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@sigstore/oci sends the registry Authorization header to a cross-host blob-upload Location

CVSS 3.1 7.4 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.4 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.4 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by @sigstore/oci 0.7.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-118763

Published

sigstore-js provides JavaScript libraries for interacting with Sigstore services. Prior to 0.7.2, packages/oci/src/registry.ts contains a RegistryClient.signIn() method that stores registry Authorization and Docker configuration headers as defaults on a shared HTTP client, while RegistryClient.uploadBlob() sends a fresh PUT to an absolute blob-upload Location supplied by the registry without checking that its origin or scheme matches the registry. A malicious or compromised registry can therefore direct a user pushing an artifact through attachArtifactToImage() to an attacker-controlled host and receive the registry bearer token, Basic credentials, or custom authentication headers. Redirect-time header stripping does not prevent the leak because the cross-host PUT is a new explicit request rather than a followed redirect. This is a residual of CVE-2026-59891, whose fix changed credential selection in credentials.ts but did not constrain where credentials are sent from registry.ts. Version 0.7.2 fixes the issue by separating registry credentials from client-wide defaults and sending them only to the registry origin.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-113272

Published

sigstore-js provides JavaScript libraries for interacting with Sigstore services. Prior to 0.7.2, packages/oci/src/registry.ts contains a RegistryClient.signIn() method that stores registry Authorization and Docker configuration headers as defaults on a shared HTTP client, while RegistryClient.uploadBlob() sends a fresh PUT to an absolute blob-upload Location supplied by the registry without checking that its origin or scheme matches the registry. A malicious or compromised registry can therefore direct a user pushing an artifact through attachArtifactToImage() to an attacker-controlled host and receive the registry bearer token, Basic credentials, or custom authentication headers. Redirect-time header stripping does not prevent the leak because the cross-host PUT is a new explicit request rather than a followed redirect. This is a residual of CVE-2026-59891, whose fix changed credential selection in credentials.ts but did not constrain where credentials are sent from registry.ts. Version 0.7.2 fixes the issue by separating registry credentials from client-wide defaults and sending them only to the registry origin.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-118763

Published

sigstore-js provides JavaScript libraries for interacting with Sigstore services. Prior to 0.7.2, packages/oci/src/registry.ts contains a RegistryClient.signIn() method that stores registry Authorization and Docker configuration headers as defaults on a shared HTTP client, while RegistryClient.uploadBlob() sends a fresh PUT to an absolute blob-upload Location supplied by the registry without checking that its origin or scheme matches the registry. A malicious or compromised registry can therefore direct a user pushing an artifact through attachArtifactToImage() to an attacker-controlled host and receive the registry bearer token, Basic credentials, or custom authentication headers. Redirect-time header stripping does not prevent the leak because the cross-host PUT is a new explicit request rather than a followed redirect. This is a residual of CVE-2026-59891, whose fix changed credential selection in credentials.ts but did not constrain where credentials are sent from registry.ts. Version 0.7.2 fixes the issue by separating registry credentials from client-wide defaults and sending them only to the registry origin.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-j63v-mwhm-56jx

