Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Some sources, documents or advisories need attention: 272/272 feeds/APIs · 469/469 docs · 8/9 advisories · checked 08:27 UTC Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Valibot has a ReDoS vulnerability in `EMOJI_REGEX`

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2025-66020

Published

Valibot helps validate data using a schema. In versions from 0.31.0 to 1.1.0, the EMOJI_REGEX used in the emoji action is vulnerable to a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack. A short, maliciously crafted string (e.g., <100 characters) can cause the regex engine to consume excessive CPU time (minutes), leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) for the application. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.0.

Source published
26 Nov 2025 01:49:38 UTC
Source modified
26 Nov 2025 14:16:54 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd · CVE-2025-66020

Published

Valibot helps validate data using a schema. In versions from 0.31.0 to 1.1.0, the EMOJI_REGEX used in the emoji action is vulnerable to a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack. A short, maliciously crafted string (e.g., <100 characters) can cause the regex engine to consume excessive CPU time (minutes), leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) for the application. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.0.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-1333

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-11-26T02:15:49.540

lastModified: 2026-10-23T22:10:00.160

Source published
26 Nov 2025 02:15:49 UTC
Source modified
23 Oct 2026 22:10:00 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 03:17:36 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv · GHSA-vqpr-j7v3-hqw9

Published

### Summary The `EMOJI_REGEX` used in the `emoji` action is vulnerable to a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack. A short, maliciously crafted string (e.g., <100 characters) can cause the regex engine to consume excessive CPU time (minutes), leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) for the application. ### Details The ReDoS vulnerability stems from "catastrophic backtracking" in the `EMOJI_REGEX`. This is caused by ambiguity in the regex pattern due to overlapping character classes. Specifically, the class `\p{Emoji_Presentation}` overlaps with more specific classes used in the same alternation, such as `[\u{1F1E6}-\u{1F1FF}]` (regional indicator symbols used for flags) and `\p{Emoji_Modifier_Base}`. When the regex engine attempts to match a string that almost matches but ultimately fails (like the one in the PoC), this ambiguity forces it to explore an exponential number of possible paths. The matching time increases exponentially with the length of the crafted input, rather than linearly. ### PoC The following code demonstrates the vulnerability. ```javascript import * as v from 'valibot'; const schema = v.object({ x: v.pipe(v.string(), v.emoji()), }); const attackString = '\u{1F1E6}'.repeat(49) + '0'; console.log(`Input length: ${attackString.length}`); console.log('Starting parse... (This will take a long time)'); // On my machine, a length of 99 takes approximately 2 minutes. console.time(); try { v.parse(schema, {x: attackString }); } catch (e) {} console.timeEnd(); ``` ### Impact Any project using Valibot's `emoji` validation on user-controllable input is vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack. An attacker can block server resources (e.g., a web server's event loop) by submitting a short string to any endpoint that uses this validation. This is particularly dangerous because the attack string is short enough to bypass typical input length restrictions (e.g., maxLength(100)). ### Recommended Fix The root cause is the overlapping character classes. This can be resolved by making the alternatives mutually exclusive, typically by using negative lookaheads (`(?!...)`) to subtract the specific classes from the more general one. The following modified `EMOJI_REGEX` applies this principle: ```javascript export const EMOJI_REGEX: RegExp = // eslint-disable-next-line redos-detector/no-unsafe-regex, regexp/no-dupe-disjunctions -- false positives /^(?:[\u{1F1E6}-\u{1F1FF}]{2}|\u{1F3F4}[\u{E0061}-\u{E007A}]{2}[\u{E0030}-\u{E0039}\u{E0061}-\u{E007A}]{1,3}\u{E007F}|(?:\p{Emoji}\uFE0F\u20E3?|\p{Emoji_Modifier_Base}\p{Emoji_Modifier}?|(?![\p{Emoji_Modifier_Base}\u{1F1E6}-\u{1F1FF}])\p{Emoji_Presentation})(?:\u200D(?:\p{Emoji}\uFE0F\u20E3?|\p{Emoji_Modifier_Base}\p{Emoji_Modifier}?|(?![\p{Emoji_Modifier_Base}\u{1F1E6}-\u{1F1FF}])\p{Emoji_Presentation}))*)+$/u; ```

Source published
26 Nov 2025 19:33:34 UTC
Source modified
26 Nov 2025 20:28:24 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 26 Oct 08:27 UTC · 272 of 272 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current