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code-server runs VS Code on any machine anywhere through browser access. Prior to version 4.99.4, a…

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.3 HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 25 Oct 2026 02:24:54 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

nvd · CVE-2025-47269

Published

code-server runs VS Code on any machine anywhere through browser access. Prior to version 4.99.4, a maliciously crafted URL using the proxy subpath can result in the attacker gaining access to the session token. Failure to properly validate the port for a proxy request can result in proxying to an arbitrary domain. The malicious URL `https://<code-server>/proxy/[email protected]/path` would be proxied to `[email protected]/path` where the attacker could exfiltrate a user's session token. Any user who runs code-server with the built-in proxy enabled and clicks on maliciously crafted links that go to their code-server instances with reference to /proxy. Normally this is used to proxy local ports, however the URL can reference the attacker's domain instead, and the connection is then proxied to that domain, which will include sending cookies. With access to the session cookie, the attacker can then log into code-server and have full access to the machine hosting code-server as the user running code-server. This issue has been patched in version 4.99.4.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

nvd · CVE-2025-47269

Published

code-server runs VS Code on any machine anywhere through browser access. Prior to version 4.99.4, a maliciously crafted URL using the proxy subpath can result in the attacker gaining access to the session token. Failure to properly validate…

code-server runs VS Code on any machine anywhere through browser access. Prior to version 4.99.4, a maliciously crafted URL using the proxy subpath can result in the attacker gaining access to the session token. Failure to properly validate the port for a proxy request can result in proxying to an arbitrary domain. The malicious URL `https://<code-server>/proxy/[email protected]/path` would be proxied to `[email protected]/path` where the attacker could exfiltrate a user's session token. Any user who runs code-server with the built-in proxy enabled and clicks on maliciously crafted links that go to their code-server instances with reference to /proxy. Normally this is used to proxy local ports, however the URL can reference the attacker's domain instead, and the connection is then proxied to that domain, which will include sending cookies. With access to the session cookie, the attacker can then log into code-server and have full access to the machine hosting code-server as the user running code-server. This issue has been patched in version 4.99.4.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-441

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-05-09T21:15:51.263

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:27:38.423

Source published
9 May 2025 21:15:51 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 09:27:38 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 02:24:54 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

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