Integer underflow in TightVNC Server cursor shape trimming leads to out-of-bounds read
Exact source revision recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
cve-program · CVE-2026-107614
PublishedAn integer underflow in WinCursorShapeUtils::trimTransparent() in GlavSoft TightVNC Server for Windows before 2.8.88 allows a local authenticated user to crash the server, and potentially read out-of-bounds memory, by causing a cursor shape with a width or height of zero to be processed on the DXGI capture path. The loop bound width - 1 wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF, producing an access roughly 4 GB beyond the 64 KB cursor buffer; a monochrome cursor of height 1 also becomes 0 because getCursorHeight() halves the height in place.
- Source published
- 8 Oct 2026 13:39:58 UTC
- Source modified
- 8 Oct 2026 14:01:01 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H