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Dagu MCP DAG specification read bypasses path containment and workspace isolation

CVSS 3.1 6.5 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/dagu-org/dagu/v2 2.11.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-102943

Published

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to version 2.11.0, its MCP  dagu_read  operation with target  dag_spec  invokes the DAG specification API directly, bypassing the HTTP middleware introduced for CVE-2026-33344. The underlying resolver does not restrict resolved paths to configured DAG directories. An authenticated attacker with a viewer-role API key can supply an absolute or traversing path to read  .yaml  or  .yml  files outside those directories that are accessible to the Dagu process. The affected operation does not provide write or execution capability. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-117876

Published

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to version 2.11.0, its MCP  dagu_read  operation with target  dag_spec  invokes the DAG specification API directly, bypassing the HTTP middleware introduced for CVE-2026-33344. The underlying resolver does not restrict resolved paths to configured DAG directories. An authenticated attacker with a viewer-role API key can supply an absolute or traversing path to read  .yaml  or  .yml  files outside those directories that are accessible to the Dagu process. The affected operation does not provide write or execution capability. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-102943

Published

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to version 2.11.0, its MCP  dagu_read  operation with target  dag_spec  invokes the DAG specification API directly, bypassing the HTTP middleware introduced for CVE-2026-33344. The underlying resolver does not restrict resolved paths to configured DAG directories. An authenticated attacker with a viewer-role API key can supply an absolute or traversing path to read  .yaml  or  .yml  files outside those directories that are accessible to the Dagu process. The affected operation does not provide write or execution capability. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-5m6c-38r8-5w76

Published

## Summary The traversal fix for CVE-2026-33344 was implemented as HTTP middleware installed only in the chi handler chain, but the MCP service calls the same API method in process, so arbitrary YAML file read is reachable again through the MCP tool surface with a viewer-role key. Read-only, limited to .yaml/.yml targets. Confirmed at HEAD f6c039f (post v2.10.7). ## The defect The fix for CVE-2026-33344 is a reflection-based HTTP middleware (internal/frontend/.../api.go, roughly lines 553-597) that inspects a request field named FileName and rejects anything that is not a plain name. It is installed in exactly one place: the chi strict-handler chain (api.go around line 419). The MCP service does not go through that chain. internal/service/mcp/server.go calls the API method directly as an in-process Go call: ```go func (svc *Service) getDAGSpec(ctx context.Context, name string) (map[string]any, error) { // line 307 resp, err := svc.api.GetDAGSpec(ctx, daguapi.GetDAGSpecRequestObject{ FileName: daguapi.DAGFileName(name), // line 309 }) ``` No HTTP request is constructed, so no middleware executes, and the underlying resolver is still uncontained: ```go func (store *Storage) locateDAG(nameOrPath string) (string, error) { // line 1041 if strings.Contains(nameOrPath, string(filepath.Separator)) { // line 1042 foundPath, err := findDAGFile(nameOrPath) if err == nil { return foundPath, nil // line 1045, no containment check } } ``` An absolute path contains a separator, so it takes the first branch and is returned as-is, with no check that it falls under store.baseDir or any entry in store.searchPaths. ## Verification Verified end to end using the project's own conformance/mcptest harness against a real running HTTP server, not by source reading: ``` dagu_read {"target":"dag_spec","name":"/abs/outside/secret.yaml"} -> HTTP 200, full file contents returned in data.spec ``` This also succeeded with a viewer-role API key on an auth-enabled server (auth.mode: builtin), so it is not admin-only. Control test that makes this a residual: the equivalent REST request is correctly blocked (400, "name must only contain alphanumeric characters..."). The HTTP lane is fixed; the MCP lane is not. Bounded impact: read only (dagu_change and dagu_execute are both blocked by spec-level name validation; I tested both); only .yaml/.yml targets. Secondary: GetDAGSpec skips the requireWorkspaceVisible check its sibling handlers run, so this also crosses workspace isolation. ## Suggested fix Move the containment check out of HTTP middleware and into locateDAG itself, rejecting any resolved path that does not fall under baseDir or a configured search path. A middleware that runs on only one of two transports into the same API cannot hold the boundary; the resolver is the correct chokepoint since both transports converge there. Separately, add requireWorkspaceVisible to GetDAGSpec to match its siblings. ## Tooling AI assistance was used while investigating. The traversal was reproduced against a real running server through the project's own MCP conformance harness, including with a viewer-role API key, and the REST control test confirms the HTTP lane is blocked. Confirmed in the uncontained locateDAG branch and the direct in-process GetDAGSpec call at HEAD.

