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cve-program · CVE-2026-123605
Published
Hickory DNS through 0.25.0-alpha.3 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via RRSIG Signer's Name
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.1 through 0.25.0-alpha.3 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because the validator verifies an RRSIG against the DNSKEY of whatever name appears in its Signer's Name field without checking that this name is the zone containing the RRset. Attackers controlling any secure zone can produce valid signatures over arbitrary records in unrelated zones, which resolvers, recursors, and clients using DnssecDnsHandle accept as authenticated.
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.1 through 0.25.0-alpha.3 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because the validator verifies an RRSIG against the DNSKEY of whatever name appears in its Signer's Name field without che…
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.1 through 0.25.0-alpha.3 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because the validator verifies an RRSIG against the DNSKEY of whatever name appears in its Signer's Name field without checking that this name is the zone containing the RRset. Attackers controlling any secure zone can produce valid signatures over arbitrary records in unrelated zones, which resolvers, recursors, and clients using DnssecDnsHandle accept as authenticated.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:32 AM
dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2026, 5:56:59 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
msrc_CVE-2026-123605: Hickory DNS through 0.25.0-alpha.3 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via RRSIG Signer's Name
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.1 through 0.25.0-alpha.3 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because the validator verifies an RRSIG against the DNSKEY of whatever name appears in its Signer's Name field without che…
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.1 through 0.25.0-alpha.3 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because the validator verifies an RRSIG against the DNSKEY of whatever name appears in its Signer's Name field without checking that this name is the zone containing the RRset. Attackers controlling any secure zone can produce valid signatures over arbitrary records in unrelated zones, which resolvers, recursors, and clients using DnssecDnsHandle accept as authenticated.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
RRSIG signer name was not checked against the zone of the signed records
DNSSEC validation checked an RRset against the DNSKEYs of whatever zone was named in the RRSIG's Signer's Name field. RFC 4035 section 5.3.1 requires that name to be the zone that contains the RRset, but this was not checked.
Anyone who controls a DNSSEC-signed zone, and can answer or modify DNS responses, can therefore sign records for names in an unrelated zone with their own keys and have the validator accept them as secure.
This affects DNSSEC validation through `DnssecDnsHandle` (resolver, recursor and client) when built with `dnssec-ring` or `dnssec-aws-lc-rs`.
The fix ignores an RRSIG whose signer name is not the RRset's owner name or one of its ancestors. It is in 0.26.2.
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.