CVE-2025-53014
No CISA KEV listing is included in this saved record. Exploitation may still have occurred.
FIRST EPSS: 0.73 % · percentile 55.03 % · scored 16 Nov 2026.
Saved 17 Nov 2026 02:39:16 UTC · View this risk record (JSON)
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ImageMagick is free and open-source software used for editing and manipulating digital images. Versions prior to 7.1.2-0 and 6.9.13-26 have a heap buffer overflow in the `InterpretImageFilename` function. The issue stems from an off-by-one error that causes out-of-bounds memory access when processing format strings containing consecutive percent signs (`%%`). Versions 7.1.2-0 and 6.9.13-26 fix the issue.
Read the publisher's advisoryImageMagick is free and open-source software used for editing and manipulating digital images. Versions prior to 7.1.2-0 and 6.9.13-26 have a heap buffer overflow in the `InterpretImageFilename` function. The issue stems from an off-by-one error that causes out-of-bounds memory access when processing format strings containing consecutive percent signs (`%%`). Versions 7.1.2-0 and 6.9.13-26 fix the issue.
Read the publisher's advisoryImageMagick is free and open-source software used for editing and manipulating digital images. Versions prior to 7.1.2-0 and 6.9.13-26 have a heap buffer overflow in the `InterpretImageFilename` function. The issue stems from an off-by-one error that causes out-of-bounds memory access when processing format strings containing consecutive percent signs (`%%`). Versions 7.1.2-0 and 6.9.13-26 fix the issue.
Read the publisher's advisory# Heap Buffer Overflow in InterpretImageFilename ## Summary A heap buffer overflow was identified in the `InterpretImageFilename` function of ImageMagick. The issue stems from an off-by-one error that causes out-of-bounds memory access when processing format strings containing consecutive percent signs (`%%`). ## Environment - **OS**: Arch Linux (Linux gmkhost 6.14.2-arch1-1 # 1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu, 10 Apr 2025 18:43:59 +0000 x86_64 GNU/Linux (GNU libc) 2.41) - **Architecture**: x86_64 - **Compiler**: gcc (GCC) 15.1.1 20250425 ## Reproduction ### Build Instructions ```bash # Clone the repository git clone https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick.git cd ImageMagick git reset --hard 8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12 # Build with AddressSanitizer export CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -g -O1" export CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -g -O1" export LDFLAGS="-fsanitizer=address" ./configure make # Set library path and trigger the crash export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$(pwd)/MagickWand/.libs:$(pwd)/MagickCore/.libs:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH" ./utilities/.libs/magick %% a ``` ### Minimum Trigger ```bash ./utilities/.libs/magick %% [any_output_filename] ``` ## Crash Analysis ### AddressSanitizer Output ``` $ ./utilities/.libs/magick %% a ================================================================= ==2227694==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7037f99e3ad3 at pc 0x741801e81a17 bp 0x7ffd22fa4e00 sp 0x7ffd22fa45b8 READ of size 1 at 0x7037f99e3ad3 thread T0 #0 0x741801e81a16 in strchr /usr/src/debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:746 #1 0x7418013b4f06 in InterpretImageFilename MagickCore/image.c:1674 #2 0x7418012826a3 in ReadImages MagickCore/constitute.c:1040 #3 0x741800e4696b in CLINoImageOperator MagickWand/operation.c:4959 #4 0x741800e64de7 in CLIOption MagickWand/operation.c:5473 #5 0x741800d92edf in ProcessCommandOptions MagickWand/magick-cli.c:653 #6 0x741800d94816 in MagickImageCommand MagickWand/magick-cli.c:1392 #7 0x741800d913e4 in MagickCommandGenesis MagickWand/magick-cli.c:177 #8 0x5ef7a3546638 in MagickMain utilities/magick.c:162 #9 0x5ef7a3546872 in main utilities/magick.c:193 #10 0x7417ff53f6b4 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x276b4) (BuildId: 468e3585c794491a48ea75fceb9e4d6b1464fc35) #11 0x7417ff53f768 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27768) (BuildId: 468e3585c794491a48ea75fceb9e4d6b1464fc35) #12 0x5ef7a3546204 in _start (/home/kforfk/workspace/fuzz_analysis/saigen/ImageMagick/utilities/.libs/magick+0x2204) (BuildId: 96677b60628cf297eaedb3eb17b87000d29403f2) 0x7037f99e3ad3 is located 0 bytes after 3-byte region [0x7037f99e3ad0,0x7037f99e3ad3) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x741801f20e15 in malloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 #1 0x7418013e86bc in AcquireMagickMemory MagickCore/memory.c:559 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow MagickCore/image.c:1674 in InterpretImageFilename Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x7037f99e3800: fa fa 07 