Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Hickory-DNS 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Nonexistence Forgery via Wraparound NSEC

CVSS 4.0 8.9 HIGHCVSS 3.1 6.8 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.9 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.9 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.8 MEDIUMosv · severity unknownFixed by hickory-net 0.26.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-123587

Published

The DNSSEC validation in the Hickory DNS hickory-net crate 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 identifies wraparound NSEC records by comparing the next domain name to an SOA record in the response, accepting that SOA even if it fails validation. Attackers who can supply DNS responses can combine a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record to forge nonexistence of any RRset.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-119346

Published

The DNSSEC validation in the Hickory DNS hickory-net crate 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 identifies wraparound NSEC records by comparing the next domain name to an SOA record in the response, accepting that SOA even if it fails validation. Attackers who can supply DNS responses can combine a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record to forge nonexistence of any RRset.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-123587

Published

The DNSSEC validation in the Hickory DNS hickory-net crate 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 identifies wraparound NSEC records by comparing the next domain name to an SOA record in the response, accepting that SOA even if it fails validation. Attackers who can supply DNS responses can combine a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG with a crafted SOA record to forge nonexistence of any RRset.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0508

Published

The last NSEC record in a zone points back to the zone apex. To recognise it, DNSSEC validation treated an NSEC record as covering every name after its owner when its next domain name equalled the owner name of an SOA record in the response. That SOA record did not have to pass validation. An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can replay a genuine NSEC record and its RRSIG, add a forged SOA record whose name equals that NSEC record's next domain name, and so make the validator accept that any name sorting after the NSEC owner does not exist. This affects DNSSEC validation through `DnssecDnsHandle` when built with `dnssec-ring` or `dnssec-aws-lc-rs`. The fix recognises a wraparound NSEC record from the chain itself (its next domain name sorts at or before its owner and is the zone of the queried name) and only uses validated SOA records. It is in 0.26.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Related changes

Linked by CVE identifier
ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 14 Nov 11:24 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current