OHIF Viewers is a zero-footprint DICOM viewer with shared extension packages. From 3.5.0-beta.0 until 3.12.15, 3.13.7, and 3.14.0-beta.19, the dicom-pdf extension reads the attacker-controlled MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument value in extensions/dicom-pdf/src/getSopClassHandlerModule.js and uses it as the Blob media type for the attacker-controlled EncapsulatedDocument bytes. When a victim opens Encapsulated PDF SOP Class 1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.104.1, extensions/dicom-pdf/src/viewports/OHIFCornerstonePdfViewport.tsx embeds the Blob URL in an object element. A Blob labeled as HTML is handled as HTML despite the application/pdf object hint, and the Blob inherits the OHIF origin, allowing embedded script to access session storage, authentication tokens, and same-origin PACS requests. The malicious DICOM object may be opened locally, uploaded to a shared PACS, or supplied by a DICOMweb source. This issue is fixed in source versions 3.12.15, 3.13.7, and 3.14.0-beta.19.
OHIF Viewers is a zero-footprint DICOM viewer with shared extension packages. From 3.5.0-beta.0 until 3.12.15, 3.13.7, and 3.14.0-beta.19, the dicom-pdf extension reads the attacker-controlled MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument value in extensions/dicom-pdf/src/getSopClassHandlerModule.js and uses it as the Blob media type for the attacker-controlled EncapsulatedDocument bytes. When a victim opens Encapsulated PDF SOP Class 1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.104.1, extensions/dicom-pdf/src/viewports/OHIFCornerstonePdfViewport.tsx embeds the Blob URL in an object element. A Blob labeled as HTML is handled as HTML despite the application/pdf object hint, and the Blob inherits the OHIF origin, allowing embedded script to access session storage, authentication tokens, and same-origin PACS requests. The malicious DICOM object may be opened locally, uploaded to a shared PACS, or supplied by a DICOMweb source. This issue is fixed in source versions 3.12.15, 3.13.7, and 3.14.0-beta.19.
OHIF Viewers is a zero-footprint DICOM viewer with shared extension packages. From 3.5.0-beta.0 until 3.12.15, 3.13.7, and 3.14.0-beta.19, the dicom-pdf extension reads the attacker-controlled MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument value in extensions/dicom-pdf/src/getSopClassHandlerModule.js and uses it as the Blob media type for the attacker-controlled EncapsulatedDocument bytes. When a victim opens Encapsulated PDF SOP Class 1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.104.1, extensions/dicom-pdf/src/viewports/OHIFCornerstonePdfViewport.tsx embeds the Blob URL in an object element. A Blob labeled as HTML is handled as HTML despite the application/pdf object hint, and the Blob inherits the OHIF origin, allowing embedded script to access session storage, authentication tokens, and same-origin PACS requests. The malicious DICOM object may be opened locally, uploaded to a shared PACS, or supplied by a DICOMweb source. This issue is fixed in source versions 3.12.15, 3.13.7, and 3.14.0-beta.19.
### Summary
An XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) vulnerability occurs when an attacker is able to inject their own JavaScript code into a web page's source, which is subsequently processed by the victim's browser. A common cause of this vulnerability is the failure to validate user-supplied data before displaying it within the vulnerable application without proper filtering. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker must input HTML code into a vulnerable parameter containing structures that trigger the execution of JavaScript. The DOM XSS variant occurs when user-supplied data is processed by a client-side script; if this data is not handled correctly by the script itself, it becomes possible to inject additional JavaScript commands.
**Attacker model:** Any actor who can get a DICOM object in front of a victim — email a `.dcm`
for local viewing, upload to a shared PACS, or operate/compromise a DICOMweb source.
**Preconditions:** Victim opens a study whose SOP Class is Encapsulated PDF
(`1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.104.1`) and OHIF's `dicom-pdf` extension renders it (default in the
standard modes).
#### Taint path
**Source** — two attacker-controlled tags on the encapsulated-document instance:
- `MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument` (0042,0012)
- `EncapsulatedDocument` (0042,0011) — the raw document bytes
`extensions/dicom-pdf/src/getSopClassHandlerModule.js:15,20` reads the MIME tag with no
validation and passes it as `defaultType`:
```js
const { SeriesDescription = 'PDF', MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument } = instance;
...
const renderedUrlParams = {
instance,
tag: 'EncapsulatedDocument',
defaultType: MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument || 'application/pdf', // attacker-controlled
singlepart: 'pdf',
};
const renderedUrl = dataSource.retrieve.directURL(renderedUrlParams);
```
**Sink** — `defaultType` becomes the `Blob` type in all three retrieval paths:
*Local file (no server required):* `extensions/default/src/DicomLocalDataSource/index.js:120-131`
```js
directURL: params => {
const { instance, tag, defaultType } = params;
const value = instance[tag];
if (value instanceof Array && value[0] instanceof ArrayBuffer) {
return URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([value[0]], { type: defaultType })); // attacker MIME
}
},
```
*DICOMweb InlineBinary:* `extensions/default/src/utils/getDirectURL.ts:40-44` →
`platform/core/src/utils/b64toBlob.js:18`
```js
if (value.InlineBinary) {
const blob = utils.b64toBlob(value.InlineBinary, defaultType); // -> new Blob(..., { type: defaultType })
value.DirectRetrieveURL = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
return value.DirectRetrieveURL;
}
```
*DICOMweb bulk data:* `extensions/default/src/utils/getDirectURL.ts:52-55`
```js
return value.retrieveBulkData(options).then(arr => {
value.DirectRetrieveURL = URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([arr], { type: defaultType }));
return value.DirectRetrieveURL;
});
```
**Render** — `extensions/dicom-pdf/src/viewports/OHIFCornerstonePdfViewport.tsx:86-92`
```tsx
<object
data={url} {/* blob: URL whose stored MIME = attacker's MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument */}
type="application/pdf" {/* only a hint; overridden by the blob's own Content-Type */}
className={style}
>
```
**Why it fires.** A `blob:` URL stores the MIME type passed at `new Blob(..., { type })`
construction. When such a URL is navigated/embedded, the browser uses the blob's stored
Content-Type to choose a handler; the `<object type="application/pdf">` attribute is a
pre-load hint, not an override. A blob created with `type: 'text/html'` therefore renders as an
HTML document, and because `blob:` URLs inherit the creating page's origin, any `<script>` in it
executes **in the OHIF origin** — with access to `localStorage`/`sessionStorage`, auth tokens,
and same-origin requests to the PACS.
### Impact
Users using the applications. If the application is behind authentication then session can be stolen. If on the same DNS name some other applications are hosted, they are also impacted.
### Patches
Fixed in `@ohif/extension-dicom-pdf` `3.12.18`, `3.13.10` and `3.14.0-beta.36` (fix: https://github.com/OHIF/Viewers/pull/6228).
If you build OHIF from source, the fix first landed in tags `3.12.15`, `3.13.7` and `3.14.0-beta.19`.
Versions `3.5` to `3.11` will not receive a fix. Upgrade to a patched `3.12`, `3.13` or `3.14` version.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 6, 2026, 5:29:15 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 6, 2026, 5:47:50 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-79
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-06T18:17:57.340
lastModified: 2026-11-12T20:04:52.377
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.