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x7037f99e3880: fa fa 07 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x7037f99e3900: fa fa 07 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x7037f99e3980: fa fa 07 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa 0x7037f99e3a00: fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 04 =>0x7037f99e3a80: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 00 fa fa[03]fa fa fa 03 fa 0x7037f99e3b00: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7037f99e3b80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7037f99e3c00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7037f99e3c80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x7037f99e3d00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==2227694==ABORTING ``` ## Root Cause Analysis The first command line argument is interpreted as `MagickImageCommand`: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/utilities/magick.c#L83 ```c const CommandInfo MagickCommands[] = { MagickCommandSize("magick", MagickFalse, MagickImageCommand), ``` It is invoked here: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickWand/magick-cli.c#L220 ```c status=command(image_info,argc,argv,&text,exception); ``` The execution then follows this path: - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickWand/magick-cli.c#L1387 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickWand/magick-cli.c#L586 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickWand/magick-cli.c#L419 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickWand/operation.c#L5391 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickWand/operation.c#L5473 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickWand/operation.c#L4959 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickCore/constitute.c#L1009 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickCore/constitute.c#L1039 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickCore/image.c#L1649 - https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/8fff9b4f44d2e8b5cae2bd6db70930a144d15f12/MagickCore/image.c#L1674 The execution eventually reaches `InterpretImageFilename` and enters a loop. The `format` variable here is `"%%"`. At this point, it is safe to access `*(format + 2)` but not safe to access `*(format + 3)`. ```c for (p=strchr(format,'%'); p != (char *) NULL; p=strchr(p+1,'%')) { q=(char *) p+1; if (*q == '%') { p=q+1; continue; } ``` The first `strchr` call returns a pointer equal to `format` and assigns it to `p`. Then `q` is initialized with `p + 1` (`format + 1`), and `*q` is `'%'`, so the code enters the if branch. Here, `p` is reassigned to `q + 1` (`format + 2`). In the next iteration, `p + 1` (`format + 3`) is passed to `strchr`, and when `strchr` accesses it, this causes an out-of-bounds read.
Read the publisher's advisoryCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No CISA KEV listing is included in this saved record. Exploitation may still have occurred.
FIRST EPSS: 0.73 % · percentile 55.03 % · scored 16 Nov 2026.
Saved 17 Nov 2026 02:39:16 UTC · View this risk record (JSON)
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CVE-2025-53014 · 17 Nov 2026 02:39:16 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 15 Nov 2026 14:45:34 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 14 Nov 2026 16:37:01 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 13 Nov 2026 19:59:34 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 12 Nov 2026 18:18:51 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 10 Nov 2026 20:24:10 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 09 Nov 2026 21:04:24 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 08 Nov 2026 15:12:21 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 07 Nov 2026 16:07:52 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 06 Nov 2026 19:10:17 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 05 Nov 2026 22:49:22 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 05 Nov 2026 02:54:06 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 03 Nov 2026 16:59:18 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 02 Nov 2026 23:59:04 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 01 Nov 2026 23:58:58 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 01 Nov 2026 03:04:52 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 31 Oct 2026 01:52:30 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 29 Oct 2026 18:29:26 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 28 Oct 2026 19:55:37 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 27 Oct 2026 15:46:19 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 27 Oct 2026 00:23:05 UTC
CVE-2025-53014 · 25 Oct 2026 15:18:41 UTC
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