Published

### Summary @sigstore/oci sends the registry Authorization header to a cross-host blob-upload Location ## Affected versions and vulnerable location - Confirmed on sigstore-js at `3a83271` (current HEAD). - File: `packages/oci/src/registry.ts`. - `signIn()` installs the credential as a DEFAULT header on the shared client: `this.#fetch = this.#fetch.defaults({ headers: { [HEADER_AUTHORIZATION]: 'Basic ' + basicAuth } })` (`:126-128`) or `... 'Bearer ' + token` (`:145-147`), plus `creds.headers` from the Docker config (`:104`). - `uploadBlob()` reads the `Location` response header (`:184`), builds `uploadLocation = new URL(location.startsWith('/') ? this.#baseURL + location : location)` (`:190-192`), and PUTs the blob to it through the same client: `await this.#fetch(uploadLocation.href, { method: 'PUT', body: blob, headers: { [HEADER_CONTENT_TYPE]: ... } })` (`:198`). - There is no check that `uploadLocation`'s host (or scheme) equals the registry host before the PUT is sent. ## Root cause Because `signIn()` sets `Authorization` via `.defaults()`, it is attached to every request the client issues, including requests to a host the client read out of a server response. When a POST to `.../blobs/uploads/` returns an absolute `Location` pointing to a different host, `uploadBlob()` PUTs the blob there with the registry `Authorization` header still attached. If the challenge scheme was `basic`, that header carries the raw registry `username:password`; if bearer, it carries the access token; `creds.headers` custom auth headers ride along too. The library's HTTP layer (`make-fetch-happen` / `minipass-fetch`) strips `Authorization` on cross-host redirects it follows internally, which protects the `HEAD ... { redirect: 'follow' }` at `:167`. It does not help here, because the PUT to the upload `Location` is a fresh, explicit `this.#fetch()` call, not a followed redirect, so the default header is applied unconditionally. This is a residual of GHSA-pf56-329r-95rw / CVE-2026-59891 (credential confusion in `@sigstore/oci`). The fix for that advisory (commit `85c5838`) changed only `credentials.ts`, replacing a `key.includes(registry)` substring match with an exact host match when SELECTING which Docker credential to load. It never touched `registry.ts`, which controls WHERE the loaded credential is sent. The cross-host send remains. ## Attacker model A user pushing a signed artifact/attestation to an OCI registry via `attachArtifactToImage()`. The credential leaks to any host the registry names in the blob-upload `Location`. This is reachable when the registry is malicious or compromised, or when a registry that legitimately redirects blob uploads to third-party storage is impersonated. The OCI distribution spec permits absolute upload `Location` values (registries commonly redirect blob storage to a separate host), so a compliant-but-hostile registry can steer the PUT to an attacker host and capture the credential. This is the same "attacker-controlled registry" threat model accepted for GHSA-pf56. ## Reachability trace `index.ts:43 attachArtifactToImage()` -> `new OCIImage(...).addArtifact()` -> `image.ts:67 this.#client.signIn(credentials)` (installs the default Authorization header) -> `image.ts:76/79 this.#client.uploadBlob(...)` -> `registry.ts:198` PUT to the response-supplied `Location` with the default Authorization header attached. Same `RegistryClient` instance throughout, so the default persists. ## Reproduction Source-verified. No live push against a hostile registry was executed in this pass. Confirmed: ```bash rg -n "defaults\(|HEADER_AUTHORIZATION|Location|new URL\(|this.#fetch\(uploadLocation" packages/oci/src/registry.ts git log --oneline -3 -- packages/oci/src/credentials.ts packages/oci/src/registry.ts ``` `signIn()` sets `Authorization` via `.defaults()`; `uploadBlob()` PUTs to `uploadLocation.href` (which may be an absolute cross-host URL) with no host check; the GHSA-pf56 fix commit is the latest change to `credentials.ts`, while `registry.ts` has only dependency bumps since. ## Suggested fix Do not send the registry `Authorization` (or `creds.headers`) to an upload `Location` on a different host. Compare `uploadLocation.host` (and require `https`) against the registry host before the PUT; if it differs, issue the PUT without the credential (matching how registries that redirect to pre-signed storage URLs expect the upload to be unauthenticated), or explicitly re-authenticate for that host. More generally, avoid attaching the credential via a client-wide `.defaults()` and instead attach it per-request only to the registry host. ## How it was found and a note on tooling Every place `@sigstore/oci` was traced to attach a credential to an outbound request and checked whether the request host can be steered by a server response. The blob-upload `Location` path attaches the client-default `Authorization` to a PUT whose host comes from the registry response, with no host-equality check, and the GHSA-pf56 fix touched only the credential-selection code, not this send path. I used AI assistance for the trace and drafting and manually verified the cited lines and the fix scope at HEAD `3a83271`. Verification is source-only; I did not execute a push against a hostile registry. ## Independent re-verification at HEAD (2026-07-31) Re-read at HEAD `3a83271`. Unchanged, and the two halves sit in the same file: ``` 126-127: this.#fetch = this.#fetch.defaults({ headers: { [HEADER_AUTHORIZATION]: `Basic ${basicAuth}` } }) 145-146: this.#fetch = this.#fetch.defaults({ headers: { [HEADER_AUTHORIZATION]: `Bearer ${token}` } }) 104: this.#fetch = this.#fetch.defaults({ headers: creds.headers }) ``` and in `uploadBlob()`: ```ts const uploadLocation = new URL( location.startsWith('/') ? `${this.#baseURL}${location}` : location ); ... await this.#fetch(uploadLocation.href, { method: 'PUT', ... }); ``` The ternary is the whole issue. A relative `Location` is anchored to `#baseURL`, but an absolute one is passed to `new URL()` verbatim, so its host is whatever the registry response said. There is no comparison against the registry host or scheme before the PUT, and because the credential was installed with `.defaults()` rather than passed per-request, it is attached automatically. Worth separating from the redirect case: the `HEAD` at the top of `uploadBlob()` uses `redirect: 'follow'`, and the fetch layer does strip `Authorization` across hosts on redirects it follows itself. That protection does not apply here, because the PUT is a fresh explicit call the library makes to a URL it parsed out of a response body header, not a redirect being followed. This has not been executed against a hostile registry, so the leak is traced from the source rather than observed on the wire. The control flow above is unambiguous, but it is better to state the limit than imply a packet capture that has not been created.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-118763

Published

sigstore-js

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "sigstore",
                    "product": "sigstore-js",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 0.7.2",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

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euvd · EUVD-2026-113272

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Oct 29, 2026, 5:01:40 PM

dateUpdated: Oct 30, 2026, 5:13:12 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

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nvd · CVE-2026-118763

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-522

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-29T17:18:07.230

lastModified: 2026-10-30T19:39:14.897

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-j63v-mwhm-56jx

Published

@sigstore/oci

npm

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 0.7.2

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