Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

pocket-id · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 9.6 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.6 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.6 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend 0.0.0-20260727180059-43aaccd5bfacKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-115770

Published

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-117188

Published

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-115770

Published

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6

Published

## Summary An authenticated Pocket ID user can request an email-verification token while their account uses an address they control, change the account email address, and then redeem the previously issued token. The token is bound only to the user ID, not to the address to which it was sent, and changing the address does not revoke outstanding tokens. As a result, Pocket ID marks the newly supplied address as verified even though the user never proved control of it. Pocket ID subsequently returns that address with `email_verified: true` in OIDC claims. A relying party that trusts this claim for email-based account linking or provisioning can therefore link the attacker's Pocket ID identity to a victim's existing account, leading to cross-application account takeover. This was verified against commit `9f559788a44cfea790de360da0a74d4bdf8ca5d5`. ## Preconditions - The attacker has an ordinary Pocket ID user account. - Email verification is in use (`emailsVerified=false`, which is the default). - The user can edit their own account (`allowOwnAccountEdit=true`, which is the default). - The target address is not already assigned to another Pocket ID user. - For downstream account takeover, a relying party links or provisions users based on a trusted, verified email address. Applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC `sub` claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. No administrator privilege, victim interaction, or access to the victim's mailbox is required. ## Reproduction through the API 1. Sign in as an ordinary user whose current email address is controlled by the attacker, for example `[email protected]`. 2. Call `POST /api/users/me/send-email-verification`. 3. Obtain the token from the message delivered to `[email protected]`, but do not redeem it yet. 4. Call `PUT /api/users/me` and change the account email to an address the attacker does not control, for example `[email protected]`. 5. Observe that the new address is initially stored with `emailVerified: false`. 6. Call `POST /api/users/me/verify-email` with the token delivered to `[email protected]`. 7. Call `GET /api/users/me`. The current address is now `[email protected]` and `emailVerified` is `true`. 8. Complete an OIDC flow with the `email` scope. Pocket ID emits: ```json { "email": "[email protected]", "email_verified": true } ``` The old token has therefore verified a different address from the one to which it was delivered. ## Executable regression test / proof of concept Save this as `backend/internal/service/audit_email_verification_test.go` and run: ```text go test -tags=exclude_frontend,unit ./internal/service -run TestAuditEmailVerificationTokenSurvivesEmailChange -count=1 -v ``` The test passes on the referenced commit and demonstrates the unintended state transition: ```go package service import ( "testing" "time" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend/internal/appconfig" "github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend/internal/dto" "github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend/internal/model" datatype "github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend/internal/model/types" ) func TestAuditEmailVerificationTokenSurvivesEmailChange(t *testing.T) { userService, _ := newTestUserService(t) config := &appconfig.AppConfigModel{ RequireUserEmail: "true", AllowOwnAccountEdit: "true", EmailsVerified: "false", } attackerEmail := "[email protected]" user, err := userService.CreateUser(t.Context(), config, dto.UserCreateDto{ Username: "attacker", Email: &attackerEmail, EmailVerified: false, }) require.NoError(t, err) const tokenFromAttackerMailbox = "token-issued-for-attacker-email" require.NoError(t, userService.db.Create(&model.EmailVerificationToken{ UserID: user.ID, Token: tokenFromAttackerMailbox, ExpiresAt: datatype.DateTime(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)), }).Error) victimEmail := "[email protected]" _, err = userService.UpdateUser(t.Context(), config, user.ID, dto.UserCreateDto{ Username: user.Username, Email: &victimEmail, }, true, false) require.NoError(t, err) changed, err := userService.GetUser(t.Context(), user.ID) require.NoError(t, err) require.Equal(t, victimEmail, *changed.Email) require.False(t, changed.EmailVerified) require.NoError(t, userService.VerifyEmail( t.Context(), user.ID, tokenFromAttackerMailbox, )) verified, err := userService.GetUser(t.Context(), user.ID) require.NoError(t, err) require.Equal(t, victimEmail, *verified.Email) require.True(t, verified.EmailVerified) } ``` Observed result: ```text === RUN TestAuditEmailVerificationTokenSurvivesEmailChange --- PASS: TestAuditEmailVerificationTokenSurvivesEmailChange PASS ``` ## Root cause `backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go` stores only a token, expiration, and user ID. It does not store or cryptographically bind the address being verified. `UserService.SendEmailVerification` creates the token for `user.ID` and sends it to the current `user.Email`, but that email is not part of the token record: ```go emailVerificationToken := &model.EmailVerificationToken{ UserID: user.ID, Token: randomToken, ExpiresAt: datatype.DateTime(expiration), } ``` `UserService.UpdateUser` resets the verification flag when the address changes but leaves existing verification tokens valid. `UserService.VerifyEmail` validates only the token, user ID, and expiry, then sets `EmailVerified` on the user's current record: ```go err := tx.WithContext(ctx).Where( "token = ? AND user_id = ? AND expires_at > ?", token, userID, datatype.DateTime(time.Now()), ).First(&emailVerificationToken).Error user, err := s.getUserInternal(ctx, emailVerificationToken.UserID, tx) // ... user.EmailVerified = true ``` Finally, `backend/internal/oidc/claims_service.go` publishes the current address and flag together: ```go claims["email"] = *user.Email claims["email_verified"] = user.EmailVerified ``` ## Impact The direct impact is an authentication-integrity failure in an identity provider: any ordinary user can cause Pocket ID to attest control of an arbitrary unused email address. The security boundary crossed by that false attestation is the relying application. Where a relying party treats `email_verified=true` as proof of address ownership and uses email for automatic account matching, the attacker can be signed into or linked to the victim's existing relying-party account. This can expose all data and actions available through that account. ## Suggested remediation 1. Store a normalized target email address (or a keyed hash of it) with every verification token. 2. During redemption, atomically require that the stored target address still equals the user's current normalized email address. 3. Invalidate all outstanding email-verification tokens whenever the account email changes. 4. Invalidate prior outstanding tokens when issuing a replacement token. 5. Add a regression test that changes the email after issuance and requires the old token to be rejected. ## Testing note Source review and test construction were AI-assisted. The finding, affected control flow, preconditions, and executable proof of concept were validated against the referenced Pocket ID commit before submission.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

