Evervault Go SDK: Incomplete PCR Validation in Enclave Attestation for non-Evervault hosted Enclaves

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Evervault is a payment security solution. A vulnerability was identified in the `evervault-go` SDK’s attestation verification logic in versions of `evervault-go` prior to 1.3.2 that may allow incomplete documents to pass validation. This may cause the client to trust an enclave operator that does not meet expected integrity guarantees. The exploitability of this issue is limited in Evervault-hosted environments as an attacker would require the pre-requisite ability to serve requests from specific evervault domain names, following from our ACME challenge based TLS certificate acquisition pipeline. The vulnerability primarily affects applications which only check PCR8. Though the efficacy is also reduced for applications that check all PCR values, the impact is largely remediated by checking PCR 0, 1 and 2. The identified issue has been addressed in version 1.3.2 by validating attestation documents before storing in the cache, and replacing the naive equality checks with a new SatisfiedBy check. Those who useevervault-go to attest Enclaves that are hosted outside of Evervault environments and cannot upgrade have two possible workarounds available. Modify the application logic to fail verification if PCR8 is not explicitly present and non-empty and/or add custom pre-validation to reject documents that omit any required PCRs.

Source published

12 Nov 2025 20:34:04 UTC

Source modified

14 Nov 2025 17:40:17 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 8.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Evervault is a payment security solution. A vulnerability was identified in the `evervault-go` SDK’s attestation verification logic in versions of `evervault-go` prior to 1.3.2 that may allow incomplete documents to pass validation. This may cause the client to trust an enclave operator that does not meet expected integrity guarantees. The exploitability of this issue is limited in Evervault-hosted environments as an attacker would require the pre-requisite ability to serve requests from specific evervault domain names, following from our ACME challenge based TLS certificate acquisition pipeline. The vulnerability primarily affects applications which only check PCR8. Though the efficacy is also reduced for applications that check all PCR values, the impact is largely remediated by checking PCR 0, 1 and 2. The identified issue has been addressed in version 1.3.2 by validating attestation documents before storing in the cache, and replacing the naive equality checks with a new SatisfiedBy check. Those who useevervault-go to attest Enclaves that are hosted outside of Evervault environments and cannot upgrade have two possible workarounds available. Modify the application logic to fail verification if PCR8 is not explicitly present and non-empty and/or add custom pre-validation to reject documents that omit any required PCRs.

Source published

Nov 12, 2025, 8:34:04 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Nov 14, 2025, 5:40:17 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

9 Nov 2026 04:06:45 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Evervault is a payment security solution. A vulnerability was identified in the `evervault-go` SDK’s attestation verification logic in versions of `evervault-go` prior to 1.3.2 that may allow incomplete documents to pass validation. This may cause the client to trust an enclave operator that does not meet expected integrity guarantees. The exploitability of this issue is limited in Evervault-hosted environments as an attacker would require the pre-requisite ability to serve requests from specific evervault domain names, following from our ACME challenge based TLS certificate acquisition pipeline. The vulnerability primarily affects applications which only check PCR8. Though the efficacy is also reduced for applications that check all PCR values, the impact is largely remediated by checking PCR 0, 1 and 2. The identified issue has been addressed in version 1.3.2 by validating attestation documents before storing in the cache, and replacing the naive equality checks with a new SatisfiedBy check. Those who useevervault-go to attest Enclaves that are hosted outside of Evervault environments and cannot upgrade have two possible workarounds available. Modify the application logic to fail verification if PCR8 is not explicitly present and non-empty and/or add custom pre-validation to reject documents that omit any required PCRs.

Source published

12 Nov 2025 21:15:53 UTC

Source modified

18 Oct 2026 20:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 03:17:29 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

### Summary A vulnerability was identified in the `evervault-go` SDK’s attestation verification logic that may allow incomplete documents to pass validation. This may cause the client to trust an enclave operator that does not meet expected integrity guarantees. The exploitability of this issue is limited in Evervault-hosted environments as an attacker would require the pre-requisite ability to serve requests from specific evervault domain names, following from our ACME challenge based TLS certificate acquisition pipeline. The vulnerability primarily affects applications which only check PCR8. Though the efficacy is also reduced for applications that check all PCR values, the impact is largely remediated by checking PCR 0, 1 and 2. ### Patches The identified issue has been addressed in version [1.3.2](https://github.com/evervault/evervault-go/pull/48) by validating attestation documents before storing in the cache, and replacing the naive equality checks with a new SatisfiedBy check. ### Workarounds If you are using evervault-go to attest Enclaves that are hosted outside of Evervault environments and cannot upgrade: 1) Modify your application logic to fail verification if PCR8 is not explicitly present and non-empty 2) Add custom pre-validation to reject documents that omit any required PCRs. ### POC ``` package evervault import ( "testing" "github.com/evervault/evervault-go/attestation" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/hf/nitrite" ) func TestVulnerableCompare(t *testing.T) { assert := assert.New(t) // arrange expectedPCRs := []attestation.PCRs{ attestation.PCRs{ PCR0: "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", PCR1: "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002", PCR2: "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003", PCR8: "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004", }, } actualDocument := nitrite.Document {} actualDocument.PCRs = map[uint][]byte{ 10: make([]byte, 32), } // act v := verifyPCRs(expectedPCRs, actualDocument) // assert // Verify should not pass but it does assert.Equal(true, v) } ```

Source published

12 Nov 2025 21:45:06 UTC

Source modified

18 Nov 2025 17:00:18 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

Evervault Go SDK: Incomplete PCR Validation in Enclave Attestation for non-Evervault hosted Enclaves in github.com/evervault/evervault-go

Source published

17 Nov 2025 19:11:23 UTC

Source modified

3 Mar 2026 04:57:35 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.