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pgEdge RAG Server shared keyword index leaked results between concurrent unauthenticated requests

CVSS 3.1 5.9 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 5.9 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.9 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/pgEdge/pgedge-rag-server 1.0.1-0.20260729020411-a09d4872356bKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-125325

Published

pgEdge RAG Server is an API server for retrieval-augmented generation over PostgreSQL content using pgvector. Prior to 2.0.0, the BM25 keyword index is a single per-pipeline object shared by the unauthenticated query endpoint, and concurrent requests lock its clear, refill, and search operations separately. This allows one request to search a corpus populated through another request's search filter, which can return documents belonging to a different tenant or customer without malformed input. The affected responses cannot be identified retrospectively from the server logs. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-121707

Published

pgEdge RAG Server is an API server for retrieval-augmented generation over PostgreSQL content using pgvector. Prior to 2.0.0, the BM25 keyword index is a single per-pipeline object shared by the unauthenticated query endpoint, and concurrent requests lock its clear, refill, and search operations separately. This allows one request to search a corpus populated through another request's search filter, which can return documents belonging to a different tenant or customer without malformed input. The affected responses cannot be identified retrospectively from the server logs. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-125325

Published

pgEdge RAG Server is an API server for retrieval-augmented generation over PostgreSQL content using pgvector. Prior to 2.0.0, the BM25 keyword index is a single per-pipeline object shared by the unauthenticated query endpoint, and concurrent requests lock its clear, refill, and search operations separately. This allows one request to search a corpus populated through another request's search filter, which can return documents belonging to a different tenant or customer without malformed input. The affected responses cannot be identified retrospectively from the server logs. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-w437-9mwm-j6vq

Published

### Impact Documents belonging to one caller could be returned to another. Where an application passes a customer or tenant identifier as a search filter, that scoping could be defeated by ordinary concurrent traffic. **No injection and no malformed input are required** — normal load is enough. The BM25 keyword index was a single per-pipeline object shared by every request. A request cleared it, refilled it from its own filtered corpus and then searched it, taking a separate lock for each step rather than holding the sequence as a unit. Concurrent requests therefore interleaved, and a search could run against a corpus that a different request's filter had populated. **Who is affected:** any deployment of pgEdge RAG Server at `1.0.0` or earlier, including all alpha and beta pre-releases, that serves concurrent queries — most acutely those relying on a search filter to separate tenants or customers. The query endpoint is unauthenticated in the affected versions (`internal/server/middleware.go:37` applies logging, panic recovery and optional CORS only), so both the party whose results leak and the party receiving them are anonymous remote callers. ### Patches **Fixed in `2.0.0`. Upgrade to `2.0.0` or later.** The index is now built per request rather than shared. The regression is pinned by `TestSearch_ConcurrentRequestsDoNotShareKeywordIndex` in `internal/pipeline/orchestrator_test.go`. **Upgrading does not tell a developer whether or not their application affected, and needs action beyond upgrading.** If a consuminag application scopes results by tenant, treat responses served under concurrent load on any affected version as potentially having included another tenant's documents. **Affected responses cannot be identified from the server's own logs**, so there is no retrospective check available. ### Workarounds Set `hybrid_enabled: false` on the pipeline, which skips the keyword arm and with it the shared index. Callers can also pass `disable_hybrid` per request, which can only ever turn the arm off. Neither is a substitute for upgrading.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

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CVE-2026-125325 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-121707

GHSA-w437-9mwm-j6vq

cve-program · CVE-2026-125325

euvd · EUVD-2026-121707

nvd · CVE-2026-125325

osv · GHSA-w437-9mwm-j6vq

Related changes

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