Risk history

Compare earlier KEV listings and EPSS scores. Advisory wording and affected versions have a separate history.

When does an EPSS score appear as a change?

A prediction change is reported when EPSS rises from below 10% to 10% or higher. Every daily score change from the last 30 days stays in this history. Before that, it keeps KEV changes and moves between EPSS bands (0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 90%).

Advisory history

10 saved versions

See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.

How advisory history works

Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.

16 Nov 2026 07:35:44 UTC

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-veri…

euvd · EUVD-2026-117188 · Published

14 Nov 2026 07:03:27 UTC

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-veri…

euvd · EUVD-2026-117188 · Published

13 Nov 2026 23:59:06 UTC

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-veri…

nvd · CVE-2026-115770 · Published

11 Nov 2026 23:57:21 UTC

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-veri…

euvd · EUVD-2026-117188 · Published

11 Nov 2026 23:56:51 UTC

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-veri…

nvd · CVE-2026-115770 · Published

9 Nov 2026 23:05:07 UTC

Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing

euvd · EUVD-2026-117188 · Published

9 Nov 2026 23:04:37 UTC

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-veri…

nvd · CVE-2026-115770 · Published

9 Nov 2026 23:04:27 UTC

Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing

osv · GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6 · Published

9 Nov 2026 23:02:12 UTC

Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing

cve-program · CVE-2026-115770 · Published

4 Nov 2026 23:54:02 UTC

Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing

cve-program · CVE-2026-115770 · Published

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 07:54 UTC · 270 of 275 readable · 255 fully read · 11 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current