Hono has Body Limit Middleware Bypass
cve-program · CVE-2025-59139
PublishedHono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions prior to 4.9.7, a flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2025-29042
PublishedHono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions prior to 4.9.7, a flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2025-59139
PublishedHono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions prior to 4.9.7, a flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-92vj-g62v-jqhh
Published### Summary A flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. ### Details The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. ### Impact If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. ### Resolution The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2025-59139 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2025-59139
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-92vj-g62v-jqhh
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/605c70560b52f13af10379f79b76717042fafe8d
euvd · EUVD-2025-29042
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-92vj-g62v-jqhh
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/605c70560b52f13af10379f79b76717042fafe8d
nvd · CVE-2025-59139
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/605c70560b52f13af10379f79b76717042fafe8d
- https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-92vj-g62v-jqhh
osv · GHSA-92vj-g62v-jqhh
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifierNo related changes are available here.