Immich: Authenticated SVG upload reaches ImageMagick coders and enables RCE
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-105764
PublishedImmich is a high-performance self-hosted photo and video management solution. Prior to 3.2.4, an authenticated non-admin user could upload SVG files that thumbnail-generation code in server/src/repositories/media.repository.ts passed to libvips. Files that bypassed libvips' native SVG loader fell through to ImageMagick, where attacker-controlled <image href> values reached unrestricted MSL and VIDEO coder operations. By storing one crafted asset and referencing its path from a second delayed-marker SVG, an attacker could execute code in the immich-server container when thumbnail processing ran. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.4.
- Source published
- 5 Oct 2026 23:07:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 6 Oct 2026 17:59:18 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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CVSS 4.0 · 7.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N