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Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant…

CVSS 3.1 · ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 9.8 CRITICALCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 25 Oct 2026 05:17:25 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

nvd · CVE-2026-1525

Published

Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire. Who is impacted: * Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization Potential consequences: * Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

nvd · CVE-2026-1525

Published

Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length val…

Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire. Who is impacted: * Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization Potential consequences: * Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-444

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-03-12T20:16:02.670

lastModified: 2026-06-17T10:15:59.927

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:nodejs:undici:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
12 Mar 2026 20:16:02 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 10:15:59 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 05:17:25 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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