imgproxy from 4.0.0 before 4.0.16 contains an integer overflow in the ICO loader that allows remote attackers to trigger a heap buffer overflow via a crafted data_size value. Attackers can submit a crafted ICO image whose data_size wraps the allocation in vips/icoload.c, corrupting heap memory to crash the process or achieve code execution.
imgproxy from 4.0.0 before 4.0.16 contains an integer overflow in the ICO loader that allows remote attackers to trigger a heap buffer overflow via a crafted data_size value. Attackers can submit a crafted ICO image whose data_size wraps the allocation in vips/icoload.c, corrupting heap memory to crash the process or achieve code execution.
imgproxy from 4.0.0 before 4.0.16 contains an integer overflow in the ICO loader that allows remote attackers to trigger a heap buffer overflow via a crafted data_size value. Attackers can submit a crafted ICO image whose data_size wraps the allocation in vips/icoload.c, corrupting heap memory to crash the process or achieve code execution.
## Summary
The ICO loader allocates `data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN` bytes after reading a 32-bit attacker-controlled `data_size`. For `data_size > UINT32_MAX - BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN`, the addition wraps before allocation. imgproxy then writes the ICO prefix and reads up to the original declared size starting 14 bytes into the undersized allocation. A network client can turn this heap overflow into remote denial of service or remote code execution.
## Technical details
The vulnerable path is in [`vips/icoload.c` at commit `f4fedbb`](https://github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/blob/f4fedbb5c7f6684e7a8e0a9bb7e666773f3c40c0/vips/icoload.c#L154-L164):
```c
uint32_t data_size = GUINT32_FROM_LE(largest_image_header.data_size);
VipsPel *data = (VipsPel *) VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN);
void *actual_data = data + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
if (vips_foreign_load_read_full(ico->source, actual_data, data_size) <= 0) {
vips_error("vips_foreign_load_ico_header", "unable to read ICO image data from the source");
return -1;
}
```
The crafted directory entry contains:
```text
data_size = 0xfffffff5 (4294967285)
data_offset = 22
BMP header size = 14
32-bit result = (0xfffffff5 + 14) mod 2^32 = 3
```
The allocation is therefore three bytes. `actual_data` points 14 bytes after the allocation base. The fixture contains 64 bytes after the ICO header, so the source callback copies those 64 bytes to an invalid destination before it can report that the declared multi-gigabyte payload is incomplete.
The complete source-to-sink path is:
1. Attacker-controlled bytes begin with the ICO magic `00 00 01 00`.
2. imgproxy identifies the source as ICO and dispatches it to `vips_icoload_source_go`.
3. `vips_foreign_load_ico_header` reads the attacker-controlled `data_size`.
4. The 32-bit addition wraps, and `VIPS_MALLOC` receives the value three.
5. `vips_foreign_load_read_full` passes the original `data_size` to the Go source callback.
6. The callback writes the available source bytes through the invalid pointer, corrupting the process heap.
## Impact
A crafted image can terminate the imgproxy process handling it or potentially lead to remote code execution due to heap corruption.
imgproxy has integer overflow in imgproxy ICO loader that causes denial of service and may permit remote code execution in github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:38 AM
dateUpdated: Nov 9, 2026, 1:41:54 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-122
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-08T02:16:56.983
lastModified: 2026-11-12T21:35:47.960
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.