Read the publisher's advisory

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cve-program · CVE-2026-102943

Published

Dagu MCP DAG specification read bypasses path containment and workspace isolation

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to version 2.11.0, its MCP  dagu_read  operation with target  dag_spec  invokes the DAG specification API directly, bypassing the HTTP middleware introduced for CVE-2026-33344. The underlying resolver does not restrict resolved paths to configured DAG directories. An authenticated attacker with a viewer-role API key can supply an absolute or traversing path to read  .yaml  or  .yml  files outside those directories that are accessible to the Dagu process. The affected operation does not provide write or execution capability. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Source published
5 Nov 2026 22:48:45 UTC
Source modified
6 Nov 2026 17:42:54 UTC
Saved here
6 Nov 2026 19:02:40 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-117876

Published

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to version 2.11.0, its MCP  dagu_read  operation with target  dag_spec  invokes the DAG specification API directly, bypassing the HTTP middleware introduced for CVE-2026-33…

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to version 2.11.0, its MCP  dagu_read  operation with target  dag_spec  invokes the DAG specification API directly, bypassing the HTTP middleware introduced for CVE-2026-33344. The underlying resolver does not restrict resolved paths to configured DAG directories. An authenticated attacker with a viewer-role API key can supply an absolute or traversing path to read  .yaml  or  .yml  files outside those directories that are accessible to the Dagu process. The affected operation does not provide write or execution capability. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Nov 5, 2026, 10:48:45 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 6, 2026, 5:42:54 PM

Source published
Nov 5, 2026, 10:48:45 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 6, 2026, 5:42:54 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
14 Nov 2026 17:37:40 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-102943

Published

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to version 2.11.0, its MCP  dagu_read  operation with target  dag_spec  invokes the DAG specification API directly, bypassing the HTTP middleware introduced for CVE-2026-33…

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to version 2.11.0, its MCP  dagu_read  operation with target  dag_spec  invokes the DAG specification API directly, bypassing the HTTP middleware introduced for CVE-2026-33344. The underlying resolver does not restrict resolved paths to configured DAG directories. An authenticated attacker with a viewer-role API key can supply an absolute or traversing path to read  .yaml  or  .yml  files outside those directories that are accessible to the Dagu process. The affected operation does not provide write or execution capability. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-11-05T23:16:49.180

lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:18:51.470

Source published
5 Nov 2026 23:16:49 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 22:18:51 UTC
Saved here
14 Nov 2026 17:37:13 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-5m6c-38r8-5w76

Published

Dagu MCP DAG specification read bypasses path containment and workspace isolation

## Summary The traversal fix for CVE-2026-33344 was implemented as HTTP middleware installed only in the chi handler chain, but the MCP service calls the same API method in process, so arbitrary YAML file read is reachable again through the MCP tool surface with a viewer-role key. Read-only, limited to .yaml/.yml targets. Confirmed at HEAD f6c039f (post v2.10.7). ## The defect The fix for CVE-2026-33344 is a reflection-based HTTP middleware (internal/frontend/.../api.go, roughly lines 553-597) that inspects a request field named FileName and rejects anything that is not a plain name. It is installed in exactly one place: the chi strict-handler chain (api.go around line 419). The MCP service does not go through that chain. internal/service/mcp/server.go calls the API method directly as an in-process Go call: ```go func (svc *Service) getDAGSpec(ctx context.Context, name string) (map[string]any, error) { // line 307 resp, err := svc.api.GetDAGSpec(ctx, daguapi.GetDAGSpecRequestObject{ FileName: daguapi.DAGFileName(name), // line 309 }) ``` No HTTP request is constructed, so no middleware executes, and the underlying resolver is still uncontained: ```go func (store *Storage) locateDAG(nameOrPath string) (string, error) { // line 1041 if strings.Contains(nameOrPath, string(filepath.Separator)) { // line 1042 foundPath, err := findDAGFile(nameOrPath) if err == nil { return foundPath, nil // line 1045, no containment check } } ``` An absolute path contains a separator, so it takes the first branch and is returned as-is, with no check that it falls under store.baseDir or any entry in store.searchPaths. ## Verification Verified end to end using the project's own conformance/mcptest harness against a real running HTTP server, not by source reading: ``` dagu_read {"target":"dag_spec","name":"/abs/outside/secret.yaml"} -> HTTP 200, full file contents returned in data.spec ``` This also succeeded with a viewer-role API key on an auth-enabled server (auth.mode: builtin), so it is not admin-only. Control test that makes this a residual: the equivalent REST request is correctly blocked (400, "name must only contain alphanumeric characters..."). The HTTP lane is fixed; the MCP lane is not. Bounded impact: read only (dagu_change and dagu_execute are both blocked by spec-level name validation; I tested both); only .yaml/.yml targets. Secondary: GetDAGSpec skips the requireWorkspaceVisible check its sibling handlers run, so this also crosses workspace isolation. ## Suggested fix Move the containment check out of HTTP middleware and into locateDAG itself, rejecting any resolved path that does not fall under baseDir or a configured search path. A middleware that runs on only one of two transports into the same API cannot hold the boundary; the resolver is the correct chokepoint since both transports converge there. Separately, add requireWorkspaceVisible to GetDAGSpec to match its siblings. ## Tooling AI assistance was used while investigating. The traversal was reproduced against a real running server through the project's own MCP conformance harness, including with a viewer-role API key, and the REST control test confirms the HTTP lane is blocked. Confirmed in the uncontained locateDAG branch and the direct in-process GetDAGSpec call at HEAD.

Source published
10 Nov 2026 15:56:49 UTC
Source modified
10 Nov 2026 16:15:05 UTC
Saved here
10 Nov 2026 16:25:09 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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