The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates suppli…
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
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cve-program · CVE-2026-102758
PublishedThe `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake. The function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer. code: nx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c ``` UINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type, USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length, const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length) { UINT current_index; USHORT current_tag; ULONG length; ULONG length_bytes; current_index = 0; current_tag = buffer[current_index]; /* <-- read before the bounds check */ if (*buffer_length < 1) { return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); } ``` The remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes > 4 || length_bytes > *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length > *buffer_length`, and the second single-byte length read follows its own `*buffer_length < 1` guard. The tag read is the only load placed ahead of its check.
- Source published
- 29 Sep 2026 17:26:44 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Sep 2026 20:42:39 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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