OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Prior to version 1.4.0, when run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document reference is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation. A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. A workaround involves having network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs being limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks, unless necessary for production reasons.

Source published
1 May 2025 19:32:47 UTC
Source modified
2 May 2025 18:08:19 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 7.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

euvd · EUVD-2025-12838

Published

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Prior to version 1.4.0, when run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entai…

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Prior to version 1.4.0, when run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document reference is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation. A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. A workaround involves having network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs being limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks, unless necessary for production reasons.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: May 1, 2025, 7:32:47 PM

dateUpdated: May 2, 2025, 6:08:19 PM

11 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

msrc_CVE-2025-46569: OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego

CVE-2025-46569

SUSE-SU-2025:02592-1: Security update for cosign

CVE-2025-46569

openSUSE-SU-2025:15370-1: hauler-1.2.5-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2025-46569

openSUSE-SU-2025:15253-1: opa-1.6.0-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2025-22870 · CVE-2025-46569

openSUSE-SU-2025-20117-1: Security update for trivy

CVE-2024-3817 · CVE-2024-45337 · CVE-2024-45338 · CVE-2024-51744 · CVE-2025-11065 · CVE-2025-21613 · CVE-2025-21614 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-27144 · CVE-2025-30204 · CVE-2025-46569 · CVE-2025-47291 · CVE-2025-53547 · CVE-2025-58058

openSUSE-SU-2025:15355-1: cosign-2.5.3-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2025-46569

openSUSE-SU-2025:15530-1: trivy-0.65.0-2.1 on GA media

CVE-2025-46569

openSUSE-SU-2025:20160-1: Security update for hauler

CVE-2024-0406 · CVE-2024-45338 · CVE-2025-11579 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-46569 · CVE-2025-47911 · CVE-2025-58058 · CVE-2025-58190

openSUSE-SU-2025:15059-1: govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20250506T153719-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2019-11243 · CVE-2023-32198 · CVE-2024-22031 · CVE-2025-23390 · CVE-2025-32777 · CVE-2025-3879 · CVE-2025-4166 · CVE-2025-4210 · CVE-2025-46327 · CVE-2025-46342 · CVE-2025-46569 · CVE-2025-46599

openSUSE-SU-2025:20117-1: Security update for trivy

CVE-2024-3817 · CVE-2024-45337 · CVE-2024-45338 · CVE-2024-51744 · CVE-2025-11065 · CVE-2025-21613 · CVE-2025-21614 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-27144 · CVE-2025-30204 · CVE-2025-46569 · CVE-2025-47291 · CVE-2025-53547 · CVE-2025-58058

openSUSE-SU-2026:20798-1: Security update for trivy

CVE-2024-3817 · CVE-2024-45337 · CVE-2024-45338 · CVE-2024-51744 · CVE-2025-11065 · CVE-2025-21613 · CVE-2025-21614 · CVE-2025-22868 · CVE-2025-22869 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-27144 · CVE-2025-30204 · CVE-2025-46569 · CVE-2025-47291 · CVE-2025-47911 · CVE-2025-47913 · CVE-2025-47914 · CVE-2025-53547 · CVE-2025-58058 · CVE-2025-58181 · CVE-2025-58190

Source published
May 1, 2025, 7:32:47 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
May 2, 2025, 6:08:19 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 04:32:07 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

nvd · CVE-2025-46569

Published

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Prior to version 1.4.0, when run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entai…

Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine. Prior to version 1.4.0, when run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP Data API for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document reference is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation. A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0. A workaround involves having network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs being limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks, unless necessary for production reasons.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-94 · CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-05-01T20:15:37.887

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:26:38.420

Source published
1 May 2025 20:15:37 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 09:26:38 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 02:24:54 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-6m8w-jc87-6cr7

Published

OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego

### Impact When run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP[ Data API](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/rest-api/#data-api) for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document [reference](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/policy-language/#references) is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation. A HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack. **Users are only impacted if all of the following apply:** * OPA is deployed as a standalone server (rather than being used as a Go library) * The OPA server is exposed outside of the local host in an untrusted environment. * The configured [authorization policy](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) does not do exact matching of the `input.path` attribute when deciding if the request should be allowed. **or, if all of the following apply:** * OPA is deployed as a standalone server. * The service connecting to OPA allows 3rd parties to insert unsanitised text into the path of the HTTP request to OPA’s Data API. **Note:** With **no** Authorization Policy configured for restricting API access (the default configuration), the RESTful Data API provides access for managing Rego policies; and the RESTful Query API facilitates advanced queries. Full access to these APIs provides both simpler, and broader access than what the security issue describes here can facilitate. As such, OPA servers exposed to a network are **not** considered affected by the attack described here if they are knowingly not restricting access through an Authorization Policy. ### Patches Fixed in OPA v1.4.0. ### Workarounds #### Don’t publicly expose OPA’s RESTful APIs #### Unless necessary for production reasons, network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs should be limited to `localhost` and/or trusted networks. Since OPA v1.0, unless otherwise configured, the server listener defaults to `localhost`. #### Enable Authentication to Only Allow Access to Trusted Clients #### A configured [authentication](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) scheme is a requirement when OPA is exposed in an untrusted environment. While requiring authentication alone doesn’t mitigate this attack, it effectively reduces the scope from untrusted clients to trusted clients. #### Perform Path Validation Using OPA’s Authorization Policy Functionality #### OPA can be configured to use an [Authorization Policy](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/security/#authentication-and-authorization) to validate all incoming requests. By authoring the Authorization Policy to only accept paths corresponding to expected Rego package references, this attack can be fully mitigated. The HTTP path in a Data API request is of the format `/v1/data/{path:.+}` (`/v0/data/{path:.+}`, for the v0 Data API), where `data/{path:.+}` directly corresponds to a reference to a virtual document, and a prefix of `{path:.+}` corresponds to a Rego `package` declaration. E.g. the HTTP path `v1/data/do/re/mi` corresponds to the data reference `data.do.re.mi`, where `do.re` is the package and `mi` is the rule in the following Rego module: ```rego package do.re mi if { ... } ``` Unless otherwise [configured](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/configuration/#miscellaneous), OPA will use the rule at `data.system.authz.allow` as Authorization Policy. Authorization is enabled by starting OPA with the `--authorization=basic` flag, and the Authorization policy must be made available to the OPA runtime either through a bundle (via the `--bundle` flag or through [discovery](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/management-discovery/)) or as an individual module via the command-line. A trivial Authorization Policy example: ```rego package system.authz allowed_paths := [ ["v1", "data", "policy1", "allow"], ["v1", "data", "policy2", "allow"], ... ] allow if { input.path in allowed_paths } ``` **Note:** configuring an Authorization Policy in OPA isn't the only way to protect against malicious request paths. Path validation and sanitisation can also be performed by connecting clients and 3rd party intermediaries, such as API gateways, reverse proxies, etc.

Source published
1 May 2025 17:02:58 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:24 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2025-3660

Published

OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego in github.com/open-policy-agent/opa

OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego in github.com/open-policy-agent/opa

Source published
5 May 2025 16:14:33 UTC
Source modified
4 Feb 2026 04:36:32 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 11:47 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current