nerves_hub_web · Vulnerability
Historical advisory recorded 10 Nov 2026 12:21:22 UTC. Read the latest advisory.
cve-program · CVE-2026-120999
PublishedImproper Authentication vulnerability in Google sign-in and email confirmation in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an attacker who registers another person's email address to share that person's account once they sign in. NervesHub.Accounts.update_or_create_user_from_ueberauth/1 signs a Google user in to any account carrying the same email that is not yet linked to a Google account, links it and marks the email confirmed, without the account's owner ever having proved they own the address. NervesHubWeb.SessionController.confirm/2 likewise signs in whoever follows a confirmation link. An attacker registers the address from the sign-up form, changes their own account's email to it, or registers it as an organization admin from an invite link, and keeps the password; when the address's owner signs in with Google or follows the confirmation link, they land in that account. The Google path also creates accounts with registrations closed and never checks Google's email_verified claim, and the API's password sign-in in NervesHubWeb.API.UserController issues tokens to accounts whose email was never confirmed. The attacker gains only what the victim is granted afterwards, and nothing on accounts whose owners never use either path. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.3.0 before 2.5.3.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
cve-program · CVE-2026-120999
PublishedImproper authentication lets Google sign-in and confirmation links sign users in to accounts registered with their email address by someone else
Improper Authentication vulnerability in Google sign-in and email confirmation in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an attacker who registers another person's email address to share that person's account once they sign in. NervesHub.Accounts.update_or_create_user_from_ueberauth/1 signs a Google user in to any account carrying the same email that is not yet linked to a Google account, links it and marks the email confirmed, without the account's owner ever having proved they own the address. NervesHubWeb.SessionController.confirm/2 likewise signs in whoever follows a confirmation link. An attacker registers the address from the sign-up form, changes their own account's email to it, or registers it as an organization admin from an invite link, and keeps the password; when the address's owner signs in with Google or follows the confirmation link, they land in that account. The Google path also creates accounts with registrations closed and never checks Google's email_verified claim, and the API's password sign-in in NervesHubWeb.API.UserController issues tokens to accounts whose email was never confirmed. The attacker gains only what the victim is granted afterwards, and nothing on accounts whose owners never use either path. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.3.0 before 2.5.3.
- Source published
- 10 Nov 2026 10:43:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Nov 2026 10:43:38 UTC
- Saved here
- 10 Nov 2026 12:21:22 UTC
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- CVE Program Terms of Use
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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 7.4 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N