Nx: Path traversal in nx migrate package-migrations extraction

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 13.10.0 until 22.7.10 and 23.2.1, Nx migration planning reads the nx-migrations.migrations value from a target package manifest without validating that it is a contained relative path. A hostile direct dependency or a package introduced through a trusted package's packageGroup can supply .. segments or an absolute path, causing nx migrate to join an escaping destination onto its temporary directory. The migration archive can then write attacker-controlled bytes outside the temporary directory, while opening the destination stream can truncate an existing writable file even when no archive entry matches. This occurs during migration planning before review of the migration list or use of --run-migrations; the vulnerable installed Nx copy is reached when the normal nx@latest handoff is bypassed with NX_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_CLI_VERSION, --run-id, or fallback after a temporary-install failure. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.10 and 23.2.1.

Source published

2 Oct 2026 16:52:07 UTC

Source modified

2 Oct 2026 17:41:54 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 4.0 · 5.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 13.10.0 until 22.7.10 and 23.2.1, Nx migration planning reads the nx-migrations.migrations value from a target package manifest without validating that it is a contained relative path. A hostile direct dependency or a package introduced through a trusted package's packageGroup can supply .. segments or an absolute path, causing nx migrate to join an escaping destination onto its temporary directory. The migration archive can then write attacker-controlled bytes outside the temporary directory, while opening the destination stream can truncate an existing writable file even when no archive entry matches. This occurs during migration planning before review of the migration list or use of --run-migrations; the vulnerable installed Nx copy is reached when the normal nx@latest handoff is bypassed with NX_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_CLI_VERSION, --run-id, or fallback after a temporary-install failure. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.10 and 23.2.1.

Source published

Oct 2, 2026, 4:52:07 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Oct 2, 2026, 5:41:54 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 05:30:31 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 5.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 13.10.0 until 22.7.10 and 23.2.1, Nx migration planning reads the nx-migrations.migrations value from a target package manifest without validating that it is a contained relative path. A hostile direct dependency or a package introduced through a trusted package's packageGroup can supply .. segments or an absolute path, causing nx migrate to join an escaping destination onto its temporary directory. The migration archive can then write attacker-controlled bytes outside the temporary directory, while opening the destination stream can truncate an existing writable file even when no archive entry matches. This occurs during migration planning before review of the migration list or use of --run-migrations; the vulnerable installed Nx copy is reached when the normal nx@latest handoff is bypassed with NX_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_CLI_VERSION, --run-id, or fallback after a temporary-install failure. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.10 and 23.2.1.

Source published

2 Oct 2026 17:17:03 UTC

Source modified

2 Oct 2026 18:17:01 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 04:17:29 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

## Summary `nx migrate` reads each target package's `nx-migrations.migrations` value from its manifest and extracts the referenced file to a path built by joining that value onto a temporary directory. The value is never validated, so a package whose `migrations` field contains `..` segments (or an absolute path) steers the extraction to write outside the temporary directory. A hostile package — or any package pulled in transitively through a trusted package's `packageGroup` — can write attacker-controlled content, or truncate an existing file, anywhere the running user can write. This happens during migration *planning*, before the user reviews the migration list and before `--run-migrations`, so it does not require the user to approve or execute anything. **Most workspaces need no action.** By default `nx migrate` does not run the nx installed in your workspace — it installs `nx@latest` into a temporary directory and performs the upgrade planning, including this extraction, with that copy. Now that a patched nx is the latest release, a default `nx migrate` run is unaffected whatever version the workspace has installed. The installed version only runs, and is only then exposed, when that hand-off is bypassed — see Remediation. ## Severity Exploitable when the victim runs `nx migrate` against a package the attacker controls, directly or through a trusted package's `packageGroup`. The primary impact is a file write with attacker-controlled content and no path confinement; overwriting an auto-loaded file (a shell rc, a git hook, a CI script) escalates that write to code execution. There is no known evidence of exploitation in the wild. ## Affected & Patched Versions | Package | Vulnerable | Patched | | --- | --- | --- | | `nx` | `>= 13.10.0, < 22.7.10`; `>= 23.0.0, < 23.2.1` | `22.7.10`, `23.2.1` | Every version in the ranges above is affected. The lower bound is 13.10.0, the first release where `nx migrate` extracted a package's migrations file from its tarball; earlier versions resolved migrations without that extraction. > [!IMPORTANT] > `nx migrate` normally fetches and runs `nx@latest` rather than the nx installed in your workspace. The ranges above therefore say where the vulnerable code ships, not who is exposed — it only runs when that hand-off is bypassed. ## Remediation **If you run `nx migrate` normally, there is nothing to do.** It resolves and runs the latest nx, which is patched, so your workspace's own nx version does not matter for this flaw. Upgrade only if you bypass that hand-off and run the workspace's nx instead — that is, if you set `NX_USE_LOCAL` or `NX_MIGRATE_USE_LOCAL`, pin `NX_MIGRATE_CLI_VERSION` to an affected version, resume an existing run with `--run-id`, or run where the temporary install fails and `nx migrate` falls back to the local nx. In those cases upgrade to **22.7.10** (22.x line) or **23.2.1** (23.x line) or later: ``` nx migrate 23.2.1 ``` The fix is a drop-in — no configuration changes are required, and no legitimate `migrations` value is affected (real packages reference `./migrations.json` or another path within their own directory, all of which remain valid). Either way, do not run `nx migrate` against packages, or `packageGroup` members, that you do not trust. ## Details While planning an upgrade, `nx migrate` extracts each target package's migrations file to a destination built by joining the package's own `nx-migrations.migrations` value onto a temporary directory. That value is read from the manifest without validation, and it is handled asymmetrically: the name Nx matches against the archive entries is normalized (so its `..` segments collapse), while the destination path it writes to is a raw join that keeps the `..` segments and resolves outside the temporary directory. Because the attacker controls the tarball, they name their entry to equal the normalized form; the match then succeeds and the bytes are written to the un-normalized, escaping destination. The normalization is not a defence — it only dictates what the attacker must name their entry. The same value also seeds the directory used for prompt-file extraction, which has the same shape, so both writes are steerable from the one field. Two distinct primitives fall out of this: - **Truncation** — the destination write stream is opened, and truncates, before any tar entry is inspected. So a package that points `migrations` at an existing file empties that file even when no tar entry matches — no crafted archive required. - **Controlled write** — when a tar entry's name matches, its bytes are written to the escaping destination. The extractor performs no path containment of its own. ## Credits - **Arkadiusz Marta** (RE:SOURCE) — Reporter

Source published

5 Oct 2026 23:28:35 UTC

Source modified

5 Oct 2026 23:45:08 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE