CVSS 3.1 base metricsRed raises the risk · green lowers it
Attack vector
NetworkAV:N
Attack complexity
HighAC:H
Privileges required
NonePR:N
User interaction
NoneUI:N
Scope
UnchangedS:U
Confidentiality
NoneC:N
Integrity
LowI:L
Availability
LowA:L
Updates that fix it
0 KBs
No KB listed
No KB update is listed in the collected MSRC record. Check the MSRC advisory for product releases and other remedies.
Affected products
Open Source Software
2 affected products
azl3 netavark 1.10.3-9 on Azure Linux 3.0
azl4 rust-hickory-proto0.25 0.25.2-2.azl4 on Azure Linux 4.0
What changed
Affected products: azl3 netavark 1.10.3-9 on Azure Linux 3.0 → azl3 netavark 1.10.3-9 on Azure Linux 3.0, azl4 rust-hickory-proto0.25 0.25.2-2.azl4 on Azure Linux 4.0
Detection template: Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
Detection template: No Nuclei template listed → Unknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained
Page history
Changes are dated when recorded; day views use the last saved version from that UTC day, and citations stay fixed.
14 Nov 2026 · 08:16:23 UTCAffected productsazl3 netavark 1.10.3-9 on Azure Linux 3.0 → azl3 netavark 1.10.3-9 on Azure Linux 3.0, azl4 rust-hickory-proto0.25 0.25.2-2.azl4 on Azure Linux 4.0
13 Nov 2026 · 12:10:20 UTCPublic detection templateUnknown: detection-template evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-123594
Published
Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC NSEC Validation Bypass for Empty Non-Terminals
Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant…
Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:24 AM
dateUpdated: Nov 9, 2026, 1:51:34 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
msrc_CVE-2026-123594: Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC NSEC Validation Bypass for Empty Non-Terminals
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant…
Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
NXDOMAIN accepted for a proven empty non-terminal (hickory-proto)
Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record's next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.
From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0519
Published
NXDOMAIN accepted for an empty non-terminal that the NSEC record proves exists
When an NSEC record's next domain name is below the queried name, the queried name exists as an empty non-terminal (RFC 8020 section 3.1). The NSEC validator did not check for this case and accepted an NXDOMAIN response backed by such a record as secure.
The response code is not covered by any signature. An attacker who can modify DNS responses can take a genuine signed NODATA response for an empty non-terminal, change its response code to NXDOMAIN, and have the validator accept that an existing name does not exist.
This affects DNSSEC validation through `DnssecDnsHandle` when built with `dnssec-ring` or `dnssec-aws-lc-rs`.
The fix rejects NXDOMAIN as bogus, and validates NODATA as secure, when the covering NSEC record's next domain name is below the queried name and is not the zone apex. It is in 0.26.2.
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.