Hickory DNS 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 NSEC3 Proof of Nonexistence Forgery
cve-program · CVE-2026-123601
PublishedHickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 invert the relational operators in the wrap-around branch of find_covering_record() in nsec3.rs, so the last NSEC3 record in a zone's hash ring covers every hash except its owner. Attackers able to inject DNS responses can replay that NSEC3 record and its RRSIG to forge DNSSEC-validated negative responses denying legitimate names.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-119360
PublishedHickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 invert the relational operators in the wrap-around branch of find_covering_record() in nsec3.rs, so the last NSEC3 record in a zone's hash ring covers every hash except its owner. Attackers able to inject DNS responses can replay that NSEC3 record and its RRSIG to forge DNSSEC-validated negative responses denying legitimate names.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-123601
PublishedHickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 invert the relational operators in the wrap-around branch of find_covering_record() in nsec3.rs, so the last NSEC3 record in a zone's hash ring covers every hash except its owner. Attackers able to inject DNS responses can replay that NSEC3 record and its RRSIG to forge DNSSEC-validated negative responses denying legitimate names.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · RUSTSEC-2026-0504
PublishedIn hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1, DNSSEC validation handled the last NSEC3 record of a zone's hash chain with its two comparisons reversed. That record was treated as covering almost every hash it does not cover, so an attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay it, with its RRSIG, to forge proofs that existing names have no records. From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in hickory-proto 0.25 (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor 0.25) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · RUSTSEC-2026-0506
PublishedWhen DNSSEC validation looks for the NSEC3 record that covers a hashed name, the last record in the zone's hash chain needs special handling, because its next hashed owner name sorts before its own hash. For that record the two comparisons were reversed: it was treated as covering every hash below its owner hash or above its next hash, which is mostly the part of the chain it does not cover. An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can replay that one signed NSEC3 record, with its RRSIG, from the target zone and use it in forged negative answers. The validator then accepts proof that names which do exist have no records. This affects DNSSEC validation through `DnssecDnsHandle` (resolver, recursor and client) when built with `dnssec-ring` or `dnssec-aws-lc-rs`. The same code was in hickory-proto before it moved to hickory-net. The fix corrects the comparison in `find_covering_record`. It is in 0.26.2.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Related advisories and sources
Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.
CVE-2026-123601 · CVE overview and exploitation status
cve-program · CVE-2026-123601
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-588m-chg6-8jqj
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/hickory-dns-0.26.0-beta.1-before-0.26.2-nsec3-proof-of-nonexistence-forgery
euvd · EUVD-2026-119360
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-588m-chg6-8jqj
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/hickory-dns-0.26.0-beta.1-before-0.26.2-nsec3-proof-of-nonexistence-forgery
nvd · CVE-2026-123601
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-588m-chg6-8jqj
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/hickory-dns-0.26.0-beta.1-before-0.26.2-nsec3-proof-of-nonexistence-forgery
osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0504
- https://crates.io/crates/hickory-proto
- https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0504.html
- https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/87ee4f81aa9689d81847770d3a74e13982c9bcdc
osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0506
Related changes
Linked by CVE identifier- Inverted NSEC3 comparison in DNSSEC validation (hickory-proto 0.25) · Newly collected advisory · 12 Nov 2026
- Inverted NSEC3 comparison lets one record "prove" that almost any name does not exist · Newly collected advisory · 12 Nov 2026
- Hickory DNS 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 NSEC3 Proof of Nonexistence Forgery · Newly collected advisory · 8 Nov 2026