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Echo: Rejected WebSocket upgrades can bypass Echo route-level access controls

CVSS 4.0 9.1 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 4.0 9.1 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.1 CRITICALCVSS_V4 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by github.com/labstack/echo/v4 4.16.1Fixed by github.com/labstack/echo/v5 5.4.1osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/labstack/echo/v4 4.16.1Fixed by github.com/labstack/echo/v5 5.4.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-118264

Published

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-112396

Published

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-118264

Published

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-cxf3-9h37-7rr8

Published

## Impact Echo's Proxy middleware selected a raw tunnel when the client requested a WebSocket upgrade, before validating whether the configured upstream accepted it. If the upstream returned an ordinary HTTP response and kept the connection alive, subsequent HTTP requests on that connection were forwarded directly to the same upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only at Echo's routes. Exploitation requires an accessible proxy route, an upstream that rejects the upgrade without closing the connection, and a target resource on that upstream without independent authorization. The issue does not provide arbitrary-host proxying or bypass the upstream's own authentication. ## Affected versions and patch The raw proxy implementation is present throughout the v4 and v5 release lines up to v4.16.0 and v5.4.0. Runtime reproductions confirmed v4.15.0, v4.16.0, v5.0.0 and v5.4.0; source history also shows the missing upgrade-response validation in v4.0.0. Upgrade to [v4.16.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.1) or [v5.4.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1). The patch routes WebSocket upgrades through Go's HTTP reverse proxy and enters a tunnel only after a valid upstream upgrade response. Rejected upgrades remain ordinary HTTP requests. Fix commits: [v4](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/3fb0ba7e17645bb65611e2a08875d0a2f65c421f), [v5](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec). ## Workarounds Reject WebSocket upgrade requests before they reach affected Echo proxy routes, or enforce authorization independently at every upstream resource. Merely returning a non-101 response from the upstream does not prevent the vulnerable raw tunnel. ## Credits Reported by @Duodum.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6839

Published

Echo: Rejected WebSocket upgrades can bypass Echo route-level access controls in github.com/labstack/echo

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-118264

Published

Echo: Rejected WebSocket upgrades can bypass Echo route-level access controls

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1.

Source published
28 Oct 2026 19:03:01 UTC
Source modified
30 Oct 2026 19:21:07 UTC
Saved here
30 Oct 2026 22:45:26 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 9.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-112396

Published

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects …

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 28, 2026, 7:03:01 PM

dateUpdated: Oct 30, 2026, 7:21:07 PM

Source published
Oct 28, 2026, 7:03:01 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Oct 30, 2026, 7:21:07 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
16 Nov 2026 04:33:54 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-118264

Published

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects …

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Undergoing Analysis

Weakness classifications: CWE-444 · CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-28T19:17:31.237

lastModified: 2026-11-04T23:10:00.223

Source published
28 Oct 2026 19:17:31 UTC
Source modified
4 Nov 2026 23:10:00 UTC
Saved here
5 Nov 2026 22:50:23 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-cxf3-9h37-7rr8

Published

Echo: Rejected WebSocket upgrades can bypass Echo route-level access controls

## Impact Echo's Proxy middleware selected a raw tunnel when the client requested a WebSocket upgrade, before validating whether the configured upstream accepted it. If the upstream returned an ordinary HTTP response and kept the connection alive, subsequent HTTP requests on that connection were forwarded directly to the same upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only at Echo's routes. Exploitation requires an accessible proxy route, an upstream that rejects the upgrade without closing the connection, and a target resource on that upstream without independent authorization. The issue does not provide arbitrary-host proxying or bypass the upstream's own authentication. ## Affected versions and patch The raw proxy implementation is present throughout the v4 and v5 release lines up to v4.16.0 and v5.4.0. Runtime reproductions confirmed v4.15.0, v4.16.0, v5.0.0 and v5.4.0; source history also shows the missing upgrade-response validation in v4.0.0. Upgrade to [v4.16.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.1) or [v5.4.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1). The patch routes WebSocket upgrades through Go's HTTP reverse proxy and enters a tunnel only after a valid upstream upgrade response. Rejected upgrades remain ordinary HTTP requests. Fix commits: [v4](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/3fb0ba7e17645bb65611e2a08875d0a2f65c421f), [v5](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec). ## Workarounds Reject WebSocket upgrade requests before they reach affected Echo proxy routes, or enforce authorization independently at every upstream resource. Merely returning a non-101 response from the upstream does not prevent the vulnerable raw tunnel. ## Credits Reported by @Duodum.

Source published
23 Oct 2026 20:49:37 UTC
Source modified
5 Nov 2026 23:26:10 UTC
Saved here
5 Nov 2026 23:38:32 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

osv · GO-2026-6839

Published

Echo: Rejected WebSocket upgrades can bypass Echo route-level access controls in github.com/labstack/echo

Echo: Rejected WebSocket upgrades can bypass Echo route-level access controls in github.com/labstack/echo

Source published
5 Nov 2026 22:54:11 UTC
Source modified
5 Nov 2026 23:26:10 UTC
Saved here
5 Nov 2026 23:38:32 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 16 Nov 06:51 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current