Trigger.dev before 4.5.4 Hardcoded Coordinator Secret Authentication Bypass via Socket.IO

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Trigger.dev before 4.5.4 contains a hardcoded default secret vulnerability in the /coordinator Socket.IO namespace that allows unauthenticated attackers to connect using the published coordinator-secret value. Attackers can emit READY_FOR_EXECUTION to retrieve decrypted run environment variables or send TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN and similar events to tamper with arbitrary runs.

Source published

21 Oct 2026 00:36:54 UTC

Source modified

27 Oct 2026 21:52:33 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 22:45:55 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Trigger.dev before 4.5.4 contains a hardcoded default secret vulnerability in the /coordinator Socket.IO namespace that allows unauthenticated attackers to connect using the published coordinator-secret value. Attackers can emit READY_FOR_EXECUTION to retrieve decrypted run environment variables or send TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN and similar events to tamper with arbitrary runs.

Source published

Oct 21, 2026, 12:36:54 AM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Oct 27, 2026, 9:52:33 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

30 Oct 2026 01:58:24 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Trigger.dev before 4.5.4 contains a hardcoded default secret vulnerability in the /coordinator Socket.IO namespace that allows unauthenticated attackers to connect using the published coordinator-secret value. Attackers can emit READY_FOR_EXECUTION to retrieve decrypted run environment variables or send TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN and similar events to tamper with arbitrary runs.

Source published

21 Oct 2026 01:17:33 UTC

Source modified

27 Oct 2026 22:17:24 UTC

Observed here

29 Oct 2026 06:48:04 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

## TL;DR The /coordinator Socket.IO namespace mounts on every webapp boot and authenticates with a default secret ("coordinator-secret") baked into source. The override variable isn't documented in the self-host docs, .env.example, or helm values, so any operator who didn't read source ships with the default. Once connected, READY_FOR_EXECUTION returns the run's decrypted env vars. Anyone who can reach a default-config self-hosted webapp can pull production secrets out of any run whose internal id they can find. ## Vulnerabilities This attack is made possible by 3 vulnerabilities in Trigger.dev: ### 1. Hardcoded default authentication secret (CWE-798, Critical) PROVIDER_SECRET and COORDINATOR_SECRET are declared with `.default("provider-secret")` / `.default("coordinator-secret")` in [`apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts:289-290`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/env.server.ts#L289-L290). The values are present in the public source repo, neither var is documented in `docs/self-hosting/env/*.mdx`, `hosting/docker/.env.example`, or `hosting/k8s/helm/values.yaml`, and the auth check at [`packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts:148`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts#L148) is a plain string compare against that published value ### 2. Coordinator handler returns decrypted env vars to any authenticated caller (CWE-200, High) `READY_FOR_EXECUTION` at [`apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts:123`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/v3/handleSocketIo.server.ts#L123) calls `sharedQueueTasks.getLatestExecutionPayloadFromRun(runId, ...)`, which at [`apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts:1881-1895`](https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/blob/v4.4.4/apps/webapp/app/v3/marqs/sharedQueueConsumer.server.ts#L1881-L1895) returns `payload.environment` as the run's decrypted env-var dictionary. Any internal runId is enough to exfil that run's full env, regardless of tenant. Note: this read handler lives in V1-only `marqs/` code, so it returns nothing for runs on V2 (Run Engine 2.0). Self-hosts still on V1 are fully exposed; v4-only deployments only see the write handlers below ### 3. Other coordinator handlers accept attacker-controlled writes against arbitrary runs (CWE-862, High) TASK_RUN_COMPLETED, TASK_RUN_COMPLETED_WITH_ACK, TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN, CHECKPOINT_CREATED, CREATE_WORKER and friends invoke webapp services with attacker-supplied completion / attempt / worker payloads. None of them check that the caller has authority over the runId or attemptId in the message. `attempt_*` friendlyIds leak through every dashboard URL and emailed alert, so writes are trivially reachable without any internal id ## Exploit chain / PoC ```js import { io } from "socket.io-client"; const sock = io("https://<self-hosted-target>/coordinator", { auth: { token: "coordinator-secret" }, transports: ["websocket"], }); sock.on("connect", () => { // exfil decrypted env for a known run id sock.emit("READY_FOR_EXECUTION", { runId: "<runId>", totalCompletions: 0 }, (res) => { console.log(res.payload.environment); // { DATABASE_URL: "...", STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: "...", OPENAI_API_KEY: "...", ... } }); // mark any attempt failed sock.emit("TASK_RUN_FAILED_TO_RUN", { completion: { id: "<attempt_friendlyId>", ok: false, error: { type: "INTERNAL_ERROR", code: "FORGED", message: "owned" }, }, }); }); ``` ## Resolution Fixed in **v4.5.4**. The entire end-of-life V1 (Run Engine 1.0) execution stack was removed in commit `5ba8557a5` (#4236) — including the `/coordinator`, `/provider`, and `/shared-queue` Socket.IO namespaces, `packages/core/src/v3/zodNamespace.ts`, the `marqs` shared-queue consumer, and the `PROVIDER_SECRET` / `COORDINATOR_SECRET` environment variables. All three vulnerabilities are absent in v4.5.4 and later: the vulnerable namespaces no longer mount, the `READY_FOR_EXECUTION` env-var read handler and the unauthenticated write handlers no longer exist, and the hardcoded default secrets are gone. **Affected:** self-hosted Trigger.dev `< 4.5.4`. Vulnerability #2 (decrypted env-var exfiltration) additionally required a deployment still running Run Engine 1.0; v4-only (Run Engine 2.0) deployments were exposed only to the write handlers (#3). **Managed cloud (cloud.trigger.dev) was not affected:** it was configured with non-default control-plane secrets, so the default-secret entry point (vulnerability #1) that gates the chain never applied. **Action:** self-hosted operators on any release before v4.5.4 should upgrade to v4.5.4 or later.

Source published

2 Oct 2026 22:39:00 UTC

Source modified

21 Oct 2026 10:57:20 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL