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sipsorcery · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by SIPSorcery 10.0.14KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-123805

Published

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the corresponding entries fit the declared chunk length. A negotiated WebRTC peer can send a checksum-valid malformed SACK chunk that drives the parser beyond the 262144-byte receive buffer. The resulting IndexOutOfRangeException bypasses the recoverable ApplicationException handler in RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive, causing the generic handler to exit the dedicated receive loop and permanently terminate the SCTP association and all data channels. This issue is fixed in 10.0.14.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-120398

Published

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the corresponding entries fit the declared chunk length. A negotiated WebRTC peer can send a checksum-valid malformed SACK chunk that drives the parser beyond the 262144-byte receive buffer. The resulting IndexOutOfRangeException bypasses the recoverable ApplicationException handler in RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive, causing the generic handler to exit the dedicated receive loop and permanently terminate the SCTP association and all data channels. This issue is fixed in 10.0.14.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-123805

Published

SIPSorcery is a WebRTC, SIP, and VoIP library for C# and .NET. Prior to 10.0.14, SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk reads the numGapAckBlocks and numDuplicateTSNs fields from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk without checking that the corresponding entries fit the declared chunk length. A negotiated WebRTC peer can send a checksum-valid malformed SACK chunk that drives the parser beyond the 262144-byte receive buffer. The resulting IndexOutOfRangeException bypasses the recoverable ApplicationException handler in RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive, causing the generic handler to exit the dedicated receive loop and permanently terminate the SCTP association and all data channels. This issue is fixed in 10.0.14.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-jwjp-4649-v8jp

Published

## Summary `SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk` reads the `numGapAckBlocks` and `numDuplicateTSNs` fields (each up to 65535) directly from an attacker-controlled SCTP SACK chunk and loops that many times reading 4 bytes per iteration, with no validation of the counts against the chunk length or the receive buffer. A single crafted SACK chunk from a negotiated WebRTC peer forces reads past the end of the 262144-byte receive buffer, raising `IndexOutOfRangeException`, which is not caught by the recoverable handler and terminates the dedicated SCTP receive thread — permanently killing the SCTP association and all data channels. ## Root Cause `src/SIPSorcery/net/SCTP/Chunks/SctpSackChunk.cs`: - `ushort numGapAckBlocks = NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, startPosn + 8);` (:141) - `ushort numDuplicateTSNs = NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, startPosn + 10);` (:142) - gap-ack loop (:146) and duplicate-TSN loop (:154) index the buffer via `NetConvert.ParseUInt16/32` (`buffer[posn]`, no bounds check — `sys/Net/NetConvert.cs:30,41`). `SctpPacket.ParseChunks` (SctpPacket.cs:195-203) only validates `chunkLength >= 4` and `posn+chunkLength <= length`; the counts inside the value are never checked. `RTCSctpTransport.DoReceive` calls `SctpPacket.Parse(recvBuffer, 0, bytesRead)` on a reused `recvBuffer = new byte[262144]`. ## Impact `IndexOutOfRangeException` is a `SystemException`, not `ApplicationException`, so the recoverable `catch (ApplicationException) { … continue; }` at RTCSctpTransport.cs:345 is skipped and control falls to the generic `catch (Exception) { … break; }` at :356. The `break` exits the receive loop, `DoReceive` returns, and the dedicated `_receiveThread = new Thread(DoReceive)` (:173, started once) exits with no restart → the SCTP association and every data channel are permanently dead (denial of service). ## Proof of Concept A negotiated WebRTC peer (post-DTLS) sends a checksum-valid SCTP packet: 12-byte common header + a SACK chunk (type 3) with `chunkLength=16`, `numGapAckBlocks=0xFFFF`, `numDuplicateTSNs=0xFFFF`. CRC32C is attacker-computable. The gap-ack loop reaches `buffer[262144]` on a 262144-byte array (valid indices 0..262143) → `IndexOutOfRangeException`. ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: post-DTLS negotiated peer sends a checksum-valid SCTP packet with a SACK chunk (`chunkLength=16`, `numGapAckBlocks=0xFFFF`). Guard: `VerifyChecksum` (CRC32C). Bypass: CRC32C is computable by the sender. 2. Processing: `DoReceive` (RTCSctpTransport.cs:286) reads into reused `recvBuffer` (262144 bytes, :280) → `SctpPacket.Parse(recvBuffer, 0, bytesRead)` (:302) → `ParseChunks` → SACK dispatch (`SctpChunk.Parse` :340-341) → `SctpSackChunk.ParseChunk`. Guard: `ParseChunks` checks only `chunkLength>=4` and `posn+chunkLength<=length` (SctpPacket.cs:195-203). Bypass: `chunkLength=16` is well-formed; the counts are never validated. 3. Sink: gap-ack loop (SctpSackChunk.cs:146) calls `NetConvert.ParseUInt16(buffer, reportPosn)` with `reportPosn` starting at `startPosn(16)+FIXED_PARAMETERS(12)=28`, climbing `+4` each iteration. Guard: none on the count. Bypass: `NetConvert.ParseUInt16` (NetConvert.cs:30) indexes `buffer[posn]` unchecked. 4. Impact: at iteration 65529, `reportPosn = 28 + 65529*4 = 262144` → `buffer[262144]` → `IndexOutOfRangeException` → generic `catch` at RTCSctpTransport.cs:356 → `break` → receive thread exits, no restart → association permanently dead. ## Bypass Evidence - Unchecked counts at SctpSackChunk.cs:141-142; loops at :146,:154. - `NetConvert.ParseUInt16` unchecked indexing (NetConvert.cs:30). - `ParseChunks` validates only `chunkLength` (SctpPacket.cs:195-203). - OOB math: `28 + 65535*4 = 262168 > 262144`; buffer is 262144 (`DEFAULT_ADVERTISED_RECEIVE_WINDOW`, SctpAssociation.cs:62). `numGapAckBlocks` alone suffices — the dup-TSN loop is not needed. - `DoReceive` catch split: recoverable `catch(ApplicationException)` at :345 (`continue`) vs generic `catch(Exception)` at :356 (`break`); `_receiveThread` started once at :176. ## Affected Versions `nuget:SIPSorcery <= 10.0.13` (verified present on release tag v10.0.13 and HEAD da944543). ## Dedup NOT a duplicate of GHSA-qmvg-569h-hqrh — that fix (`fe5a1fa`) touched only `SctpPacket.cs` (the chunk-cursor zero-length infinite loop, CWE-835). This is a distinct out-of-bounds read (CWE-125) in `SctpSackChunk` count loops, untouched by that fix. ## Suggested Fix Validate `startPosn + FIXED_PARAMETERS_LENGTH + numGapAckBlocks*4 + numDuplicateTSNs*4 <= posn + chunkLen` before the loops, and/or make `NetConvert.Parse*` bounds-checked, and/or treat `IndexOutOfRangeException`/`ArgumentException` as recoverable in `DoReceive`. --- Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-123805

Published

sipsorcery

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "sipsorcery-org",
                    "product": "sipsorcery",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 10.0.14",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-120398

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 9, 2026, 7:57:35 PM

dateUpdated: Nov 12, 2026, 6:05:10 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-123805

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-125 · CWE-755

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-11-09T20:18:10.173

lastModified: 2026-11-12T19:16:51.623

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-jwjp-4649-v8jp

Published

SIPSorcery

NuGet

ECOSYSTEM · introduced 0 → fixed 10.0.14

115 versions listed as affected

1.3.0-PRE, 1.3.1, 1.4.0, 1.4.1, 1.5.0, 1.5.2, 1.5.3, 1.5.5, 1.5.6, 1.6.0, 1.6.1, 1.6.2, 10.0.1, 10.0.10, 10.0.11, 10.0.12, 10.0.13, 10.0.2, 10.0.3, 10.0.4-pre, 10.0.5, 10.0.6, 10.0.7, 10.0.8, 10.0.9, 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 3.0.0, 3.0.1, 3.0.2, 3.0.3, 3.0.4, 3.1.0, 3.2.0, 3.3.0, 3.4.0, 3.5.0, 3.6.0, 4.0.0-rc, 4.0.1-rc, 4.0.13-pre, 4.0.2-rc, 4.0.28-pre, 4.0.29-pre, 4.0.3-rc, 4.0.30-pre, 4.0.31-pre, 4.0.32-pre, 4.0.33-pre, 4.0.34-pre, 4.0.35-pre, 4.0.4-rc, 4.0.40-pre, 4.0.41-pre, 4.0.42-pre, 4.0.43-pre, 4.0.44-pre, 4.0.45-pre, 4.0.46-pre, 4.0.47-pre, 4.0.49-pre, 4.0.50-pre, 4.0.51-pre, 4.0.55-pre, 4.0.58-pre, 4.0.59-pre, 4.0.60-pre, 4.0.7-rc, 4.0.8-rc, 5.1.0, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.4-pre, 5.1.5-pre, 5.1.6-pre, 5.1.7-pre, 5.1.8-pre, 5.2.0, 5.2.3, 5.3.0-pre, 5.3.3-pre, 6.0.1-pre, 6.0.11, 6.0.12, 6.0.2, 6.0.3, 6.0.4, 6.0.6, 6.0.7, 6.0.8, 6.0.9, 6.1.0-pre, 6.1.1-pre, 6.2.0, 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 8.0.0, 8.0.1, 8.0.10, 8.0.11, 8.0.12, 8.0.13, 8.0.14, 8.0.15-pre, 8.0.20-pre, 8.0.21-pre, 8.0.22, 8.0.23, 8.0.3, 8.0.4, 8.0.5, 8.0.6, 8.0.7, 8.0.9

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ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 18 Nov 19:58 UTC · 272 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current