Nodemailer 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 Address Parsing Bypass via Nested Comments
cve-program · CVE-2026-121424
PublishedNodemailer from 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 contains an address parsing vulnerability in addressparser that allows remote attackers to redirect recipients by ending nested RFC 5322 comments at the first closing parenthesis. Attackers can submit addresses whose nested comment hides an attacker address, bypassing conformant validators and recipient allow lists to receive mail or spoof senders in mailparser.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-115956
PublishedNodemailer from 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 contains an address parsing vulnerability in addressparser that allows remote attackers to redirect recipients by ending nested RFC 5322 comments at the first closing parenthesis. Attackers can submit addresses whose nested comment hides an attacker address, bypassing conformant validators and recipient allow lists to receive mail or spoof senders in mailparser.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-121424
PublishedNodemailer from 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 contains an address parsing vulnerability in addressparser that allows remote attackers to redirect recipients by ending nested RFC 5322 comments at the first closing parenthesis. Attackers can submit addresses whose nested comment hides an attacker address, bypassing conformant validators and recipient allow lists to receive mail or spoof senders in mailparser.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8
Published### Vulnerability summary RFC 5322 comments nest. addressparser ended a comment at the first `)`, including the one that closes a nested comment, and parsed the rest of the outer comment as header text. `Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>` names `[email protected]` with `x(y) <[email protected]>` as a comment, and Nodemailer read it as the address `[email protected]`. This is the same shape as the escaped parenthesis fixed in 10.1.2, reached through nesting instead of a quoted-pair. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3. ### Attacker capabilities The attacker controls the text of an address that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the From or To header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 address that conformant parsers accept without defects. ### Realistic exploitation scenario An application validates a submitted address with a conformant parser and allows only its own domain. The attacker submits `Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>`, which validates as `[email protected]`. Nodemailer delivers to `[email protected]`. In the inbound direction, a DMARC or display layer built on a conformant parser and a mail client built on mailparser disagree on the author of the same message, which is the setting for sender spoofing. The boundary crossed is the application's recipient allow list, or the author check of the receiving side. ### Proof of concept ```js const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser'); console.log(addressparser("Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>")); // [ { address: '[email protected]', name: 'Victim) [email protected]' } ] ``` Python's `email._header_value_parser.get_address_list` reads the same value as `[email protected]` with the display name `Victim`, with no defects reported. The envelope a message gets is built from the same parse, so `sendMail({ to: "Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>" })` issues the RCPT TO shown above. ### Security impact Mail intended for an approved recipient is delivered to an attacker chosen domain, disclosing its content, and parsers built on this module report a different author than conformant ones. The misreading only occurs on values a conformant validator approves, so correct validation is bypassed. Affected are applications that pass user influenced addresses to Nodemailer and consumers of the standalone parser such as mailparser. The fix counts comment depth and ends a comment only at the `)` that closes the outermost one. Found in an internal review of addressparser on 2026-10-18. Verified on 3.0.0, 6.9.16 and 10.1.3.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
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cve-program · CVE-2026-121424
PublishedNodemailer 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 Address Parsing Bypass via Nested Comments
Nodemailer from 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 contains an address parsing vulnerability in addressparser that allows remote attackers to redirect recipients by ending nested RFC 5322 comments at the first closing parenthesis. Attackers can submit addresses whose nested comment hides an attacker address, bypassing conformant validators and recipient allow lists to receive mail or spoof senders in mailparser.
- Source published
- 3 Nov 2026 14:28:20 UTC
- Source modified
- 3 Nov 2026 18:30:19 UTC
- Saved here
- 3 Nov 2026 19:57:16 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-115956
PublishedNodemailer from 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 contains an address parsing vulnerability in addressparser that allows remote attackers to redirect recipients by ending nested RFC 5322 comments at the first closing parenthesis. Attackers can submit add…
Nodemailer from 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 contains an address parsing vulnerability in addressparser that allows remote attackers to redirect recipients by ending nested RFC 5322 comments at the first closing parenthesis. Attackers can submit addresses whose nested comment hides an attacker address, bypassing conformant validators and recipient allow lists to receive mail or spoof senders in mailparser.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 3, 2026, 2:28:20 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 3, 2026, 6:30:19 PM
- Source published
- Nov 3, 2026, 2:28:20 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 3, 2026, 6:30:19 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 22 Nov 2026 09:30:13 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-121424
PublishedNodemailer from 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 contains an address parsing vulnerability in addressparser that allows remote attackers to redirect recipients by ending nested RFC 5322 comments at the first closing parenthesis. Attackers can submit add…
Nodemailer from 3.0.0 before 10.1.4 contains an address parsing vulnerability in addressparser that allows remote attackers to redirect recipients by ending nested RFC 5322 comments at the first closing parenthesis. Attackers can submit addresses whose nested comment hides an attacker address, bypassing conformant validators and recipient allow lists to receive mail or spoof senders in mailparser.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-20
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-03T15:17:32.883
lastModified: 2026-11-03T19:18:02.800
- Source published
- 3 Nov 2026 15:17:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 3 Nov 2026 19:18:02 UTC
- Saved here
- 4 Nov 2026 03:59:20 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-8c8m-p3m8-cjg8
PublishedNodemailer: A nested comment ends early in addressparser, releasing the rest of the comment as a recipient
### Vulnerability summary RFC 5322 comments nest. addressparser ended a comment at the first `)`, including the one that closes a nested comment, and parsed the rest of the outer comment as header text. `Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>` names `[email protected]` with `x(y) <[email protected]>` as a comment, and Nodemailer read it as the address `[email protected]`. This is the same shape as the escaped parenthesis fixed in 10.1.2, reached through nesting instead of a quoted-pair. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3. ### Attacker capabilities The attacker controls the text of an address that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the From or To header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 address that conformant parsers accept without defects. ### Realistic exploitation scenario An application validates a submitted address with a conformant parser and allows only its own domain. The attacker submits `Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>`, which validates as `[email protected]`. Nodemailer delivers to `[email protected]`. In the inbound direction, a DMARC or display layer built on a conformant parser and a mail client built on mailparser disagree on the author of the same message, which is the setting for sender spoofing. The boundary crossed is the application's recipient allow list, or the author check of the receiving side. ### Proof of concept ```js const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser'); console.log(addressparser("Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>")); // [ { address: '[email protected]', name: 'Victim) [email protected]' } ] ``` Python's `email._header_value_parser.get_address_list` reads the same value as `[email protected]` with the display name `Victim`, with no defects reported. The envelope a message gets is built from the same parse, so `sendMail({ to: "Victim (x(y) <[email protected]>) <[email protected]>" })` issues the RCPT TO shown above. ### Security impact Mail intended for an approved recipient is delivered to an attacker chosen domain, disclosing its content, and parsers built on this module report a different author than conformant ones. The misreading only occurs on values a conformant validator approves, so correct validation is bypassed. Affected are applications that pass user influenced addresses to Nodemailer and consumers of the standalone parser such as mailparser. The fix counts comment depth and ends a comment only at the `)` that closes the outermost one. Found in an internal review of addressparser on 2026-10-18. Verified on 3.0.0, 6.9.16 and 10.1.3.
- Source published
- 23 Oct 2026 21:53:04 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Nov 2026 02:56:06 UTC
- Saved here
- 4 Nov 2026 03:57:35 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE